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individual would always freely choose in every situation to perform the exact action God
desired. But if God could have brought it about that every instance of moral evil was
freely not performed, then we must conclude that God is directly responsible for each
instance of moral evil in the world and the free will defence fails. In short, the free will
defence can only work ­ i.e., divine responsibility for the actuality of moral evil in the
world can only be absolved ­ by denying that God can totally control free creatures, that
is, by denying premise (2).
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Given the fact that the FWD is bound up with the acceptance of libertarianism (and its particular
construal of divine sovereignty), it should now be quite evident why an adoption of the FWD is
incompatible with (2). Premise (2) assumes that God can infallibly guarantee that human beings
will perform the specific actions he desires without violating their freedom, whereas
libertarianism denies this possibility. Thus, the Basingers conclude their article with the
following dilemma: either affirm (2) and thus inerrancy, but at the cost of making God
responsible for all the moral evil in the world; or adopt the use of the FWD, thus absolving God
of any responsibility for evil, but at the cost of rejecting (2) and thus being "left with the
seemingly impossible task of showing how God could perfectly control what the biblical writers
uttered without removing their freedom."
39

How are we to evaluate the Basingers' argument? Two points need to be emphasized.
First, the Basingers's argument is reductionistic. Why? Because there are more options
available to us than what they seem to allow. For example, the FWD is not the only way to
absolve God of the responsibility for evil in the world. No doubt, for a person who embraces a
libertarian view of human freedom, the FWD is a logically consistent and an attractive option.
Nonetheless, it is not the only defense available to a libertarian,
40
nor is it the only defense that is
available to other theological viewpoints that do not embrace libertarianism.
41
Moreover, along
a similar line and more importantly for our purposes, the Basingers are reductionistic in
presenting libertarianism as the only option for a defender of inerrancy. Even though it is
outside the purpose of this paper, I would argue that a person such as myself who adopts a view
of divine sovereignty that incorporates a compatibilistic understanding of human freedom, is
able to affirm premise (2) without contradiction, and thus, defend a high view of Scripture.

38
Ibid. On this same point cf. Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), 166-67.
39
Ibid., 180.
40
On this point see John S. Feinberg, The Many Faces of Evil (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1994) 111-23. However,
regardless of which way a libertarian attempts to solve the problem of evil, it is still true that if one adopts
libertarianism, there is a problem with holding premise (2).
41
See John Feinberg's defense of a compatibilistic theological position in The Many Faces of Evil, 124-55. Also see
John Frame, Apologetics to the Glory of God (Phillipsburg: Presbyterian & Reformed, 1994), 149-90; Greg Bahnsen,
Always Ready (Texarkana: Covenant Media Foundation, 1996), 163-75.