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4
This view of freedom is set over against a compatibilist or soft determinist view.
7
In a
compatibilist approach, human actions are viewed as causally determined, yet free. In other
words, in contrast to a libertarian view, a compatibilist view of freedom perceives the human
will as decisively and sufficiently inclined toward one option as opposed to another, yet it is still
free as long as the following requirements are met: "(1) The immediate cause of the action is a
desire, wish, or intention internal to the agent, (2) no external event or circumstances compels
the action to be performed, and (3) the agent could have acted differently if he had chosen to."
8
If these three conditions are met, then even though human actions are determined, they may still
be considered free. John Feinberg summarizes this view well when he states, "if the agent acts
in accord with causes and reasons that serve as a sufficient condition for his doing the act, and if
the causes do not force him to act contrary to his wishes, then a soft determinist would say that
he acts freely."
9
Open theists reject this view of freedom and they do so quite strongly.
10

Divine Sovereignty and Human Freedom

How, then, does open theism conceive of the divine sovereignty-human freedom
relationship given its commitment to libertarianism? How do open theists view the relationship
between a libertarian view of human freedom and God's sovereign rule over the affairs of
humanity? Most open theists, if not all of them, tend to "limit" God's sovereignty in some sense.
Now it must quickly be added that by the use of the word "limit" I am not necessarily using the
word in a pejorative or negative sense. Instead, "limit" is being used in the sense that God freely
chooses to limit himself by virtue of the fact that he has chosen to create a certain kind of world,
that is, a world that contains human beings with libertarian freedom. In this sense, then, "limit"
does not refer to a weakness or imperfection in God; rather it refers to a self-imposed limitation
that is part of his plan, not a violation of it.
11
7
Even though compatibilism or soft determinism is a view of human freedom that fits under the broad category of
determinism, it is important to distinguish it from the concept of "hard" determinism found in the natural sciences
and from the concept of fatalism. For more on these distinctions see John S. Feinberg, "God Ordains All Things," in
Predestination and Free Will, eds. David Basinger and Randall Basinger (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1986),
21-26 and No One Like Him: The Doctrine of God (Wheaton: Crossway Books, 2001), 625-42; Richard Taylor,
"Determinism," in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 2, ed. Paul Edwards (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 359-73.
For more on compatibilism in general see Paul Helm, Eternal God (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 157-58 and
The Providence of God (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1994).
8
Michael Peterson, et al. Reason & Religious Belief, 59. Also see John Feinberg, "God Ordains All Things," 26-28.
9
John S. Feinberg, "Divine Causality and Evil: Is There Anything Which God Does Not Do?" Christian Scholar's
Review 16 (1987), 400.
10
See for example, Sanders, God Who Risks, 220-224; Basinger, Case for Free Will Theism, 21-37.
11
On the issue of "limit" in regard to divine sovereignty see the helpful article by John Frame, "The Spirit and the
Scriptures," in Hermeneutics, Authority, and Canon, 217-35. For an example of the outworking of this view in
relation to divine sovereignty and libertarianism see Jack Cottrell, "The Nature of Divine Sovereignty," in The
Grace of God and the Will of Man: The Case for Arminianism, ed. Clark H. Pinnock (Grand Rapids: Zondervan,
1989), 108-10.