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to be crucified to be the determined, constrained, and morally vacuous actions of a
divinely engineered robot. We'll consider each possibility in order.

First, while it is harmful enough to the surety of God's covenant commitment to say, as

Sanders has, that had Abraham not obeyed, God might seek another through whom to fulfill his
covenant promise to bless the nations; it is altogether more devastating to the truthfulness of
God's long salvific covenant pledge to suggest that Christ, as a free agent, might not have chosen
to go to the cross. Sanders writes, "Although Scripture attests that the incarnation was planned
from the creation of the world, this is not so with the cross. The path of the cross comes about
only through God's interaction with humans in history. Until this moment in history other routes
were, perhaps, open."

Though startling, does not the open view require this possibility? If

Christ is a moral agent and if his actions are free, it follows that Christ could choose to be given
over or not, and then it follows that God cannot have known, prior to his choice, just what Christ
would do. In light of Psalm 22; Isa. 52:13-53:12; Acts 2:23; 4:27-28; 1 Pet.1:20, this implication
of the open view contradicts precious biblical teaching while it undercuts the certainty and surety
of God's eternal saving promise and purpose.

But second, some may be aware that Greg Boyd asserts a different position from Sanders

on this point, claiming that "Scripture portrays the crucifixion as a predestined event" even if "it
was not certain from eternity that Pilot [sic.], Herod, or Caiaphas would play the roles they
played in the crucifixion."

Boyd explains, "Since God determines whatever he wants to about

world history, we should not find it surprising that the central defining event in world history--
the crucifixion--included a number of predestined aspects. It seems that the incarnation and
crucifixion were part of God's plan from `before the foundation of the world.'"

Of course,

holding this position has the advantage of avoiding the implication just noted, viz., of the
uncertainty of the cross if God cannot know in advance what Christ will choose to do. But, I am
startled and incredulous that any open theist would want to solve this problem by asserting that
the event of the crucifixion was divinely foreknown and predestined. After all, even if God may
not know the roles that Pilate or Herod might play, if the event of the crucifixion is predestined,
must God not know, at bare minimum, that his Son will choose to go to the cross? But just call
to mind the strong and emotionally-charged language open theists regularly offer to the notion
that God can foreknow what creatures freely do. If God knows what they will do, their actions
cannot genuinely be free; rather, they are robots, and there can be no true love, no true moral
action, and no true relationship between the constrained agent and God. In fact, some open
theists go so far as to call God's predetermination of future actions, carried out in a non-
consensual manner, as instances of divine rape!

What can save Boyd's position from being

Ibid., 100.

Boyd, God of the Possible, 45.

Ibid., 44-45. Boyd's full last paragraph of this discussion reads, "While Scripture portrays the crucifixion as a

predestined event, it never suggests that the individuals who participated in this event were predestined to do so or
foreknown as doing so. It was certain that Jesus would be crucified, but it was not certain from eternity that Pilot
[sic.], Herod, or Caiaphas would play the roles they played in the crucifixion. They participated in Christ's death of
their own free wills" (ibid., 45, italics added). But, it seems impossible that when Boyd says "it never suggests that
the individuals who participated in this event were predestined to do so" that he would include the Christ's actual
choice to go to the cross was left uncertain. If so, in what meaningful sense could we see "the crucifixion as a
predestined event"?

See, e.g., Sanders, God Who Risks, 240.