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seems very reminiscent of--indeed, all but inseparable from--the type of argument
characteristically forwarded by antirealists concerning absolute future contingent truths.
Consider a proposition such as

(2) Albert Gore will freely decide to run for president in 2000. [The state of
affairs referred to in this proposition was future when Flint wrote it.]

Those who deny that propositions such as (2) can be true generally defend their
antirealism by pointing out that such propositions lack sufficient metaphysical grounds.
Nothing that Gore is doing here and now, and nothing about his present character, entail
that (2) is true.

The Anti-molinist can reply to this argument in one of three ways. First, he might simply

bite the bullet and say, "Well, so much the worse for future-tense contingent statements." This
would be, I suppose, the response given by Open Theists, who reject not only MK, but also God's
foreknowledge of his creatures' future free acts. Second, the Anti-Molinist might be a
compatibilist, agreeing that arguments against CFs and those against future-tense contingent
statements do parallel one another, if one assumes that libertarianism is true. But, if
libertarianism is false, then future-tense contingents will be grounded by the characters of human
agents which determine what they will do in the future. Thus a future-tense statement such as
Flint's (2) above would be grounded by Gore's present character. CFs, on the other hand, will
still be ungrounded because they presuppose, by definition, the truth of libertarianism.

The simpler response, however, is to say that it is all very well and good that CFs would

correspond to reality if the actions they refer to "would be taken if the specified circumstances
were to exist," but it is precisely the question at issue as to whether in fact such actions would be
taken. The grounding objection just is the view that there simply is no fact to the matter as to
what an agent with libertarian freedom would do in a given hypothetical (or even actual)
circumstance. That is, the problem that the grounding objection is raising is not simply that the
antecedent and consequent of a statement like "If David had remained in Keilah, then Saul would
have besieged the city" refer to states of affairs that do not exist (which is the alleged problem
with future-tense propositions). Rather the problem revolves around the nature of agents who
have libertarian freedom. It is because MK requires that God know counterfactuals of freedom--
counterfactual statements about what free agents would (hypothetically) do in a given
circumstance--that gives rise to the grounding objection.

Another way of putting this is to say that the parallel between antirealism about CFs and

antirealism about future-tense contingents is only superficial. When the antirealist about future-
tense contingents says that such propositions lack sufficient metaphysical grounding, then Craig's
reply is perfectly adequate: "In order for . . .future-tense statements to be true [i.e., grounded], all

Flint, Divine Providence, 129.

For what it's worth, this is the solution that I favor. I think that libertarianism is false, and that

agent's always act on the basis of their desires, so that what grounds their future actions is quite literally
present states of affairs.