2
libertarian freedom is to open theism, so equally central and essential is its denial of exhaustive
divine foreknowledge.
Now, why is Pinnock right to raise this question about the openness understanding of
divine foreknowledge, in particular? Two answers are needed. First, it is precisely here, in open
theism's denial of exhaustive divine foreknowledge, that the open view has separated itself from
classical Arminianism specifically and from all versions of classical theism generally. Let's be
clear about this: some of open theism's most basic and fundamental theological commitments are
held in common with the entirety of the classical tradition.
4
For example, openness proponents
could not be clearer in rejecting the process model of a co-eternal and interdependent God-world
relationship in favor of a strong commitment to the classical doctrines of God's aseity, the divine
self-sufficiency, and creatio ex nihilo.
5
And, some other of open theism's most basic and
fundamental theological commitments are shared with large segments of the broader evangelical
and orthodox heritage. For example, open theism shares with classical Arminianism their
common commitment to the centrality of the love of God and the necessity of libertarian
freedom for moral experience, worship, love, and genuine relationship.
6
None of these openness
commitments shared in common with classical theism generally or with Arminianism specifically
raises the question of its rightful place within the boundaries of evangelicalism. Rather, it is the
specific and distinctive openness denial of exhaustive divine foreknowledge that separates it from
its otherwise endearing relationship to Arminianism and its significant connection to much of the
classical heritage, and it is this denial, defended only in open theism and in no other branch of
orthodoxy or evangelicalism, that raises the boundary question.
7
The second reason Pinnock is right to raise the foreknowledge question is this: open
theism has, by this denial, entertained and promoted a reformulated understanding of God and
God's relationship to the world in ways that are massive in its implications both theologically
and practically. Perhaps when Pinnock asked, "Why draw the line at foreknowledge?" he meant
us to take it rhetorically, implying that no good reason could be given. But with Pinnock's
concluding chapter, I agree that "it is time now to ponder the implications"
8
of the openness
proposal. And so, I propose in the body of this paper to take the question "why draw the line at
4
So Pinnock is justified to say, "The open view is also a `traditional' view and it belongs to a family of theologies
that witness to the dynamic nature of God" (ibid., 105).
5
See, e.g., Clark Pinnock, Richard Rice, John Sanders, William Hasker, and David Basinger, The Openness of God:
A Biblical Challenge to the Traditional Understanding of God (Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 1994) 108-112, 138-
141; John Sanders, The God Who Risks: A Theology of Providence (Grand Rapids: InterVarsity, 1998) 30, 41; and
Cobb and Pinnock, eds., Searching for an Adequate God, x-xi, 185.
6
Pinnock, Most Moved Mover (p. 45), writes, "Had God not granted us significant freedom, including the freedom
to disappoint him, we would not be creatures capable of entering into loving relationships with him. Love, not
freedom, is the central issue. Freedom was given to make loving relations possible. . . . The biblical story
presupposes what we call libertarian freedom. This is plain in the ways God invites us to love him and in the ways
in which he holds us responsible for what we decide."
7
While in my book (Bruce A. Ware, God's Lesser Glory: the Diminished God of Open Theism [Wheaton, IL:
Crossway, 2000]), I offer a more holistic critique of open theism including, of necessity, some discussion of the
openness (and more general Arminian) commitment to libertarian freedom, here in this paper, since the question is
specifically whether open theism is in the boundaries of evangelicalism, I restrict my critique strictly to what
distinguishes open theism from Arminianism and all other branches of evangelicalism and orthodoxy, viz., its
distinctive denial of exhaustive divine foreknowledge.
8
Ibid., 179.