actions or choices which a person would or would not do, but (for Boyd, and contrary to
Molinism) this requires that such future actions are done from ones nature in such a way that
they are performed without libertarian freedom, i.e., they could not have been done differently.
But given all that open theists (and other advocates of libertarian freedom) have said about the
moral bankruptcy of actions performed that could not have been different, I fail to see how Boyd
finds this a helpful category (within his openness structure). Do not the actions to which would-
counterfactuals refer reduce to determined actions? If so, and given the rhetoric of libertarianism,
how does moral accountability attach to them?
For example, when Boyd applies this understanding to Peters denial of Christ, Boyd
kind such that "he would be the kind of person who would deny Christ in a certain situation."
from determinism. If Peter, because of previous free choices (in which he could have chosen
differently), now is faced with a situation in which he cannot but make this one choice, on what
grounds (on standards of libertarian freedom) does Boyd suggest we should hold Peter
accountable for what he does in this moment? And how does this appeal to a crystallized
character in Peter account for Jesus telling Peter that after his denials, "when you have turned
again, strengthen your brothers" (Luke 22:32), since evidently Peter is only "the kind of person
who would deny Christ" at one moment, but later he has changed? Furthermore, what happens
to the notion that people can perform totally unexpected actions or make shocking decisions, as
when we speak of someone "acting out of character"? It appears that again here, Boyd has
delivered less than his rhetoric might suggest. What his "would-counterfactuals" turn out to be is
simply a microcosm of determinate actions and choices, whether these are determined by God or
by the persons character being such that he will make only this decision and not another. So, in
the end, Boyds "might-counterfactuals" are merely a subset of Gods knowledge storehouse of
all logically possible states of affairs, and Boyds "would-counterfactuals" are merely a subset of
previously determined actions and choices. It appears that nothing has been gained by appeal to
these notions, and certainly they cannot help deal with Gods regulation of the world.
this, open theists have raised questions which have caused theologians in a variety of traditions
to consider afresh how they conceive of Gods relationship to the world, to moral agents, and to
his people in particular. As one involved in this re-thinking process, allow me to provide a brief
sketch of some of the central elements of a model I would commend.
9:6-26; and Eph 1:11 lead me to conclude that the God of the Bible, the true and living God, has
ultimate and specific (or exact, or precise, or detailed, or meticulous) control over all that occurs.