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for God to make a mistake in predicting the future, a possibility that presentism must allow, then
it is not only impossible to uphold the biblical criterion of a test of a true prophet, but it is also
impossible to maintain that God can guarantee that his promises and predictions will come to
pass. No doubt, one could still argue that it is possible that God just happened to predict
everything correctly and that the biblical authors just happened to write everything that God
wanted them to write. But that appeal is certainly quite different than asserting that God can
guarantee that what he predicts will come true.
Third, it must be admitted that in some cases God does unilaterally act irrespective of
human decision. However, there are a good number of prophecies that convey God's intentions
of what will certainly occur through the means of future human actions. Certainly the major
redemptive events of Scripture, such as the death of Christ, involved the free actions of
individuals to crucify Jesus (see Acts 2:23; 4:23-30). It will not do to reduce this event merely to
God's purposes and intentions irrespective of human actions. Yes, God declared that Jesus was
going to die, but he also declared the manner of his death and the intricate details concerning all
those humans who would freely be a part of his death in the precise fulfillment of OT Scripture.
In the case of the cross, it requires much more than God's general knowledge and strategies of
the future. Instead it requires nothing less than God's detailed foreknowledge.
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But how can
God predict such an event, given the intertwined views of libertarianism and presentism?
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What, then, should we conclude about the relationship between the openness proposal
regarding divine omniscience and the doctrine of Scripture? Does the proposal uphold or
undermine a high view of Scripture or does it have very little impact? It would seem that the
openness proposal does have some very significant implications for one's doctrine of Scripture.
Two points need to be made in this regard. First, even though it is logically possible for
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D. A. Carson states it this way: "It will not do to analyze what happened as an instance where wicked agents
performed an evil deed, and then God intervened to turn it into good, for in that case the cross itself becomes an
afterthought in the mind of God, a mere reactive tactic. All of Scripture is against the notion. The Biblical theology
of sacrifice, the passover lamb, the specifications for yom kippur, the priestly/sacrificial system all together
anticipate and predict, according to the NT authors, the ultimate sacrifice, the sacrifice of the ultimate lamb of God.
But neither will it do to reduce the guilt of the conspirators because God remained in charge. If there is no guilt
attaching to those who were immediately responsible for sending Jesus to the cross, why should one think that there
is guilt attaching to any action performed under the sovereignty of God? And in that case, of course, we do not need
any atonement for guilt: The cross is superfluous and useless" ("God, the Bible, and Spiritual Warfare: A Review
Article" Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 42:2 [1999], 263).
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William Craig has some helpful comments on this point. He states, "Explanation (1) [the idea that prophecy can
be explained in terms of God's announcement of what he intends to do] is useful only in accounting for God's
knowledge of events which he himself will bring about. But the Scripture provides many examples of divine
foreknowledge of events which God does not directly cause, events which are the result of free human actions. And
even in prophecies concerning God's own actions, foreknowledge of free human actions is sometimes presupposed.
For example, when God speaks of using Cyrus to subdue the nations (Isa 44:28-45:1), God's intention presupposes
his foreknowledge that such a person shall in fact come to exist at the proper time and place and be in a position to
serve as God's instrument. To respond that God brings about all these details as well would be to deny the very
human freedom which the view we are discussing wants to affirm" (The Only Wise God, 43-44). On some similar
points see the helpful discussions in John Frame, No Other God, 198-203; John Feinberg, No One Like Him, 767-75.