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It seems, then, one faces a dilemma: either 1) one denies the reality of the many specific

and inviolable divine predictions that involve future free human decisions and actions, or 2) one
accepts these predictions and acknowledges that the truth value of them is in question due to
their relationship to future free agents who may or may not do what was predicted. In the first
instance, one has the formidable task of accounting for hundreds of texts the church has
interpreted for two millennia as literally predictive of future human actions (e.g., 70 year
captivity, 15 years extended life, destruction of Jeroboam's alter, naming and activities of Josiah,
naming and activities of Cyrus, birth in Bethlehem, divided clothing, unbroken bones, rich man's
tomb, three denials); in the second, one can no longer in principle affirm the inerrancy of
Scripture's predictive teachings, when those predictions are of future actions and events that
might go contrary to what was predicted.

Clark Pinnock seems to vacillate between these options, holding one and then the other.

Apparently in line with the first approach, he writes, "the fulfillment of a prophecy may differ
from what the prophet had in mind,"

indicating, I take it, that prophecies are conditional or

have a level of imprecision that allows for unexpected kinds of fulfillment. But then in an
explanatory footnote to the same discussion, he continues apparently in line with the second
approach, saying, "We may not want to admit it but prophecies often go unfulfilled" and as
examples he offers, "despite the Baptist, Jesus did not cast the wicked into the fire; contrary to
Paul, the second coming was not just around the corner . . . ; despite Jesus, in the destruction of
the temple, some stones were left one on the other."

This would seem to suggest that what was

prophesied was simply mistaken. So, in the first instance where "God is free in the manner of
fulfilling prophecy," one can maintain inerrancy only at the price of denying specific, inviolable
predictions involving free creatures; yet in the second instance, where "prophecies often go
unfulfilled,"

it seems here difficult to see how inerrancy is not abandoned when admitting that

predictions simply failed.

5.

[Related to the above:] Open theism's denial of exhaustive divine foreknowledge
severely implicates the complete and perfect accuracy of God's word, since God may
state something that he believes to be true but later realizes, in retrospect, he was
mistaken and in error.

To put it bluntly, God unavoidably lies, but he never means to. For example, in Jer. 3:19-

20, God states that Israel would prosper and would follow him, but in fact they forgot the Lord
their God. For open theists, what God states in 3:19 is shown to be wrong in light of what Israel
does in 3:20.

Because of God's massive ignorance regarding the future of human affairs, it is

entirely possible for God to say things about that future which prove wrong. Although formally,
he means always to speak the truth, materially, what he says may in fact be mistaken and in
error.

Pinnock, Most Moved Mover, 51.

Ibid., 51, f.n. 66.

Both statements are found in the same footnote, ibid.

See Sanders, God Who Risks, 132, 205; and Boyd, God of the Possible, 60. Ironically, Boyd charges the classical

view with entailing the view that God lies, if God has said one thing knowing it not to be true as he said it. Clearly,
what God's intention was as he made such a claim has to be carefully considered. For discussion on this issue, see
my God's Lesser Glory, 92-98.