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definite foreknowledge is misdirected. The logical possibility of might-counterfactual
knowledge (or of exhaustive definite foreknowledge) offers no proof whatsoever for Gods in
fact having might-counterfactual knowledge (or exhaustive definite foreknowledge) in this, the
actual world. The fact is, both kinds of divine knowledge are possible, and so which is true in
relation to the real world must be determined by looking elsewhere, and presumably the most
important place to look is what God reveals about the nature of his own knowledge as given us in
Scripture.

Consider yet another way to see this point. Is it logically possible for God to lie? We

must be careful how we answer this question. Clearly it is impossible for God to lie (e.g., Titus
1:2; Heb. 6:18), but is this impossibility a logical impossibility? No, the reason God cannot lie is
not that it is logically impossible for him so to do, but rather that his character and nature are
such that God is always truthful. So, the impossibility of Gods lying is not logical but
ontological.

Now, what if this is also the case with Gods omniscience? What if it is logically possible

for God to know might-counterfactuals, but it is ontologically necessary that God (as omniscient)
know what free creatures actually would and will do? More simply, what if God, as God (i.e.,
qua omniscient), simply must know the future definitely and exhaustively? If so, while God may
know might-counterfactuals as a logical possibility (much as he knows ,,God lying as a logical
possibility), God also must possess exhaustive definite foreknowledge by virtue of the nature of
his omniscience, i.e., as an ontological necessity. Boyds assertion that "the very fact that might-
counterfactuals are not self-contradictory (necessarily false) proves that God does not by
definition have exhaustively definite foreknowledge" simply does not follow. All that Boyd has
shown by "might-counterfactuals" is that since these are logically possible states of affairs (much
like "unicorns existing" or "God lying" are logically possible states of affairs), God knows these
as logically possible. What Boyd fails to show is that 1) in fact God possesses such might-
counterfactual knowledge regarding the real world, or that 2) possessing knowledge of might-
counterfactuals as logically possible precludes Gods also possessing exhaustive definite
knowledge about the real world as factually true or, stronger, as an ontological necessity of his
omniscient divine nature. Boyds discussion misleads the reader to think that might-
counterfactual knowledge as logically possible entails Gods actual knowledge of might-
counterfactuals in the real world and the actual denial of Gods exhaustive definite
foreknowledge. Boyds argument here, simply, is mistaken.

For recent biblical defenses of Gods exhaustive and definite knowledge of the future that are cognizant of open

theisms denial of this doctrine, see Bruce A. Ware, God's Lesser Glory: the Diminished God of Open Theism
(Wheaton, Ill: Crossway, 2000), 99-141; John S. Feinberg, No One Like Him: The Doctrine of God (Wheaton, Ill.:
Crossway, 2001), 299-320; John M. Frame, No Other God: A Response to Open Theism (Phillipsburg, N.J.:
Presbyterian & Reformed, 2001), 191-203; John M. Frame, The Doctrine of God (Phillipsburg, N.J.: Presbyterian &
Reformed, 2002), 479-505; and William Lane Craig, "What Does God Know?" in God Under Fire: Modern
Scholarship Reinvents God, eds. Douglas S. Huffman and Eric L. Johnson (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 2002),
137-156.

This is much the same reason why it is impossible for human beings, unassisted, to breathe underwater, or fly to

the tops of trees, or run the mile in fifteen seconds--none of these is logically impossible, but all are ontological
impossibilities for human beings, given the natures we have.