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trinity without really grasping the logical difficulty). However, some highly intelligent people
(having extraordinary memory and logical abilities that permit them to comprehend complex
concepts and long chains of reasoning) can work towards rigorous formal solutions to
metasystemic problems. This is highly desirable when it can be done, but relatively few people
have such abilities. Moreover, some metasystemic problems have not yet had completely
satisfactory logical solutions (e.g. God's sovereignty and human responsibility), and it may be
the case that they will never be solved logically to our satisfaction. It may be that the chains of
reasoning required for such problems, though within God's competence, are too great for any
human mind. Metasystemic thought allows persons who recognize the problem of concurrences
revealed by the LONC but who have not solved them logically to nonetheless submit to the
authority of all the available evidence in the absence of a formal logical harmonization, at least
for now.
Let us compare the cognitive dilemma of a paradox with the problem of coming upon a
gorge during a backpacking trip (using the two opposing cliffs as an analogy for two concurrent
truths). The gorge, unfortunately, is filled with a thick fog, so that the bottom cannot be seen
from above. In hiking (and thinking), we have three (analogous) choices. First, from the one
cliff we can reject the hope of bridging the gap, of getting to the other side, since "they are not
(logically) connected" and "it is (intellectually) dangerous." (This is the option taken by the
rigid single-system thinker who rejects one or the other truth.) Second, since the cliffs are just
barely within jumping distance, we can jump from one side to the other (concluding that the
evidence for the other part of the concurrence is strong enough to warrant belief, even though we
cannot see how it is connected to the "cliff" we started from. This is something both presystemic