logically possible situation. Giving this subset of Gods knowledge of possible states of affairs
the name "might-counterfactuals" may sound impressive, but it advances our understanding of
Gods knowledge not at all.
Boyds category of "might-counterfactuals" is misleading for at least two reasons. First,
proof) that God can know what a libertarianly free creature would do, and that God can have
exhaustive definite foreknowledge. That is, when Boyd asserts that it is logically possible for
God to know what free creatures might or might not do, he intends to say that whenever God
knows such might-counterfactual knowledge, he cannot also know what those same free
creatures would do or will do in those same states of affairs. These are mutually exclusive
realities. Recall his words above, "If it is true that agent x might or might not do y in situation z,
it is false that agent x would do y in situation z, and vice versa."
situation z, either what the agent might or might not do or (but not and) what the agent would or
would not do, Boyd nonetheless does not prove that God in fact has such might-counterfactual
knowledge in regard to the real world. He seems to think that if such knowledge is logically
possible, then God must know the world in fact to be this way. But this clearly is not the case.
Does not God know the logical possibility of unicorns while also knowing in fact that they do
not exist? So, Boyd is false and misleading when he asserts, "Indeed, the very fact that might-
counterfactuals are not self-contradictory (necessarily false) proves that God does not by
definition have exhaustively definite foreknowledge."
God neither would determine all that would be nor does he have would-counterfactual
knowledge (i.e., he knows what free creatures might or might not do in all worlds where might-
counterfactual knowledge pertains), he may also know in fact and exhaustively what all free
creatures would do and will do in this, the actual world. Essentially, Boyd misleads his readers
into thinking that if might-counterfactuals are logically possible, God must know these to be true
about the actual world. However, as we know, this is not the case for unicorns, and it is also not
necessarily the case for might-counterfactuals.
Another way to see this is to ask, Is it logically possible for God to create a world in
proponent who would answer no. And regardless, this obviously is a logically possible state of
affairs. But then, should we make the reverse point from Boyds, and claim that ,,the very fact
that exhaustive definite foreknowledge is not self-contradictory (necessarily false) proves that
God does not by definition have might-counterfactual knowledge? Of course not, because we
recognize some possible worlds are ones where God has might-counterfactual knowledge, and
others are ones where God has exhaustive definite foreknowledge. Therefore, to assert that the
mere logical possibility of might-counterfactual knowledge proves God does not have exhaustive
follows.