being just what they are, we must choose as we do! This constitutes our freedom exactly at this
point: we do what we most want. So, compatibilist freedom commends itself to me both
because it alone accords with divine sovereignty and fits Scriptures teaching about divine-
human concurrence of action, but it also explains and accounts for human choice and action
where libertarianism simply cannot do so.
Fourth, the mechanism by which we conceive of Gods control over and supervision of
fashion, causing particular events and actions to occur (e.g, creation, regeneration), but the other
of which works in an indirect and permissive manner, allowing human activities or natural
conditions to proceed as they are, all the while able to change those if what he sees would come
from them stands in conflict to his wise and good purposes (e.g., the regular functioning of the
laws of nature, ongoing unbelief and rejection of Christ by the non-elect). Perhaps we could call
the first manner of divine activity "direct-causative" divine action and the second, "indirect-
permissive" divine action. Notice that the second kind of divine action is not, in fact, inaction;
i.e., it properly is "action." Why? Simply because, as Paul Helm makes clear in his volume on
the Providence of God, this form of permissive divine will is one in which God permits
specifically and only those aspects of the natural order or human actions which he could, were he
to choose to, prevent. And, since he permits specifically and only what he could prevent,
therefore he actively chooses to allow just these items when he is fully capable of having brought
about others instead.
Having made clear this distinction, the main point, however, is that Gods control
reluctant to embrace the "permissive will of God" simply rejects one of the very conceptual tools
necessary to account for Gods moral innocence in regard to evil. Surely, more is needed than
just this manner of the divine activity, but I dont see how we can proceed if Gods sovereign
dealings in matters of good and evil are, in fact, symmetrical.
Fifth, this indirect-permissive divine action functions with human compatibilist freedom,
Calvinist version of middle knowledge. Ill call it "compatibilist middle knowledge," knowledge
of what compatibilistically free creatures would do, which is middle between Gods knowledge
of merely what could be and of specifically what will be. Both Terrance Tiessen and John Frame
have, in recent years urged this concept, even if not with the same terminology. I agree fully
with these men and others who argue that Molinist middle knowledge, predicated on libertarian
human freedom, is not possible. How can God know what a free agent would do in some state of
affairs if, all things being just what they are, the agent can do A or A? Knowing and controlling
the circumstances in which free creatures act only exerts control over the range of possible
choices, but in no way does it indicate just what choice would in fact be made. And, as seen
earlier, since these libertarian free choices have no choice-specific reasons for them, neither God
nor the agent could know why he chooses what he does. How, then, is God to know what an
agent would choose?