If each of the three persons have wills, then there is no common essence, since it only by the unity of action that we know indirectly that they have one essence…

This looks like a strong argument, and I’d like to see it carried out, but it got cut off by the blog. But here you go too far, and contradict your own Church. We know not by unity of action, but rather by revelation that there is only one God, and thus one essence of God. By the same authoritative revelation we know that the Persons participate in actions differently, as I discussed in an earlier post. I won’t carry on, both to prevent duplication and to allow your true argument to emerge.

-Wm

The doctrine of the two wills and two energies gives us the conclusion that what is natural is not opposed to the divine by the fact that Christ can will both simultaneously without sin. If Christ wills both, then things can be different but good. Second, the point is that the preservation of human life is also good and also willed by God. To will either is to submit to God.

I can see that the doctrine of two wills of Christ would imply that, but that is also taught by many other examples — in fact, by simply praying for that Christ makes it clear (without the doctrine) that it’s okay to will to avoid suffering. The doctrine of two wills fails here because it makes it look like it’s okay to will (not merely desire, but will) something that contradicts the revealed will of the Father. It’s not. Christ therefore did not will against what He knew the will of the Father was; He simply desired otherwise, but submitted His will to the Father’s, by deliberately emphasizing His desire for the Father above His (good) desire to preserve His life.

Christ did not will to preserve His life, and then renounce that will; rather, he desired to preserve His life, and renounced that desire in favor of a greater one. If he’d ever willed to preserve His life when His Father had revealed a will that He lay it down, every righteousness He performed while so willing would have been a filthy rag.

-Wm

I don’t think martyrs could have done the same thing since they aren’t the font of the race and their choice wouldn’t redirect the destiny of human nature towards resurrection. (Jn 6:38-39)

Yes, and Rom 8:29: to be conformed to His image.

But we’re talking about what Christ said to the Father in Gethsemane. Nothing he said there implied what you’re saying now; any martyr could make the same prayer and actually be saying: “Father, I know you have a purpose for my suffering, and I value your purpose above any goal I’ve conceived on my own; but I don’t want to suffer, and if you can accomplish that purpose without my suffering, please do so.” The martyr could say that even without knowing what the purpose was. (I would argue that we should all be saying that, and as we become more conformed to Christ’s image, we will.)

Second, martyrs can’t simultaneously will two things with two powers of choice, both different.

How can I read this as NOT begging the question? The only thing I can think of is that you’re contradicting the very next statement you make:

Third, Christ is the chief and prototypical martyr.

This is my point. He is the chief and prototypical martyr not because He was about to die (others have done so without being martyrs), but because the later martyrs were being conformed to His image. This doesn’t mean they developed two wills; it meant, in this case, that they were growing toward desiring and wholeheartedly submitting to the fulfillment of the Father’s will in the same way Christ desired and wholeheartedly submitted to it.

-Wm

If the will is hypostatic, then there will be no human will in Christ, or Christ will be two persons or there will be three wills in the Trinity leading to Tri-theism. (Btw, this is a great passage to use with the LDS when they say that all three gods always agree in will with each other.)

This requires a distinction between a divine will and a human will, where there’s no suggested or revealed difference. Why can’t the Son’s will be Christ’s (full) will? Christ himself makes no distinction between His will before He incarnated and after; John 6:48 suggests that the Son’s purpose before He came down from Heaven was to reject His own will and do the Father’s. If you say that the Son intended to subject the “human will” He took on to His own Divine will, that’s grammatically possible — but this makes Christ seem to speak against Himself, since He’s denying His own will in order to assert His own will. It’s syntactically possible, but makes a revelation that reveals nothing — in particular, it would become an odd thing to say in the middle of an explanation of how the Father’s actions were the source both of the manna and of Himself.

Now, you make a good point when you say that there’s a danger of tritheism in claiming that each Person in the Godhead has a will. There are many dangers; when you assert that Christ has two wills, there’s a danger (against the background of modern philosophy) of confusing that with claiming that Christ had two persons, extreme Nestorianism. Both dangers appear when either doctrine appears without a proper understanding of its background, and both dangers disappear when the teaching is properly understood (as you’ve helped me start toward doing, thank you).

-Wm

I can think of one argument for God having a single will: actions should be attributed to the one who wills and then does them. A number of actions are attributed in the Bible to God, and a number are attributed to the Father in one place and the Son in another (for example, creation). God is one substance, so anything one Person of the Godhead does is done by (all of) the substance of God; thus, it would be perfectly consistent to attribute actions to both or all Persons if all actually willed that action in advance, which they of course would if the Godhead had a single will.

The problem with this argument is that it results in being impossible to attribute actions to ANY of the Persons individually; all actions done by God would be done by all the Persons in the same way at the same time. In short, God would not be revealed to us as three distinct Persons, because there would be no distinction between them in action. The role of the Spirit as the Paraclete is not the role of the Son or the Father; this is not because the Spirit is present with us while the Father is not (impossible), but because the actions of the Paraclete are properly the intention (willing) of the Spirit and not of the Father, although perfectly in line with those of the Father.

-Wm

I think it is clear that Christ is talking about will and not desire. The grammar I’d argue supports it exegetically.

I’ve just parsed and word-studied both passages. I can’t do any better, given my lack of education (I can barely read Homeric Greek)… So I’m as ready as I’ll get to hear your exegetical argument.

Second, if it isn’t good then Christ isn’t impeccable as far as his desires go.

Our desires are normally for good things (things God created); the sin comes in wanting those things apart from God, and apart from God’s timing. Christ desired to avoid suffering, which is without doubt a good thing; but He desired to do the will of Him who sent Him _more_, which is a better thing.

…anyhow, I don’t see how claiming that Christ could never have a sinful desire contributes to his impeccability; it seems to me that such would merely show that He was never tempted. When Satan tempted Christ, Christ desired bread; that was a desire outside of God’s will, and Christ knew it, which is why He didn’t bend to it for one moment.

The negative statement indicates a past willing or choice. What he did will while this has now changed.

There are two passages that cover these prayers, and a couple of repetitions. The statement is not only given negatively; in Luke 22:42 and Matt 26:39 it’s stated as a (conditional) imperative: “take this cup from me” (if you are willing, Father). This is a present statement, not in mere grammatical tense but in plain sense. It implies that Christ would have been grateful if God had interrupted the trial that followed with an alternate plan.

When you say that Christ submitted his own will to that of the Father, that depends on what you mean. Do you mean Christ’s human will or his divine will?

That begs the question. Let’s say that Christ submitted his entire will to the Father.

If the latter, this can’t be the case since there is only one will between the members of the Trinity.

Then why did Christ say “not my will but thine”? Why did Christ say in John 6 that He came from heaven not to enact his own will? Why does the Bible so often attribute will to one of the Persons rather than always to God?

(cont’d)

Perry, thank you; I’ll be spending focussed time studying what you’re saying, and will attempt to correct my errors based on it. Thank you for explaining the error in definition of the gnomic will; I will reread the paper (and some others I ran across) with that in mind.

(BTW, your post got cut off; if anything vital got lost, please continue. I must say that your cut-off sentence seemed very significant, and in line with the argument that God’s essence is simple.)

I can offer one thing on a topic I know something about, as it’s a doctrine I hold to. You said “And given that I don’t hold to Sola Scriptura, going beyond Scripture isn’t problematic for me. (I don’t think Protestants consistently adhere to it either.)”

Sola scriptura doesn’t mean that Scripture is the only valid source of knowledge, nor the only authority. It means that Scripture is the only _infallible_ authority; the highest authority (because it is infallible); the source of authority for the Church (because it is the testimony of the direct disciples and apostles of Christ, and speaks with their authority); and the source for the doctrines that explain salvation (because it speaks with that authority when it says it contains everything so needed). I’m not arguing for this definition; I’m just explaining the Protestant doctrine.

The point is that going beyond Scripture isn’t problematic for a Protestant; what is problematic is claiming that one must believe something not contained in the Scriptures in order to be saved.

Thus, I do not claim that the council was wrong in its conclusions; rather, I claim that its conclusions follow from its premises, and some of its premises are philosophical rather than Scriptural. It therefore binds only those who follow its philosophical premises. And unless you can show that those premises are implied by Scripture, according to Sola Scriptura they are not binding.

Now, I see above that you’re doing a credible job in arguing your point with Scriptural reasoning. I will study that carefully, treating it with the respect and seriousness that is its due, and I’ll have a response ASAP.

-Wm

Wm,

The monochos paper is ok, but I think it gets the gnome wrong if I recall. In sum, the gnomic will is a specific and personal use of the will. It is a way the will or power of choice may be used. It is not necessarily sinful as Adam had it prior to the fall.

I think it is clear that Christ is talking about will and not desire. The grammar I’d argue supports it exegetically. Second, if it isn’t good then Christ isn’t impeccable as far as his desires go.

The negative statement indicates a past willing or choice. What he did will while this has now changed. When you say that Christ submitted his own will to that of the Father, that depends on what you mean. Do you mean Christ’s human will or his divine will? If the latter, this can’t be the case since there is only one will between the members of the Trinity. If the human will, isn’t that the point? If the will is hypostatic, then there will be no human will in Christ, or Christ will be two persons or there will be three wills in the Trinity leading to Tri-theism. (Btw, this is a great passage to use with the LDS when they say that all three gods always agree in will with each other.)

I don’t think martyrs could have done the same thing since they aren’t the font of the race and their choice wouldn’t redirect the destiny of human nature towards resurrection. (Jn 6:38-39) Second, matyrs can’t simultaneously will to things with two powers of choice, both different. Third, Christ is the chief and prototypical martyr.

The doctrine of the two wills and two energies gives us the conclusion that what is natural is not opposed to the divine by the fact that Christ can will both simultaneously without sin. If Christ wills both, then things can be different but good. Second, the point is that the preservation of human life is also good and also willed by God. To will either is to submit to God.

If I thought that philosophy were the handmaiden to the theology filling in the conceptual content of theology, I might agree that what natures do and do not possess might be a matter of philosophical definition, but I don’t. And given that I don’t hold to Sola Scriptura, going beyond Scripture isn’t problematic for me. (I don’t think Protestants consistently adhere to it either.)

Any definition can risk misunderstanding and stating that you think that the council acted prematurely and can’t bind the consciences of Christians is a statement and not a demonstration that it did so. That would take a lot more work than you’ve presented here. Secondly, that judgment will place you not only outside of the historic position of Orthodoxy and Catholicism, but Protestantism as well, entailing that you endorse a Christology that your own church rejects as heterodox. I am not sure you wish to make that move.

If each of the three persons have wills, then there is no common essence, since it only by the unity of action that we know indirectly that they have one essence…

Ouch. I should have said: I don’t think the council’s decree is wrong; I just think it’s not binding on all, because it presupposes a philosophical commitment that has never been claimed to be binding on all.

Within that philosophy, it’s necessary, because otherwise one risks denying the dual natures of Christ. In the framework of the now more common understanding of personal will, affirming dual wills risks claiming that Christ is two persons (which might be called Nestorianism), which seems to me to be a more directly antibiblical result than even monophysitism.

-Wm

Natures have powers and that seems pretty uncontroversial to me.

Any doctrine regarding what natures do and do not possess should be controversial. It’s a matter of philosophical definition, not a matter of clear fact or Scriptural testimony. The doctrine of the two natures is viable because Scriptures strongly indicates it; but defining the architecture of natures goes outside of Scripture.

In this case, after some study, I believe that this council acted prematurely, and released a definition which cannot bind Christians unless they subscribe to a set of philosophical definitions which are, by and large, no longer widely used. Furthermore, the council’s definitions seem hasty and ill-informed, and if they don’t contradict scripture, they at least seem to risk being misunderstood to cause contradiction. For example, it seems that the Father, the Son, and the Spirit all have wills, in that they have purposes distinguishable from one another; this is often used to demonstrate that they are distinct persons. Even if the will is not a part of the person, though, it can’t be a part of the nature, because Christ was of the same nature as God (and therefore the same as the Father).

It might help to think of powers as forces or something like that. Salt has the power of saltiness, but also of purification. Fire has the power of heat and so on.

This is true, but Salt is not Saltiness. The nature of salt is not itself salty — we do not sprinkle the nature of salt on our food.

Choice is a power of human nature, but it gets used by the person who’s nature it is. I have the power of mobility, but it is I who do the moving. The distinction turns on possessing a power and using it. Possessing it doesn’t imply the use of it.

You are not your nature. Your body naturally gives you the power of mobility, but your nature has neither mobility nor indeed location. Your person naturally “gives” you the power of choice, but your nature does not have that power (although your nature says that you are a person).

Tis true that Christ goes to the Cross and I am not denying that. There are a few questions here. First, does Christ will to preserve his life at any point? Second, if he does will to go to the cross with his human power of choice, what significance does that have in the schema of salvation and for the nature of humanity?

Christ does not will to save His life by the definition you’ve given. Clearly He desires to save His life, but also clearly He lays it down instead, becoming obedient unto death. If Christ had willed to save His life, He would have been willfully uncompliant to death at best. No, Christ desired to save His life, but desired more to submit to the Father’s will; and then He stood up, and willfully submitted. With all his heart, not half of it.

-Wm