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to the actual world as is a Z-ful one, then the claim that z would be grounded if she were
in c is false. . .

In response to this grounding objection, Flint then appeals to Plantinga's view that the

similarity of possible worlds is partly determined by the counterfactuals they share. Therefore,
says Flint, "the Z-ful world may well be the more similar to the actual world due to the fact that,
both in it and the actual world, (c _ z) is true, whereas the same counterfactual is false in the
relevant Z-less world."

Flint's response to the grounding objection seems, however, to be an obvious case of

circular reasoning. William Hasker has commented on Flint's argument:

This passage would seem to admit of paraphrase as follows: The counterfactual (c _ z) is
true in the actual world because z is true in the world nearest the actual world in which c
is true, and that world is nearest to the actual world because it shares with the actual
world the counterfactual (c _ z)! But this appears to be an unusually clear case of
circular explanation. . .

In fairness to Flint, though, he does anticipate Hasker's response. He says the charge of

circularity here is once again reminiscent of the attack on future-tense statements. He writes:

Suppose the antirealist [about future-tense statement] were to point out that (2), the
claim that Gore will freely run for president, cannot now be grounded because there are
possible futures (call them Goreful ones) in which "Gore freely runs" is true and other
possible futures (call them Goreless ones) in which "Gore freely runs" is false, and there
is no reason to view either type of future as privileged with respect to (or, as we might be
tempted to say, as more similar to) the world as it is here and now. The natural realist
response, I take it, would be to say that the two types of possible futures are not equal, for
only one is part of the actual world. But won't such a response be rejected by the
antirealist, whose whole point is that there is no such thing as the actual, fully
determinate world? Won't he ask what it is about the world here and now which grounds
the claim that the Goreful future will come to be? In reply, the realist, I think, would
have to grant that the Goreful future may not have any privileged status over the Goreless
ones if only fundamentally non-future propositions are allowed into consideration.
However, if fundamentally future propositions (such as the temporally indexed "Gore
runs for president in 2000," or the simpler "Gore runs for president") are acknowledged
as truth about the way things are here and now, it follows that the privileged status of the
Goreful futures can indeed be defended. But, of course, to the antirealist, assuming there
to be such truths here and now is sure to seem unsatisfying, question-begging, perhaps
even amusing. . .

Flint, Divine Providence, 135.

Ibid., 135-36.

William Hasker, Review of Flint's Divine Providence in Faith and Philosophy 16:2 (April

1999):248-253.
23

Flint, Divine Providence, 136-137.