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only their own work but also God's work."
46
On the other hand, when we do come across an
apparent contradiction or problem in Scripture, do we then admit that it is an error? For after all,
given libertarianism, it may be true that it is logically possible to affirm inerrancy, but the
probability of it is so low that we have no overwhelming reason to think that the apparent
problem is not really an error after all. And if we move in this direction, can Scripture then serve
as its own self-attesting authority by which we evaluate all theological proposals?
47

Indeed, these are serious implications for one's view of Scripture given open theism's
understanding of the sovereignty-freedom relationship. But, someone might object, could not
this challenge also be raised against other evangelicals who hold to a view of divine sovereignty
that incorporates a libertarian view of human freedom, and not just the viewpoint of open
theism? Is it only the open theist who succumbs to this kind of problem? Do not all those who
maintain a libertarianism also face the same dilemma? My answer is both yes and no. Yes, in
the sense that it is very difficult for any libertarian position to argue consistently how God can
guarantee that what he wants written is written freely by human authors. But no, in the
important sense that traditional evangelicals who are committed to libertarianism are also
committed to exhaustive divine foreknowledge of future free human actions which allows them
to maintain simultaneously libertarian freedom and the guarantee necessary in order to uphold a
high view of Scripture. An excellent example of this approach is that of William Craig.

In a recent article, Craig appeals to the theory of middle knowledge as the means by which
he reconciles his commitment to libertarianism and the doctrine of inerrancy.
48
Even though I do
not take this approach myself and instead opt for a compatibilist solution, Craig does
demonstrate cogently that there is a way to reconcile libertarianism and inerrancy.
49
But it is
important to stress that this is not an option `open' to open theists. And thus, the openness
proposal faces some serious problems, especially in regard to how God can guarantee what he
intends to be written, through the free agency of human authors. How, in the end, is open theism
able to rationally explain how both God and the human author are active in the process of
inspiration and that the final result is exactly what God intended? It would seem that the
46
Packer, `Fundamentalism' and the Word of God, 80.
47
On the issue of the self-attestation of Scripture see John M. Frame, "Scripture Speaks For Itself," in God's
Inerrant Word, ed. John W. Montgomery (Minneapolis: Bethany House, 1974), 178-200.
48
William L. Craig, "Men Moved By the Holy Spirit Spoke From God" (2 Peter 1:21): A Middle Knowledge
Perspective on Biblical Inspiration" Philosophia Christi. Series 2, 1:1 (1999), 45-82.
49
The problem I have with middle knowledge is that I do not think it can get off the ground in terms of an
explanation. Middle knowledge depends upon the notion that God knows what we would freely do, not just could
do, were we placed in different circumstances, and on the basis of that knowledge, God then freely decides to
actualize one of those worlds known to him through this middle knowledge. But given libertarianism, I do not see
how God can know, even counterfactually, what we would do if we can always choose otherwise. Hence, in the end,
I do not think middle knowledge will be able to deliver what it promises. For similar critiques of middle knowledge
at this point see Paul Helm, The Providence of God, 55-61; J. A. Crabtree, "Does Middle Knowledge Solve the
Problem of Divine Sovereignty?" in The Grace of God, The Bondage of the Will. Vol 2. eds. Thomas Schreiner and
Bruce Ware (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1995) 429-457; John Feinberg, The Many Faces of Evil, 89-90.