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GO, rather than press the defense of the GO, many critics of MK have sought to provide other,
more sophisticated and complex attacks on MK.

I am not denying that these new anti-molinist

arguments are useful. In fact, I find many of them quite persuasive. Moreover, as Thomas Flint
recognizes, some of these new arguments are "clever variations on the 'grounding' objection."

Nevertheless, I believe that it is not necessary to formulate new anti-molinist arguments in order
to defeat Molinism. The "generic grounding objection" that I have outlined above will do just
fine. This generic version of the grounding objection may be formulated as part of a straight-
forward argument against MK, the Generic Grounding Objection Argument (GGOA), which may
be stated as follows:

(1) Given any set of antecedent circumstances C, S is free in C with respect to

an action x if an

(2) Let S be free in C with respect to some action x. (Assumption)
(3) S is not determined to do either x or ~x in C. (From 1 & 2)
(4) If S is not determined to do x or ~x in C, then there is no fact of the matter to

what S would d

(5) If there is no fact of the matter to what S would do in C, then no CF in which

S is the subject

(6) If S is not determined to do x or ~x in C, then no CF in which S is the subject has

a truth-value. (F

(7) No CF in which S is the subject has a truth-value. (From 3 & 6, Modus Ponens)
(8) If no CF in which S is the subject has a truth-value, then God cannot know any such

CF.

(9) Therefore, God cannot know any such CF. (From 7 & 8, Modus Ponens)

The conclusion (9) is tantamount to denying that God has MK. Premises (1), (5), and (8) are

unobjectionable. The key premise of the argument is (4). This premise is an assertion of the
grounding objection, and is the one that the Molinist will want to reject.

My contention, in defense of (4), is that the very fact that S's actions are undetermined (i.e.,

that S has libertarian freedom) vitiates any alleged CF (where S is the subject) of any truth value.
For, if S is free to do x or refrain from x in C, there simply is no fact of the matter to what S would
do. Notice that I am not claiming that there is no fact of the matter to what S actually does or will
do (if S is actualized by God), but only that any claim as to what S would (counterfactually) do is
neither true nor false. There is nothing about S, nor about C, nor about x, which would or could
make it true that S does (for example) x in C.

So, on the assumption that he has libertarian freedom, it is an open question as to whether

Saul would besiege Keilah if David remained in the city. We cannot say what Saul would do.
Not even Saul can say for sure what he would do. He might intend to besiege Keilah if David
remains, but intentions can change and persons can act out of character. He might (even
probably) besiege Keilah, given what we know of his character, but this does not imply that he
would besiege Keilah. Given this, not even an omniscient being can know what Saul would do,
for there is simply nothing to know. There is just no telling what Saul would do! The truth value
of any and every CF, then, is undeterminate. And since they are undeterminate, God cannot know

See Robert M. Adams, "An Anti-Molinist Argument" Philosophical Perspectives 5 (1991): 343-

53; William Hasker, "A Refutation of Middle Knowledge" Nous 20 (December 1986): 545-557; "Middle
Knowledge: A Refutation Revisited" Faith and Philosophy 12:2 (April 1995): 223-36; "A New Anti-
Molinist Argument," Religious Studies 35 (1999): 291-97; "Anti-Molinism Is Undefeated!" Faith and
Philosophy 17:1 (January 2000): 126-31; and Timothy O'CONNER, "The Impossibility of Middle
Knowledge," Philosophical Studies 66 (May 1992): 139-66.
10

Flint, Divine Providence, 123.