Why Calvinism is the Least Rational Option
One of the dozens of reasons I am a Calvinist has to do with the tension that is allowed within the Calvinistic system that is not allowed in other options. You see, the issues of Calvinism primarily center on one issue: predestination. While the sovereignty of God has its place, it does not ultimately determine where one lands. An Arminian can believe that God is sovereign to a similar degree as a Calvinist. But an Arminian cannot believe in predestination the same way as Calvinists.
Both Calvinists and Arminians believe in predestination. In other words, whether or not God predestines people is not the issue. All Bible believing Christians believe this doctrine. The issue has to do with the basis of this predestining.
The Calvinist says that God’s predestination has no founding in the predestined in any sense. God did not choose people based on any merit, intrinsic or foreseen. This is called unconditional predestination because there are no conditions in man that need to be met. It does not mean that God did not have any reason for choosing some and not others, but that the reason is not found in us.
The Arminian says that God’s predestination has a founding in the faith of the predestined. In other words, God looks ahead in time and discovers who will believe and who will not and chooses people based on their prior free-will choice of him.
The Arminian chooses this position because, for them, it is the only way to reconcile human freedom and God’s choice. Both are clearly taught in Scripture. Therefore, in order to have a reasonable and consistant theology, one or the other must be altered. If God unconditionally choose people, then people don’t have responsibility in their choice, good or ill. Therefore, it is not human choice that is nuanced, but God’s choice. To make sense out of this, the Arminian says that God’s choice is based on man’s choice. Therefore, we have consistency. The tension is solved. There is no tension.
However, the Calvinist is not satisfied with a redefining of God’s predestination. To the Calvinists, man is fully responsible for his choice, yet God’s election is unconditional. Therefore, there is a tension that is created between human responsibility and God’s election. This tension is left in tact since, according to the Calvinist, it is best understood this way in Scripture. To redefine predestination to suit one’s need to alleviate tension seems to be a very rationalistic approach to doctrine. While there is nothing wrong with using one’s reason to understand truth, there are problems when reason takes priority over revelation.
This is one of the mistakes that I believe the Arminian system of conditional election/predestination makes. There is no need to solve all tensions, especially when the solution comes at the expense of one’s interpretive integrity. There are many tensions in Scripture. There are many things that, while not irrational, just don’t make sense. The doctrine of the Trinity, the Hypostatic Union, creation out of nothing all fit this category. So does human responsibility and unconditional election. God’s sovereign unconditional election can stand side-by-side with man’s responsibility without creating a formal contradiction. We may not know how to reconcile these two issues, but that does not mean God does not know how. Their co-existence does not take away from their collective truthfulness.
I believe that the Arminian system sacrifices biblical integrity for the sake of intelligibility and doctrinal harmony. The Calvinistic system allows tension and mysteries to remain for the sake of Biblical fidelity.
I have had people say to me (often) that they are not Calvinists because the system attempts to be too systematic with all its points for the sake of the system itself. I think that it is just the opposite. The Calvinistic system creates more tensions than it solves, but seeks to remain faithful to God’s word rather than human intelligibility.
Now, I must admit. I am confused as to why most emergers that I know of are more attracted to the rationalistic approach of the Arminians than the tension filled approach of the Calvinists.
Fire away…
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Bryan Cross on 20 Nov 2008 at 1:56 am #
Michael,
This tension is left intact since, according to the Calvinist, it is best understood this way in Scripture. To redefine predestination to suit one’s need to alleviate tension seems to be a very rationalistic approach to doctrine.
I see no principled difference between the “rationalistic approach to doctrine” and the philosophy of private judgment. If one accepts the latter, then one has no grounds for rejecting the former.
In the peace of Christ,
- Bryan
Michael W on 20 Nov 2008 at 2:22 am #
In all fairness, YOU think Calvinism is more faithful to God’s word, otherwise you wouldn’t be a Calvinist, but Arminians also think they are being more faithful to God’s word. It isn’t like Arminians are saying ‘well we only believe in part of the Bible’ (but Calvinists SAY that is what Arminians are doing, just as Arminians say that is what Calvinists are doing).
This is what frustrates me about many (not all) Calvinists. They just take a reductionist approach of ‘Well I just believe what the Bible says’ as though other people are throwing the Bible into the waste bin.
Same with Catholics
Same with Anglicans
Same with Infant Baptism
Same with Transubstantiation
Same with Young Earth Creationists
The list goes on. Everyone thinks they are ‘doing what the Bible says’ and they are the only ones.
I am no different.
I don’t really buy into Calvinism, but if it is true, I was just predestined to be wrong, which is fine. At least I am a Christian and am not predestined to burn as torches so people in heaven can see.
…ok that was a cheap shot….
Truth Unites... and Divides on 20 Nov 2008 at 2:31 am #
CMP: “I believe that the Arminian system sacrifices biblical integrity for the sake of intelligibility and doctrinal harmony.”
Very generous statement. I don’t even think their sacrifice of biblical integrity even nets them intelligibility and doctrinal harmony.
You lose biblical integrity, you just about lose everything else.
God’s Glory. Monergism. Augustine. Calvin. Sola Gratia.
John on 20 Nov 2008 at 5:28 am #
Both Arminianism and Calvinism tend to think of God as embedded in time with us. They argue over the sequence of events. What if God doesn’t see sequentially like we do, He just sees? We have no problem believe God exists outside of our physical space; why do we find it harder to believe he is outside our experience of time?
rick on 20 Nov 2008 at 8:24 am #
“I believe that the Arminian system sacrifices biblical integrity for the sake of intelligibility and doctrinal harmony. The Calvinistic system allows tension and mysteries to remain for the sake of Biblical fidelity.”
I have to agree with Michael W (#2) on this one, except for the cheap shot
David on 20 Nov 2008 at 9:15 am #
John: I agree that God exists outside of time, and I’m a Calvinist. In fact, when I discuss predestination to other believers who are free-willers (or who have never considered the topic), I pretty much always talk about God’s existence outside of time (this is usually linked to tangent discussions on God “changing His mind” which. I believe, is impossible for a perfect, immutable, omniscient God who exists outside of time). It is also His eternality (though not a perfect synonym for existing outside of time, I use it because I am lazy) and our temporality, that causes some of the tension Michael mentions.
It has never occurred to me that Calvinism tends to restrict God to time. Maybe I’m not as Calvinist as I thought.
J's comment on 20 Nov 2008 at 10:02 am #
Part of the difference is that Arminians actually think that the principle of non-contradiction in logic actually means something. To say that one’s decision to follow Christ is both free and not-free is not a tension, its a illogical, a violation of the principle of non-contradiction. Consequently, most Calvinists end up using the principle of “middle-knowledge” which does involve G foreseeing choices, or they define free-will differently, usually dropping “origination” from the concept and keeping only “voluntariness”. Arminians and Calvinists do not, generally, have the same definition of “free will”, and so in many ways they are not directly comparable. From what I’ve read, Arminians give the Biblical text more credit and interpret it more literally, while Calvinists dismiss passages that talk about G changing his mind as not being literally true. God ends up more transcendent and unlike us, it becomes difficult to understand what (if anything) is meant by being made in his image, and portions of the Bible that talk about God changing ihis mind or entreating us to chnage ours become essentially obscure (what is really meant if God didn’t actually change his mind) and meaningless.
On this issue of time, the work of William Lane Craig has not been effectively countered to date, at least not by evangelicals. His conclusion is that G was timeless before creation, but within time after creation. Craig has also been a strong proponent of the use of middle knowledge to resolve issues of foreknowledge and predestination.
Scott Ferguson on 20 Nov 2008 at 10:03 am #
“(this is usually linked to tangent discussions on God “changing His mind” which. I believe, is impossible for a perfect, immutable, omniscient God who exists outside of time)”
Does this make God subject to predestination?
havoc on 20 Nov 2008 at 10:05 am #
John (response #4) pretty much nailed it. The phrase, “God looks ahead in time…” seems to be meaningless since God shows us in scripture that he doesn’t “look down the tube of time” in any sense. C.S. Lewis used the words “outside and above time,” I think that is useful.
I have had to wrestle with this for a long time (hah), but it seems to me that the God who created time cannot be limited by it any more than God can be limited by space or distance. The frustrating part for me to understand is how God can created time, remain “outside and above” it and yet interact within time.
If you deny predestination, it seems to me that you’re stuck with a severe problem when you look at prophecy. Wether God is making promises which he later has to force the pieces to fit (thereby denying free will), or God is looking at history “from outside of time” and revealing to us a future that He has already worked out (not like a plan, but like a reality).
I would like to cut off the attempts to view time as an illusion created by man, which people often try to use as an escape. If time is an illusion, there is no cause and effect, there is no tomorrow and yesterday, there is no hope because there is no future. When you deny time, you lapse into Indian philosophy that the whole world is an illusion.
To say that God’s foreknowledge denies free will is a Category Error. Dr. Ronald Nash treated this issue very succinctly in several of his books.
Truth Unites... and Divides on 20 Nov 2008 at 10:22 am #
“On this issue of time, the work of William Lane Craig has not been effectively countered to date, at least not by evangelicals. His conclusion is that G was timeless before creation, but within time after creation. Craig has also been a strong proponent of the use of middle knowledge to resolve issues of foreknowledge and predestination.”
Thanks for the morning laugh. You need to read a little more widely.
BTW, outside of WLC’s arminianism, I’m a big fan of his.
C Michael Patton on 20 Nov 2008 at 11:22 am #
J,
I understand what you are saying, but this is exactly what I wanted people to think through and avoid. “Part of the difference is that Arminians actually think that the principle of non-contradiction in logic actually means something.”
Holding human responsibility and unconditional election in tension is not holding two opposing forces in contradiction and saying it is OK. I very much oppose any system of doctrine which allows contradiction and calls it mystery. If it is a contradiction, it is not true.
But there is no way to say that human responsibility and unconditional election is a contradiction. I am not even comfortable with the lesser word “paradox.” It is a mystery, but there are no logical fallacies being committed.
Craig’s argument seeks to harmonize libertarian freedom with election. That is in another ballpark that seeks to alleviate the tension by introducing middle knowledge. Again, it is a mystery resolver.
What I am talking about is human responsibility (not libertarian freedom) with unconditional election. All people are 100% responsible for their rejection of God, God unconditionally elects, in the end, God will remain just without pulling a moral 180. No contradiction, just mystery and tension.
Michael
C Michael Patton on 20 Nov 2008 at 11:25 am #
Friends, simply belittling or laughing at someone’s argument does not promote good edifying discussion. Please take each other seriously or reserve comments. If someone overstates something in your opinion, just respectfully say how.
Luke on 20 Nov 2008 at 11:26 am #
Oh, that explains it then…Calvinists are just being “biblical” and Arminians aren’t! Arminians just believe what they “feel” is right and Calvinists just believe the Bible! Wow, I’ve never heard that from a Calvinist before (sarcasm).
Amen to Michael W. in #2 and J in #7. The Calvinistic system is about the most illogical and contradictory system of all. When they’re confronted about this, they just kind of give a prideful smile and throw it off as mystery. I’m sorry, but I kind of think that God wants us to understand some things and not have systems of beliefs that completely contradict themselves. He gave us brains and rationale for a reason. Just the thought that he “chose” all those ahead of time who would be saved (not based upon their merit, of course, we have to get Luther’s frame of thought in there somewhere), and he passed over others is just monstrous to me. There is nothing remotely or inherently good about that…I don’t care who you are. This is hardly an attribute of a God who is consistently described as abounding in loyal love, slow to anger, and changing his mind when others repent. This also doesn’t really line up with a God who desires all to come to know him and wants all to come to repentance. Nor does it line up with a God who loves the entire “world” and sent his only son to die for everyone in it.
Sorry CMP, but tension is the wrong word. Complete contradiction would be better. Of course your system would be the one to remain true and faithful to “biblical” integrity…who wouldn’t claim this about their system? Actually, I have found your claims to be the exact opposite, IMO. Calvinists sacrifice biblical integrity for the sake of their system. They start with their presuppositions about God and make the text conform to those presuppositions (God changing his mind is a perfect example of this, as are impeccability and impassibility). Calvinism is the least “biblical” of all the systems I have encountered, totally submitting itself to platonism and Greek thinking in regards to God ontologically. They have to completely deny some of his essential attributes in order to protect their monstrous and barbaric system. Their misunderstanding of “election” is so wrong that it has become comical as well. So basically, CMP, maybe postmoderns like systems that aren’t contradictory, that don’t make God out to be a monster who just chooses people out of a hat, that don’t fester a terrible sense of pride and arrogance in its adherents, and that is honest to the whole biblical text as opposed to 10-15 verses in Paul’s epistles….maybe you can start there and not with rationalism and intelligibility. Boasting about how irrational your system is communicates this to me, “Hey, I know my system is fully of contradictions. But I’m gonna believe it anyways. I know it doesn’t make any sense, but it’s just the Bible and I just want to be honest with it.” Sorry, but “just the Bible” is used by everybody, and Calvinists are the last ones that are exempt from their presuppositions and eisegetical conclusions. The fact that the majority who believe this way are white, middle-class males should communicate about everything you need to know about the system. Go preach this to the Dalites in India and see what they tell you. People like them were attracted to Jesus, would they be attracted to Calvinism? Not a chance…..sorry. That should tell you everything you need to know about it, for the Gospel is for the poor and outcast in society.
Just a suggestion.
Luke on 20 Nov 2008 at 11:31 am #
Sorry CMP, I was too harsh. I need to think a few minutes before I submit something. It won’t happen again, I promise. The blame is all on me.
C Michael Patton on 20 Nov 2008 at 11:32 am #
Luke, thanks for the comments. But it seemed a little overstated for me to really be able hear.
C Michael Patton on 20 Nov 2008 at 11:32 am #
LOL… thanks Luke. Just saw your comments here.
Seth R. on 20 Nov 2008 at 11:36 am #
OK, mostly lurking, occasionally commenting Mormon here.
The problem on the predestination thing is the unspoken assumptions that people bring to the table. Both Arminians and Calvinists are bringing some assumptions into the question of predestination that neither usually acknowledge.
The assumptions for our purposes can be encapsulated in one specific doctrine:
Creation ex Nihilo
It is from this one doctrine that most of Christianity goes wrong in everything else. Calvinist and Arminian arguments on Predestination only make sense if you are assuming the “God of the philosophers” – the Unmoved Mover that is the only uncreated thing in the universe, from which proceeds all other things in the universe – ex nihilo – out of nothing.
If you believe in that foundational idea, it’s not hard to draw the conclusion that our lives and fates are predestined. Everything else is just a matter of performing the correct theological gymnastics. Which is what the Calvinist vs Arminian debate is really all about – who does a better job of reconciling human free will to the doctrine of creation ex nihilo?
But what if the premise is wrong?
What if creation ex nihilo is little more than a philosophical fable that is not required by scripture, is not logically necessary, and in short, is not true?
If you start out wrong, it’s very easy to go wrong everywhere else.
Seth R. on 20 Nov 2008 at 11:44 am #
By the way J (#2),
William Lane Craig has also been challenged by Mormon theologian Blake Ostler over his work on the book “New Mormon Challenge.” Ostler basically attacks Craig’s logical and scriptural arguments over issues like “Kalam Infinity,” infinite regress of causes, the definition of omnipotence… stuff like that. You might check it out sometime (easy enough to Google).
Vance on 20 Nov 2008 at 12:57 pm #
Of course, as Christians who are not “of this world” and who scorn all human logic and the ability make rational sense of God and His teaching, we should always choose that approach which allows for the most contradictions, um, I mean, “tensions”! :0)
We would not, of course, wish to “reclaim the mind” or anything. :0)
But you beg the question when you say the Arminian approach is a “redefinition” of God’s predestination, don’t you? It seems to me that both definitions of predestination are equally possible and one simply works better with *less* tension.
Layton on 20 Nov 2008 at 1:23 pm #
How I became a Calvinist:
“14 How then will they call on him in whom they have not believed? And how are they to believe in him of whom they have never heard? And how are they to hear without someone preaching? 15 And how are they to preach unless they are sent? As it is written, “How beautiful are the feet of those who preach the good news!” 16 But they have not all obeyed the gospel. For Isaiah says, “Lord, who has believed what he has heard from us?” 17 So faith comes from hearing, and hearing through the word of Christ.”
Romans10:14-17
This passage from Romans covinced me that some sort of individual election is happening in real time and space because the gospel has not and is not heard by everyone in the world. Why ? Because there is no preaching without a preacher and there is no pracher (messenger) from God unless he is sent and God has been selective in the history of the church as to where and when the message is heard.
J's comment on 20 Nov 2008 at 1:26 pm #
My comment regarding Craig was meant to pertain only to his analysis of time. Few evangelicals have provided significant analsyses of time. If God were still timeless, or outside of time, after the creation of the world, then it is difficult or impossible to propose a way in which he could interact with the world.
The statements “To the Calvinists, man is fully responsible for his choice, yet God’s election is unconditional” are contradictory, not merely in tension. They resolve to A = not A. that is, Man is fully responsible for his choice (A) = Man is not responsible for his choice (not A), for that is what it means to say that God’s choice of man is unconditional. Molinism, or the concept of middle knowledge, is one way to ascribe both choice to humans and election by God without the contradiction that those bare statemetns creates.
I thought Mormons also believed in creation; I guess I was wrong on that. However, there is no evidence whatsoever that our universe has always existed. It had a beginning. What is disputed is how that beginning came about. It is also no disputed that if anything existed before this universe, it was not material (i.e., not quarks / electrons / protons, etc.). So there does not seem to be any basis for calling creation ex nihilo a fable. At least not any scientific basis, and no basis from the Hebrew scrpitures.
Michael W on 20 Nov 2008 at 1:39 pm #
Hmm, seems like Luke must have gone to Mark Driscolls church for a little while…
Kidding, I only make fun of Driscoll because I went to his church when I lived in Seattle, and I love him and love that Church a lot, even though I am not a Calvinist.
I think this went around the Blogosphere a little bit (from Ben Witherington) but it is a good listen…
It is John Piper talking about why Calvinists can seem so negative and elitist.
Very funny for me, because last year I lived in Seattle, went to Driscolls church, this year I live in Minneapolis, and have gone to Pipers church a few times (haven’t settled anywhere yet though). I am by no means a Calvinists, but all my Calvinist friends are jealous of me for getting to go to these guys Church’s…:)
M. Jay Bennett on 20 Nov 2008 at 2:24 pm #
The one doctrine the natural mind will never accept is the doctrine of a personal God’s unconditional predestination.
Truth Unites... and Divides on 20 Nov 2008 at 2:34 pm #
“If anyone should ask me what I mean by a Calvinist, I should reply, “He is one who says, Salvation is of the Lord.” I cannot find in Scripture any other doctrine than this. It is the essence of the Bible. “He only is my rock and my salvation.”
Tell me anything contrary to this truth, and it will be a heresy; tell me a heresy, and I shall find its essence here, that it has departed from this great, this fundamental, this rock-truth, “God is my rock and my salvation.” What is the heresy of Rome, but the addition of something to the perfect merits of Jesus Christ—the bringing in of the works of the flesh, to assist in our justification? And what is the heresy of Arminianism but the addition of something to the work of the Redeemer? Every heresy, if brought to the touchstone, will discover itself here.
I have my own private opinion that there is no such thing as preaching Christ and Him crucified, unless we preach what nowadays is called Calvinism. It is a nickname to call it Calvinism; Calvinism is the gospel, and nothing else.”
from Charles Spurgeon in a Defense of Calvinism.
C Michael Patton on 20 Nov 2008 at 3:30 pm #
Vance,
“Of course, as Christians who are not “of this world” and who scorn all human logic and the ability make rational sense of God and His teaching, we should always choose that approach which allows for the most contradictions, um, I mean, “tensions”! :0)
We would not, of course, wish to “reclaim the mind” or anything. :0)
But you beg the question when you say the Arminian approach is a “redefinition” of God’s predestination, don’t you? It seems to me that both definitions of predestination are equally possible and one simply works better with *less* tension.”
Vance, I am certainly not advocating an approach which neglects logic and reason for the sake of fideism. But when we say that the Bible, rightly interpreted, is the final arbiter of truth, then we are saying that whether we understand something does not make it true. No one understands creation ex-nihilo or the Trinity, but if the Bible teaching them (or they are philosophical necessities like ex-nihilo), then we are obligated to go in the direction of the clearest support, not a “systematic” theology (this is coming from a systematic theologian!).
In the end, my argument is that the Arminian tradition attempts to reconcile tensions that are best left in tact for the sake of a rational understanding. This is not always the best move to make. But, more importantly, what I am saying is that Arminianism is more influenced by the enlightenment than Calvinism at this point. At least this is my argument here that I would like people to consider. And the reason why I push this is because Calvinists are often accused of making their theology fit a neat paradigm where everything fits. This is not always the case as I have demonstrated here. The Calvinistic understanding of human responsibility and unconditional election is the least rational (NOT irrational) of the options, but it, in my opinion, follows the most probably interpretation of the text opting for a both/and rather than an either/or.
Arminians need to consider whether they will allow tension or attempt to solve it. When they attempt to solve it, are they creating a exegetical dissonance for a philosophical luxury that the Bible does not provide.
ThinkTheology.org on 20 Nov 2008 at 3:31 pm #
Michael W – what are you doing in MSP? I live 1.5 hours from there and used to go to Piper’s church every Sunday since I was going to NCU.
Anyway, I’m a Calvinist. I personally find it to be both biblical and logical. I know others disagree. I like Arminians. I like Calvinists. I also like coffee. I wish people could have more conversations like this over a cup of joe and not want to kill each other.
Interestingly, I’m a pastor who is both Reformed and Charismatic and I am surrounded by Arminians… and it is fun.
I liked reading this, Michael. There’s a lot of stuff to talk about… which I do not have time to do now. Good stuff though.
Blessings,
luke g.
Vance on 20 Nov 2008 at 4:14 pm #
Yes, Michael, I think it is a very good point to make. But, rather that accepting the necessity of a tension when it is, indeed, necessary, you occasionally seem to make a *virtue* of the tension, as if the tension, or seeming contradiction, is an indication of truth in itself. Sort of an extension of the “foolish things to confound the wise”. Mr. Bennet, above, seems to hint at this approach.
So, when Calvinism provides a rational solution to a problem, then it is a good thing, when it fails to provide a rational solution, it is simply embracing the tension. A hard-core Calvinist can justify every variation of this in a “win-win” manner.
I think you point to the best approach: that we seek out the rational, logical “Occam’s Razor” solution whenever possible within the bounds of Christian theology, but when one simply can not be had, then we realize that “there is more in heaven and earth, Horatio, than is dreamt of on our philosophy” and leave it at that.
The Arminian says this is an area in which we DO have a rational approach to seemingly contradictory Scripture that works within a Christian theological framework. Calvinists, I would assert, have become so wedded to *one* side of that seeming contradiction that, rather than follow the rational argument to it’s logical conclusion, they stick to their “seeming contradiction” and claim “tension”.
You know that I tend to be MUCH less systematic (by philosophy, not lack of exposure) in my theological approach, simply because I think SO many of these issues are the “things of God” and we mere humans argue at much more “fine” a level than our information or cognitive abilities justify. In the end, I think that both sides of the entire predestination argument will end up being seen as mere shadows of what is REALLY going on, and we will all feel a bit silly.
Michael W on 20 Nov 2008 at 4:15 pm #
Luke G. (ThinkTheology),
Honestly, I have no idea what I am doing in MSP. I lived in Seattle last year, went to Capernwray Bible School in England the year before that, graduated high school the year before that. I am just sorta moving around while I am young and am able too. I went a private Christian school in Seattle, but that was way too much money, and now I am paying off the debt, without a degree (and regret it) but I figured I would try moving to another city. I didn’t really have many connections or friends in Portland (where I am originally from) or Seattle. I have a great friend here in MSP that I met in England.
Right now I am looking for a community to join. I have gone to Bethlehem a few times (only been in MSP for a month now, and its really cold). I went to a house church, which was, in all honesty, a bit too liberal for my comfort. I think I might go to Hope CC next week, hopefully I will find somewhat of a fit.
Piper’s church seems like a really great place, it just isn’t really my thing. I know that sounds terrible, I just don’t really fit in/feel comfortable there. I have honestly never been to a church where so many people wear suits (I have growing up in Portland and going to Imago Dei to thank for that).
Really, it is nothing against Piper, or the people, it just isn’t really my thing.
Seth R. on 20 Nov 2008 at 4:20 pm #
J, I don’t want to threadjack or anything, but just to answer you…
Mormon scripture rejects creation ex nihilo (in addition to statements from Joseph Smith). Mormon scripture clearly states that matter is eternal (even if its state or form is not). It also states that the most fundamental state of human identity – “intelligence” as it is called” – is also “not created, neither can be.”
Makes the theodicy a much different proposition for a Mormon.
As for proof of a “beginning.” I find none. If you are referring to the Big Bang, that is not even remotely proof, since the mathematics seems to be pointing to a CONSTANTLY expanding and collapsing universe (a cyclical process). To say nothing of the possibilities opened up by String Theory…
But if you want to insist on an absolute beginning, I’m not going to argue the point further in the interest of staying on topic here.
I will say it does indeed, as Rev. Patton has stated, make your theology much more uncomfortable.
But I would question whether that is always a sign of strength.
C Michael Patton on 20 Nov 2008 at 4:26 pm #
Vance, I am not sure how much you have really been exposed to Calvinism, but your comments give make me think that you are somewhat intentionally disengaged in the subject. Most people don’t become Calvinists because it sits well or because they have a natural inclination toward this way of thinking, but because they, like myself, just don’t know what else to do with the texts. As an Arminian, I wanted to the Arminian position to be correct. I would have done anything to go in that direction, but I just could not.
It is not if Calvinists would not accept the Arminian interpretation if it made exegetical sense to them. But that is exactly the point, for the Calvinist, the Arminian option does not present a viable exegetical option. Most Calvinists are reluctant Calvinists at first.
C Michael Patton on 20 Nov 2008 at 4:45 pm #
Actually, the alternative to ex-nihilo is not merely a tension, but a contradition. Eternal matter requires an infinite succession which is formally absured when we have a present. Theoretically fine, but actually impossible.
Enough of this though as this is not this tread.
Vance on 20 Nov 2008 at 4:51 pm #
hmm, Michael, I believe what you say from an individual point of view, but most Calvinists would agree that the Scripture does seem contradictory on this point, and that good, sensible and supportable arguments can be made both ways. So, I don’t think it is a matter of exegetical *necessity* as much as exegetical preference, UNLESS you cling steadfastly to certain definitional presuppositions. I think if you find yourself only seeing one POSSIBLE exegetical option, then it may be that there is something too rigid somewhere in the exegesis.
Rather than delve into the particulars of the Calvinist/Arminian debate, I will just say that so very often I see such divisions arise because one side (or both) has a “misplaced dogmatism” in their theological construction process. There is a “well, since this MUST be true, then . . .” that should not be there.
And your first sentence is both true and untrue. I have definitely been exposed to Calvinism (and the full range of Calvinism), but it is entirely true that I have disengaged myself from the subject. And that is because I think it falls into the “angels on the head of a pin” category.
I think that solid, sensible, Godly and, most importantly, Biblically sound, people view all of the evidence and find an exegetical path to either conclusion. That is enough to tell me that this is one of those areas in which dogmatism is not the best approach. I end up thinking that the Arminian approach seems to make the most sense (maybe even more in the direction toward the horrible “P” word!), but I can see both sides making solid arguments. And, in the end, I expect to get to heaven and find out it is a “slap the head and yell D’oh!” situation, where we all just missed the point entirely.
Lisa R on 20 Nov 2008 at 5:31 pm #
Luke, quick question for you. Since it is God’s will that all come to repentance and all don’t, has man then frustrated the will of God?
CMP, personally I think the Calvinist construct is more logical than you give it credit. Yeah sure, I agree that in consideration of key passages it is a bit to digest at first and may even seem irrational and contradictory to our finite and tainted minds. But when I consider the Biblical revelation of God in His dealing with His people, what may seem arbitrary and capricious to us is perfectly fitting in with his sovereign attributes as He has demonstrated in the course of His progressive revelation. Romans 9 in context of ch 9-11 are then consistent with His character though it may not seem very fair from a human perspective.
Vance, it’s good to see you again! I absolutely love the balance you bring. You have a way of just soaring about the issue and keeping the main thing the main thing. I’ve heard it said that S. Lewis Johnson has commented on this subject by saying that whether you ascribe to conditional election or unconditional election, it would not change the number of people who come into the kingdom.
C Michael Patton on 20 Nov 2008 at 5:42 pm #
Vance, I don’t think that admitting that there are good sensible people who disagree with a position that you hold necessitates saying that you believe that their option is viable. If that becomes the case, true argumentation is aborted due to some misunderstanding of what gentleness and respect mean. I am not saying that you are going in this direction, but when you say “I think if you find yourself only seeing one POSSIBLE exegetical option, then it may be that there is something too rigid somewhere in the exegesis.” Just by admiting possibilities does not admit such probability. In other words, there are lost of possibilities, but, in my opinion, one must uphold unconditional predestination along with human responsibility and out of necessity hold them in tension.
If I cannot make such a statement, then the true value of such search for truth is not present. In other words, when one says I have examined the evidence and I find such and such position wanting and without exegetical integrity, we are not saying that those who disagree with me are ignorant or less able to understand than me, but that my conclusions have left me no other alternative.
Not to throw and argument ad populum into this mix, but if you are around NT exegetical scholars enough, you would see there is not such balance of representation. Outside of a couple that I know (maybe only 1), there is a very strong consensus concerning passages such as Rom 8 and 9 that say the same thing. In fact, it would be hard to get an exegetical commentary published (outside of I.H. Marshall) that goes anywhere toward an Arminian interpretation. It would be left to the field of philosophy and theology to go there. So when I say that good unbiased exegesis normally heads in the Calvinistic camp, I think I speak with some informed judgement from a place that can make such a claim. What you do with it is up to you for the consesus is not always correct.
David on 20 Nov 2008 at 5:57 pm #
Ben Witherington just posted a rather controversial article from his side of the fence too. Wow is this a coincidence or what?
I think most of the Calvinists who fall prey to the “over-coherence” disease are usually closer to hyper-Calvinists. Two examples would be Gordon Clark and Vincent Cheung, as well as anyone who is an occasionalist.
Vance on 20 Nov 2008 at 6:28 pm #
Michael, I would agree that most scholarly exegesis leans toward a Calvinist understanding of those passages (although Roger Olsen would go the other way), and that (almost alone) prevent me from dismissing the argument altogether. And, yes, I know that you are not claiming that those who do not reach the same conclusion are ignorant.
What I am saying is that I think this is not an area where we can even remotely be certain enough about to hold a conclusion very tightly. And, I think that the fact that there IS, to our humans minds, a seeming contradiction between unconditional predestination and human responsibility/free will within Scripture should be a huge red flag that we are beyond our depth and are in the realm “God Things”. While we can lean toward one or the other being the predominate force, I think the “tension”, like ALL such tensions or contradictions, are the result of a human inability to truly interpret Scripture correctly because of our limited human experience and understanding.
In short, if this is true, and our human limitations prevent us from seeing through to a clear, uncontradictory answer, then I would see any exegesis as necessarily tentative and, thus, any conclusions to be drawn from such an exegesis as even more tentative.
And, Lisa, it is great to have the time to engage with such discussions again! I am involved in a “theodicy” discussion over at Cliff’s site as well:
http://cliff-martin.blogspot.com/2008/11/epicurus-and-problem-of-evil.html
C Michael Patton on 20 Nov 2008 at 6:31 pm #
David, very interesting is BW3 illustrates what I talked about concerning the misconception that many people have. Granted, I think that BW3 is referring to all five points of Calvinism, which can sometimes be forced, and with him I agree on this. But I also agree with you that the “over-coherence” should be seen as more of the hyper variety, not exegetical Calvinists.
I think we all need to look and see if we are being to modernistic in our theologies, attempting to have all “i”s dotted and all our “t”s crossed. God reveals himself truly, but not fully. That which he does reveal, we accept even if it does not fit into a nice neat package.
But, again, I stress, that this is not saying the same thing as “we should allow God to contradict himself.” If we go there, throw out all truth and belief all-together. Tension is not the same as contradition.
Vance on 20 Nov 2008 at 6:33 pm #
Wow, I just read Ben Witherington’s article and I see he is making some of the points I have been trying to make, but does a better job! :0)
As far as what God does reveal and it fitting into a neat package, I guess my point is that the lack of “fitting” is just as likely to be failure of exegesis as much as anything else. Rather than it being “well, God clearly says this and He clearly says this other thing, so we must accept both as true”, it might be that we have one or the other of those interpretations wrong. God may not be saying what we think he is saying at all.
Our human limitations are not just in overall understanding of “God Things” but in understanding Scriptural revelations in the first place.
C Michael Patton on 20 Nov 2008 at 6:35 pm #
Thanks Vance. Well said. BUT Olson is not an exegete. Witherington and I. H. Marshall are the two best examples of Arminian NT exegetes. However, I am hesitant to put Witherington in this camp as he is more of a NT historian.
My good friend Paul Copan from this blog is an Arminian and he is ten times the scholar and Christian I am so who am I to say to much
Vance on 20 Nov 2008 at 6:50 pm #
I agree with Witherington being an historian first and foremost, and I love Copan as well!
BTW, a new book which I am almost finished with and consider almost a “must read” for understanding the Old Testament is “Ancient Near Eastern Thought and the Old Testament: Introducing the Conceptual World of the Hebrew Bible” by Walton. An evangelical scholar who gets it right.
C Michael Patton on 20 Nov 2008 at 6:57 pm #
You would be jealous to know that I am here with Pete Enns at ETS. He has been discussing this a lot. Don’t agree with his conclusions, but I think his direction is good and challenging.
Vance on 20 Nov 2008 at 7:07 pm #
Oh, my, jealous indeed!! And you SHOULD agree with him! :0)
While I find his “incarnational” concepts interesting and very possible, I am still trying to work out whether I agree with it entirely. However, I find his approach to the text and his understanding of the ANE issues top notch.
davidbmc on 20 Nov 2008 at 9:04 pm #
Why is it assumed that the Arminian is the one re-defining predestination? Could it not be the Calvinist re-defining it?
dm
C Michael Patton on 20 Nov 2008 at 10:01 pm #
Yes, it could be David. The argument I am making here is not so much with which one is legitimate, but that Calvinism is not a system (at least at the most foundational levels) that is built upon rational intelligibility. It is a rather modest claim for this post, but it helpful to clear some misconceptions about motives in Calvinism.
jc.freak.arminian on 20 Nov 2008 at 10:12 pm #
I once wrote a paper for seminary describing how both Calvinism and Arminianism deals with tension. The difference is what we are comfortable keeping in tension. For the Arminian, the biggest issue is maintaining that God is love. Love is the thing that is compromised by the tension is Calvinism, “How is God love and just if He desires to skip over a certain number of persons for the display of His righteousness?”
However, the Calvinist is not willing to having tension which leaves God’s soveriegnty in the middles Thi is the tension that the Calvinist tries to solve.
In the end, there is always some level of mystery. The question isn’t which theology il smore consistant or logical, but which ils more biblical. Personally, I believe that to be Arminianism. ou are free to disagree though.
Lisa R on 20 Nov 2008 at 10:35 pm #
Vance, I read through some of the comments on the theodicy thread and can’t help but see the parallels to this thread, which I would sum up as our finite minds trying to understand an infinite God and how He works. We really do hate the tension, don’t we? Great responses in your interaction, btw.
C Michael Patton on 20 Nov 2008 at 10:45 pm #
Some great interaction here.
I think one of the difficulties that is being played out here is that most people are all defining or understanding Calvinism differently. This is somewhat justified, but some of these are very much charactures based upon people’s naturally assumptions. For example, most Calvinists believe that God loves everyone. It is a great mystery why he chooses some and not others. It is a great mystery that there is this decidedly different type of predestining love affecting the elect. But, once again, this is the mystery. Calvinists don’t solve it by saying that it is the fault of the person for being loved in a electing sort of way. All the elect deserve condemnation just as much as the non-elect.
Again, there is a great sense in which Calvinists are able to leave the mystery in tact while Arminians solve this mystery through theological adjustments.
davidbmc on 20 Nov 2008 at 10:49 pm #
Thanks for the clarification. My next question would be: Is it necessary for there to be tension for the theological position to be true?
If not, what’s the point?
If a theological answer exists that is biblically sound and logically consistent, I don’t see the need for tension.
(I am not arguing here that Arminianism is either biblically sound or logically consistent. But arm.’s would submit it is both, so then…my question.)
davidbmc on 20 Nov 2008 at 10:59 pm #
Again, there is a great sense in which Calvinists are able to leave the mystery in tact while Arminians solve this mystery through theological adjustments.
Sorry, but this is driving me nuts. Maybe they are not adjustments. Maybe they are just recognizing what is. Maybe the Calvinists are making adjustments. (I know you already answered this. No need to readdress it. I just wanted to point out that you did it again.)
For example, most Calvinists believe that God loves everyone.
I may be mistaken but I think it was a booklet by Arthur Pink I read where he laid out a fairly convincing case that God does NOT love everyone but only the elect. Of course, Pink alone certainly does not constitute “most Calvinists” so your point stands.

dm
jc.freak.arminian on 20 Nov 2008 at 11:03 pm #
“I think one of the difficulties that is being played out here is that most people are all defining or understanding Calvinism differently. This is somewhat justified, but some of these are very much charactures based upon people’s naturally assumptions. For example, most Calvinists believe that God loves everyone. It is a great mystery why he chooses some and not others. It is a great mystery that there is this decidedly different type of predestining love affecting the elect. But, once again, this is the mystery. Calvinists don’t solve it by saying that it is the fault of the person for being loved in a electing sort of way. All the elect deserve condemnation just as much as the non-elect. ”
I think you miss my point. Yes, Calvinists believe in God’s love, but Arminians also believe in God’s soveriegnty. I’m just pointing out that both sides possess tension. The differ on what subjeects they allow this tension to exist.
C Michael Patton on 20 Nov 2008 at 11:09 pm #
Thanks David. I am responding to the first (#48).
No, there is no sense in which something must be mysterious or full of tension to be true. I hope that I am not communicating this. I am simply responding to many non-Calvinists who suggest that Calvinist simply attempts to put all their systematic ducks in a row so that they feel consistant. This, as I have shown, is not the case.
It does not necessarily make it more or less true. Indeed, most of our faith should be understandable to a finite degree (relatively speaking).
However, one must also consider that people are not prone to create tensions as a first resort, but to solve them. As the text critic goes by the principle “The harder reading is usually the best” one has to see these principles of integrity applied to Calvinists to some degree. They don’t want to create a harder reading. In accepting it, against there will (no pun intended), it at least evidences that there might be more credence to their integrity than people give them credit for.
Truth first. If a theological system of consistancy is created, great. If not, then we must do all we can to resolve the tension and remain in the circle of fidelity. If tension cannot be resolve, we bow and submit it to an apophatic mystery. Remember, apophatic (mysterious/tension) truths are very much a part of the Christian faith. “The secret things” do still belong to the Lord. Not to any system, Calvinism or Arminianism. The question become Who is more willing to admit this and apply it when push comes to shove. My argument, at least in this case, is that advocates of unconditional election do.
C Michael Patton on 20 Nov 2008 at 11:13 pm #
I certianly don’t deny tension to both systems and I know that Arminians believe in divine sovereignty.
This post is primarily focused on the issue of unconditional election. This concept creates too much tension for the Arminian. Therefore, in my opinion, they are more willing to sacrafice biblical fidelity for internal consistancy. One should not be surprised that I say this. I don’t have to say that everyone is doing things right, they are just coming to different conclusions, do I?
Anyway, let me repeat a post that I made a while back. I really love Arminians dearly. I don’t think, at all, that they are somehow less spiritual or less enlightend, generally speaking, than Calvinists. I just believe that they are very wrong and don’t handle the text well in key passages.
jc.freak.arminian on 20 Nov 2008 at 11:36 pm #
Likewise micheal
. Its good to hear your irenic spirit.
davidbmc on 21 Nov 2008 at 12:06 am #
thanks michael. btw-enjoy the blog even though i rarely chime in.
dm
C Michael Patton on 21 Nov 2008 at 12:11 am #
Thanks David!
Chris on 21 Nov 2008 at 12:18 am #
Question (and being asked in a serious manner): What difference does it make in terms of salvation?
Jason on 21 Nov 2008 at 1:13 am #
A historian sits at the end of eternity, in his library he has the knowledge of every event that has happened since the beginning of time. He knows the contents of every book in his library.
The question is then asked. Does the historian cause the actions of those people whose history is recorded in his library?
If we then move him outside of time so he has the capability to interact with that history, to tell the characters events ahead of time, does his interaction cause their actions?
If he tells one group that their actions will bring about their destruction, but telling them causes them to change their ways so they are not destroyed, has his knowledge been invalidated or extended? Is it “changing his mind” to spare those who mend their way? Perhaps from the perspective of those within time it would look like that.
Extratemporal perspectives are hard to maintain.
rayner markley on 21 Nov 2008 at 11:14 am #
In strict predestination, God at some point created and predestined the creation, and since that act He has not predestined or adjusted anything. Everything unfolds according to the inflexible master plan. The God of predestination is thus an inflexible God. That doesn’t make Him any more sovereign than a flexible God would be. In fact, it is the picture of a limited God, who does not and cannot enjoy His creation. God made his creatures in order to give them a choice of good or evil, or faith or rejection.
Vance on 21 Nov 2008 at 11:56 am #
At the risk of angering folks who feel strongly on both sides of this issue, I will explain why I think this entire debate is a moot point, and much ado about nothing.
The reason this all goes round in circles and why, I believe, it makes no difference theologically is that, regardless of the degree of our free will (and I do believe we have such free will) and the degree of randomness in the universe (and I do believe God created a universe to operate entirely naturally), God, in His omniscience, chose the exact variation of such a universe that we have, in all its minute glory.
God, the omnipotent, is there, before time, and He can create as He sees fit. He has an infinite variety of choices on how and what to create, and He can foresee in that instant every tiny, minute variation of every split second of every bit of matter in every one of those infinite possibilities, and what chain of historical events occurs depends on exactly how He chooses to create. So, there is an infinite (and that infinite is an important concept here) number of variations of potential creations in which we exist with entire free will to choose God or not, one in which I choose God, for example, and one in which I don’t (not to mention one in which I type this post and one in which I don’t, etc, etc, etc, ad infinitum, and I *mean* ad infinitum).
So, even if this is a universe in which God has allowed, in His sovereignty, humans to have complete free will to choose or reject Him, He at the very beginning chose to create in THIS particular way, among the infinite possible ways to create, knowing EXACTLY how it would all turn out, who would choose and who would not, etc. God could have chosen to create a world in which I, in my completely free will, chose to reject God. But, He didn’t, He chose THIS chain of freely occurring, naturally happening events.
So, given this omnipotence and omniscience, whether or not we have entirely free will to reject or accept God becomes somewhat moot, since God made a purposeful choice to select the variation of creation in which every event in our history happened exactly as it did. This is not mere foreknowledge as the Arminian position stresses, but actual CHOOSING based on that foreknowledge, the EXACT results among the infinite possibilities, thus getting us to predestination in a very real sense. Yet, since the free will is entirely there, regardless of the fact that God chose the flavor of universe, responsibility exists as well.
So, yes, even if we have complete free will to choose God or reject Him subjectively (which I think is true), God still “predestined” in the sense of choosing that reality in which we either do or don’t. Thus, the seeming contradiction in Scripture, I believe, since both are true in a very real sense.
So, ultimately, while I side with the Arminian viewpoint on free will, possibly even semi-pelagian in some respects, I don’t see this as making really any difference and can’t get too worked up over it any more.
rayner markley on 21 Nov 2008 at 1:06 pm #
So if God with all his omniscience and omnipotence and perfection knew all that occurs in this chain of events, and He chose it, then if all his works are perfect we must live in a perfect world. I don’t think reality and scripture bear that out.
David on 21 Nov 2008 at 1:14 pm #
rayner markley,
Have you ever looked at the problem of evil?
Michael recently did a great job explaining it here:
http://www.reclaimingthemind.org/blog/2008/08/the-problem-of-evil-suffering-and-pain/
Vance on 21 Nov 2008 at 1:18 pm #
A perfect God does not have to create perfect world. He can create whatever world He chooses.
This bleeds over into the theodicy discussion I have been having elsewhere:
http://cliff-martin.blogspot.com/2008/11/epicurus-and-problem-of-evil.html
Edit: Ah, post crossed in the ether with the one above, I will have to check out Michael’s take and see whether we are thinking along the same lines.
Seth R. on 21 Nov 2008 at 1:35 pm #
If God truly is the “ground of all being,” then free will is impossible. The best you can hope for is illusory free will – you will never have the real thing.
Which leaves you two options.
Either deny human free will.
Or deny that God is the philosophical ground of all being.
I’ll leave it to you to decide which option is more scriptural.
Vance on 21 Nov 2008 at 1:55 pm #
Seth, even with the Absolute, we still have God as a creative force and, within that creation, God as the ground of all beings can create a space within which man can truly exercise free will in every real, subjective sense. If you read my post above, you will see that I fully grasp the idea that God, as the creative force of all reality, chooses the reality that He creates, but I need not deny free will as a true concept within that.
I find the “free will is just an illusion” argument as restrictive of God’s sovereignty as any Pelagian argument.
Seth R. on 21 Nov 2008 at 3:04 pm #
I sort of get that. Sort of anyway (I acknowledge it’s a tough field of argument).
It’s just that, as a theological matter, I do not think that predetermined results are logically coherent with the existence of free will.
It’s not enough to say that “God can do anything” when the thing you are talking about is logically impossible. It’s like saying God can make a rock so big he can’t lift it. You can appeal to mysteries, and omnipotence and all that. But not when the argument violates the basic law of non-contradiction.
I guess our true dispute would be whether free will is logically possible in a universe of predetermined results.
I would argue that it is not.
But this also rises from my own assumptions about God’s nature. My definition of omnipotence is the ability to do anything that is LOGICALLY POSSIBLE. Therefore, I see God as omnipotent in this sense. Perhaps you do not?
But if we are going to start talking about a God who can do things that are not logically possible, then you and I have no real basis for talking about God in the first place. Indeed, such a God gives us no reason to trust or have faith in Him either.
Jason on 21 Nov 2008 at 3:10 pm #
My contribution to Vance’s link.
kangaroodort on 21 Nov 2008 at 3:11 pm #
Mr. Patton,
Just a few quick comments with regards to two of your statements:
In the end, my argument is that the Arminian tradition attempts to reconcile tensions that are best left in tact for the sake of a rational understanding.
and…
This post is primarily focused on the issue of unconditional election. This concept creates too much tension for the Arminian.
I can only speak for myself but I do not reject unconditional election because it creates too much tension for me. I reject unconditional election because I do not see it in Scripture. I don’t see the need to reconcile tensions what do not exist in the Bible. Now you may say they exist but that brings us back to a matter of exegesis and interpretation.
I also reject Calvinism because I see so many Scriptures that seem to plainly contradict it as a system. And I do mean contradict (I am not referring to creating “tension”).
Now it seems that you became a Calvinist because you found some tensions in the Bible that you could not resolve without becoming a Calvinist but then you also affirm that you see Calvinism as superior because it holds to so many tensions. Strange.
Anyway, I am fine with you being a Calvinist but I get a little frustrated when Calvinists tell me why I hold to Arminianism and it seems that the two statements above get quite close to that. You are welcome to your tensions and you are welcome to see them as evidence for the truthfulness of your system but I think it is pushing it to tell Arminians that they are Arminians because certain concepts “create too much tension” for them, etc.
Also, when you affirm tensions that seem to me to be plain contradictions (though it seems you would deny that or at least try to “reconcile” it) you give up all rights to criticize an alternative theological system on rational or coherent grounds. You forfeit the right to point the finger at Arminian theology and say, “that doesn’t make sense with what the Bible says”, etc. You put your system in a position of being impossible to falsify and yet attack other positions based on incoherence.
Now maybe you have never done this. Maybe you have never said that Arminianism leads to conclusions that simply do not make sense or are incoherent, etc. But if you have attacked Arminianism on logical grounds with respect to what you perceive as Biblical realities, then you have no right to affirm “apparent” contradictions within your own system and even go so far as to make the acceptance of such “apparent” contradictions (“tensions”) into a pious act for the sake of just trying to be more honest with the Bible etc. Do you see where I am coming from? Hopefully I am misunderstanding you on this.
Let’s take another angle. You say the Bible teaches unconditional election (and you appeal to certain Scriptures) and I say the Bible teaches conditional election (and I appeal to certain Scriptures- and surprisingly some of the same Scriptures you think teach the opposite). Now, can’t I just as easily say that you reject conditional election due to the tension it creates for your view and your unwillingness to embrace those tensions? Maybe you reject conditional election because it creates too much tension for the Calvinist.
I hope my comments have been coherent
God Bless,
Ben
Luke on 21 Nov 2008 at 3:29 pm #
CMP,
I would argue that your point about the “majority” (your self-proclaimed reference to the argument ad populum) is incorrect. Well, maybe not technically, but I believe it’s much more balanced that you give it credit. In fact, I would argue that in academia as a whole we are seeing individuals distance themselves from Calvinism more and more everyday, particularly in the last 10 years as missional and canonical theology have picked up steem. Apart from the resurgence at institutions like SBTS, I would say Calvinism is actually losing ground. Regarding NT scholars, ones that come to my mind are David DeSilva, Joel B. Green, I. Howard Marshall, Ben Witherington, and James D.G. Dunn. These are just the very well-known guys that come to my mind that are not Calvinistic (perhaps you forgot about them). Also, I would argue N.T. Wright is not Calvinistic in the slightest, though he does describe himself as reformed (as far as the solas go at least). Believe it or not, I don’t consider Darrell Bock to be a Calvinist. Granted, I wouldn’t call him an Arminian, but I have heard him say some things that lead me to believe he is certainly not Calvinist. Regarding a NT prof at DTS who is not a Calvinist, Joseph Fantin. Regarding other scholars who may not be officially “exegetes” but who frequently write commentaries on the NT, see about the entire “Context Group” (Bruce Malina, John Pilch, Philip Esler, Jerome Neyrey, etc). Asbury Seminary has some excellent NT exegetes (besides Witherington), and none of them are Calvinists. I would also argue that those who lean toward the “New Perspective” theology are not Calvinists (as indicated above by my references to Dunn and Wright). Also, another well-known NT scholar who I don’t believe is a Calvinist is Richard Bauckham.
So, there is a whole slew of evidence for non-Calvinist NT exegetes who are very well-known. The list would be much longer for the other exegetes at major institutions that aren’t as well-known. This is why I’m clueless about your argument ad populum reference, because it just seems not to be the case at all…and you saying you could only think of 1 leaves me puzzled. Maybe the NT guys whom you read the most and are the most familiar with are Calvinists, but to claim that basically all are Calvinists is misleading and simply not true. I would even say with the groundbreaking work in hermeneutics and biblical theology within the last 20 years, more and more traditionally reformed folks are rethinking Calvinism and not ascribing to its points any longer. This isn’t to say they’re Arminian, but just that they’re not Calvinists anymore and refuse to give themselves a label.
Now, the list would be extremely long for other scholars who are non-Calvinists. The majority of missiology people are not Calvinists, and I have actually found that the vast majority of OT exegetes are not Calvinists (this includes those at DTS). From my view of things, the main bulk of Calvinists are your systematic theologians and a bulk of NT scholars at more reformed institutions (SBTS, RTS, WTS, GCTS, etc). Even at DTS, I would argue that many of the NT exegetes who would line up more under Calvinism don’t hold to it as tightly as you may think…apart from 1 or 2.
What do you think?
Luke on 21 Nov 2008 at 3:32 pm #
BTW, to classify Witherington as more of a historian I believe is misguided. A scholar who has written a commentary on just about every book of the NT (extensive commentary, mind you), and who works in the NT department at a seminary is an exegete. He may be both, but there is not a “he’s one more than the other” thing. He’s written one NT history book, but over a dozen commentaries, along with a 2-volume NT theology due to come out probably within a year.
Luke on 21 Nov 2008 at 3:44 pm #
Not to exhaust my point, but another NT scholar that came to mind that is not a Calvinist is Gorden D. Fee. Now, many of the scholars I’ve mentioned are not self-proclaimed Arminians (apart from Witherington and DeSilva and I think Green), but they would not take the “general consensus” on Romans 8-9 and Eph. 1, like you say. In fact, I have seen many a NT exegete actually laugh at how Calvinists take Romans 9, because it’s not speaking about individual salvation at all. Calvinists read things into it that aren’t there. So regarding “unbiased exegesis” (if there is such a thing), you are wrong to say it all falls on the Calvinistic spectrum in regards to those passages which you speak of (which are few, mind you, there’s much more to NT theology than those few passages).
Oh yeah, another well-known NT exegete who publicly denies Calvinism is William Klein who is a NT scholar at Denver Seminary. He has written a standard biblical interpretation book along with Blomberg and has been teaching for over 20 (maybe 30) years at Denver (a legit institution). Klein wrote possibly the best defense for corporate election in the last 50 years (“New Chosen People).
I’m sure I’ll think of more, but I will spare you the exhaustion. I think I’ve made my point, I would just like to hear your response.
kwk on 21 Nov 2008 at 3:44 pm #
Vance (#59),
I’m not sure I agree that God could have chosen any of a truly infinite variety of possible worlds. This reduces to “God could have created a world where everyone, of their own free will, chose Him.” If, following Luther, our free will is bound in such a way that, once we sin, we are unable to choose Him, then your hypothesis that we could choose Him in such a world presents a logical contradiction.
I think any world that allows free will of necessity means that some within that world will chose against Him (initially, and probably continuously). As far as I can tell, this means that I believe that we are in the best of all possible worlds, where “best” is measured by some metric such as “resulting in the most people saved” or, less anthropocentrically, “giving the most glory to God”. The alternative seems to me to be a world with no free will whatsoever, and my hunch is that such a world is much worse than just about any potential world that would include free will.
Vance on 21 Nov 2008 at 4:18 pm #
Yes, Seth and kwk, there is an underlying “circular reasoning”, but I think that God can, if He chooses, create a world in which man can freely choose to reject Him. The fact that God then chooses to create in the way He does KNOWING who will freely choose and who will deny (when He could have chosen differently), definitely does bring back predestination and *could* argue that the free will is just illusory. But let me explain why I go there.
First, we start with Scripture. The reason this is even a debate in the first place is that the Bible is chock full of texts which describe very clearly people making free choices and God letting them. This is too easily hand-waved away by those for whom these texts are uncomfortable. At the same time, we have, well, Romans. So, Scripture describes BOTH a predestination concept and a very real free will concept.
Second, for all intents and purposes, a universe in which God allowed me to freely make a cognitive choice to accept or reject Him would look and feel entirely the same regardless of the fact that God chose the universe variation in which I do just that. There is nothing internal within me that is different due to that fact, the choice is just as free.
Third, this free choice, even if it is predestined by God’s choice, puts the responsibility for any failure to accept God’s free gift squarely on my own shoulders.
As far as whether God could have chosen to create a world in which everyone chooses Him, that is absolutely true. Let’s face it, God is God, the possibilities of what He could have done ARE infinite, so given that infinity, there HAS to be that variation of possible results. I don’t see how we can get around that. But why God chose the particular one He did and not the one where everyone accepts Him I have no idea.
Seth R. on 21 Nov 2008 at 5:20 pm #
Vance, I just can’t get around the fact that God is supposed to have created people the way they were and are. This makes it really HIS decisions that are being made whenever a human being makes a choice (as it seems to him or her).
David on 21 Nov 2008 at 5:44 pm #
Seth R.,
This is more of a theological argument, but think about God’s mercy. Is it happenstance that our world magnifies this aspect of God’s personality?
I will try to be careful the way I formulate this because it is a very slippery argument.
1. God’s purpose in creation is to bring Himself the fullest glory
2. In a perfect world there would be no display of God’s mercy.
3. Without receiving mercy, the created realm lacks something with which to fully glorify God’s attributes.
Conclusion: An imperfect world is necessary to fully glorify God.
Now you might ask, but what about those who go to hell? Jonathan Edwards did some work on this from a similar angle that I have presented. Basically they are bringing glory to God by virtue of receiving justice, while the elect receive mercy. I still haven’t fully digested his stuff, but I’m chewing on it. Its an interesting take on things.
Luke on 21 Nov 2008 at 5:51 pm #
It’s a barbaric take on things that completely diminishes essential attributes about God and the incarnate Jesus Christ, IMO.
Luke on 21 Nov 2008 at 5:55 pm #
Sorry to exhaust the point again, CMP, but another legit NT exegete who is not a Calvinist (self-proclaimed un-Calvinist) that I forgot about is Scot McKnight. If I’m not mistaken, I don’t believe Klyne Snodgrass is either.
(now I’ll shutup)
Vance on 21 Nov 2008 at 6:19 pm #
Seth, I know how you feel, but within the context of this discussion, it is much more “moderate” than the Calvinist view in that it recognizes true free will in mechanics: we are actually making free will choices, we actually bear the responsibility. The fact that an omniscient and omnipotent God chose to create as He did is simply not something I see a way around. We can say, in the classic Arminian mode, that God created us with free will and “predestination” is simply foreknowledge in action. But the omniscience and omnipotence, working together, seems to compel the idea that when God created WITH that foreknowledge, he was choosing the results as well.
For me this also has the virtue of validating the seemingly contradictory Scripture on both sides.
Regardless, I think that what God is doing “under the hood”, the mechanics of how all of this works, is ultimately of little consequence. All we know subjectively is that God has offered us a free gift and we must choose to accept it. If that choice is compelled or predestined or simply foreknown, it doesn’t really matter because to our subjective minds it is all the same.
Seth R. on 21 Nov 2008 at 6:57 pm #
It’s not “all the same” to me.
Of course, there is a way around it. By doubt many here are willing to go there. It gives up too many foundational assumptions.
Vance on 21 Nov 2008 at 7:22 pm #
Well, yes, I suppose you could go the open theism route. My point was indeed based on not going that route. I am probably enough of a heretic going as far down the Pelagian road as I do! :0)
rayner markley on 21 Nov 2008 at 8:49 pm #
‘Now you might ask, but what about those who go to hell? …Basically they are bringing glory to God by virtue of receiving justice, while the elect receive mercy.’
I cannot agree with this. It’s a perverted sense of glory that is enhanced by the suffering of others. Another objection is that the purpose of justice is not to bring glory but to make right something that is wrong. God gives justice to everyone by offering mercy to everyone.
God did not create so that He could get glory by showing mercy; He created to share love. God is merciful, but God is not mercy. On the other hand, God is love.
C Michael Patton on 21 Nov 2008 at 9:28 pm #
Just really brief…been out of town and cannot check these much. Breezed through them.
Remember folks, the primary issue here is not so much whether someone is a Calvinist. Some people don’t call themselves Calvinists, necessarily, but still hold to a Calvinistic understanding of unconditional election.
My comments have primarily been concerned with exegesis of key passages (primarily Rom 9). I have almost every significant exegetical commentary on Romans that there is. By far, the mass majority of them lean toward some sort of unconditional election interpretation.
Tension is not the highest order of theology. Again, this post is primarily a response to those who say Calvinism is a result of rationalism (there are a lot of those). As my post has made clear, the foundation of Calvinism (an belief in unconditional election) is not following this pattern. Therefore, Calvinism cannot be accused of such. Arminianism, on the other hand, does follow this in its results. Therefore, my humble claim is that with this foundational issue Calvinism is the least “rational” option since there are tension.
Those who want to call it a contradiction don’t really know, in my opinion, what a contradiction is. There is such thing as a formal contradiction and a tension. A formal contradiction says that A cannot be -A in the same time and the same relationship. Calvinism’s belief in unconditional election and human responsibility in tension is not a formal contradiction since, like the Trinity, it is dealing with two different issues that seem, from the human perspective, to be at odd, but are not necessarily so.
Thanks all for the lively conversation.
Let me remind everyone to stay calm. Have your passions, but don’t get so offended. We are all people who love the same Lord. This conversation is good until people get too emotional.
Jonathan Perreault on 21 Nov 2008 at 11:58 pm #
Mr. Patton,
Early in the article you said: “The issue has to do with the basis of this predestining.” I’m not convinced this is the real issue. I hope we would all agree that the basis of God’s predestining is His foreknowledge (proginosko): “For whom He foreknew, He also predestined to become conformed to the image of His Son” (Rom. 8:29a).
There is another issue concerning predestination that I did not see brought out in your article, and that is the purpose of predestination. Paul specifically says the purpose of predestination is that believers “become conformed to the image of [God's] Son” (Rom. 8:29a). A similar emphasis is given by Paul in Ephesians 1:5,11. H. A. Ironside affirms:
“Turn to your Bible and read for yourself in the only two chapters in which this word “predestinate” or “predestined” is found. The first is Romans 8:29-30. The other chapter is Ephesians 1:5,11. You will note that there is no reference in these four verses to either Heaven or Hell, but to Christlikeness eventually. Nowhere are we told in Scripture that God predestined one man to be saved and another to be lost. Men are to be saved or lost eternally because of their attitude toward the Lord Jesus Christ.” (Ironside, Full Assurance, 93-94)
I’ve written a short article on Romans 8:29 over at Free Grace Free Speech.
JP
Luke on 22 Nov 2008 at 1:46 am #
CMP,
Since you seem to be exclusively referring to exegetical commentaries on Romans 9, then I apologize for misunderstanding you. However, I would note that the “majority” of exegetical commentaries follow the unconditional election and Calvinistic route on Romans 9 because most of the exegetical commentaries on Romans are by Calvinists (since they claim it is basically the most important book in the Bible). I would agree with that statement. However, James D.G. Dunn has written a major exegetical commentary on Romans and does not take this route. N.T. Wright wrote one that came out in 2003 (in the NIBC) and neither does he follow this route. Ben Witherington has an exegetical (more socio-rhetorical than exegetical, but exegetical nonetheless) commentary on Romans and flat out goes against this interpretation of Romans 9. Philip Esler has a work on Romans (“Conflict and Identity”) and does not go the unconditional election/Calvinistic route either.
Now, I agree that Schreiner, Moo, Barret, MacArthur, Cranfield, Morris, and Mounce all follow this route. But there are some good, exegetical commentaries that do not. Hence, not all exegetes follow the unconditional election/Calvinistic reading of Romans 9, it’s just that most of the technical/exegetical commentaries are by Calvinists. It’s really not as black and white as many think. You can be as Arminian as possible and be honest about Romans 9. I even think Greg Boyd does a wonderful treatment of Romans 9. Paul is difficult to understand sometimes, and this is a really difficult chapter. But one thing is does not do is lay out the doctrines of Calvinism as plain as day, that’s for sure. In fact, it’s not even speaking about individual election at all…it’s about Jews/Gentiles.
Luke on 22 Nov 2008 at 2:02 am #
By the way, who is that “1 person” you were referring to in regards to a NT exegete who doesn’t read unconditional election into Romans 9? Was it a commentary you were talking about? The reason I ask is because from the last post you seem to be alluding to exegetical commentaries you have that don’t follow that route, but from your earlier post you seem to be alluding to NT exegetes in general. So do exegetical commentaries follow the unconditional election route, or do NT exegetes in general?
I’m just a little confused because earlier you seemed to be communicating that you cannot be honest with Romans 9 without reading a Calvinistic interpretation of it, and that it would be hard to get published if you didn’t go that route. I believe I demonstrated quite clearly that it is not unanimous in NT circles regarding Romans 9, and even some exegetical commentaries don’t follow this route.
It’s like me saying you can’t be honest without having an Arminian interpretation of 1 Tim. 2, and no publisher would publish an exegetical commentary by one who reads Calvinism into it, so I hope you see my concern. I just don’t think it’s as unanimous and black/white as you say it is, but I would be happy to hear why you said what you did after reading what I have written.
Peter on 22 Nov 2008 at 6:54 am #
I don’t see any tension in the Calvinist system. “God did everything” leaves no tension. “God did everything” but man is nevertheless responsible, is doesn’t feel like a tension so much as a contradiction in terms. It denies the meaning of the word “responsible”, so is a kind of exercise in 1984 style double-think.
Orthodoxy really does leave the tension. It affirms predestination and free choice without attempting to define predestination as caused by God (Calvin), or by man (Arminius), but rather a synergistic combination of the two. You want tension, there you have the real thing.
C Michael Patton on 22 Nov 2008 at 9:14 am #
Luke, they are the same thing in the context in which I was writing.. (commentaries and NT exegetes).
As well, you must understand that NT scholarship is the broader field into which the exegetes would fit.
I never said it was unanoumous, just that the mass majority of NT exegetes. You would have to get into the fields of philosophy and theology (not NT theology) to find more balance.
In the end however, this is not the subject of this post. It is making me say things (hold things back) that don’t need to be said and amount to ad populum arguments which, while important in some circumstances, is not fitting unless really well done. So I don’t want to go any further with this.
Jugulum on 22 Nov 2008 at 11:19 am #
Peter,
1.) Arminianism is synergistic.
2.) Speaking as a Calvinist: If I thought “God did everything” was an adequate description of Calvinistic perspective, then I might agree with you.
C Michael Patton on 22 Nov 2008 at 1:07 pm #
Well, you have only scratched the surface here. And, as I said, it is the mass majority.
However, I would challenge you in your statement that most of them take an unconditional election view because they are Calvinist.
1. That is a big of question begging. I could simply say the same thing about the few Arminian commentaries.
2. I don’t believe that the Arminian can say they have Dunn on their side.
3. Finally, many of these commentators would not necessarily describe themselves as Calvinists. Exegetes, for the most part, you will find are very timid about subscribing to any theological system.
C Michael Patton on 22 Nov 2008 at 1:55 pm #
Luke, one other thing you have to consider is Roger Olson’s recent book on Arminianism. He is an Arminian who admits that Arminianism is rather taboo in Evangelical scholarship.
I think things are changing some as more respectable scholars are attempting to make stronger arguments for the position.
C Michael Patton on 22 Nov 2008 at 1:57 pm #
Luke, one more thing!
I wrote a response to a post (#88) that you made that no longer shows up. You may have deleted it.
Luke on 22 Nov 2008 at 2:53 pm #
CMP,
I didn’t delete anything. In fact, I haven’t written a post since late last night. I think I need to be a little more clear on my statement about them taking an unconditional view because they are Calvinist. My main point was that the reason most commentaries have this view is because most Romans commentaries are written by Calvinists. That was the only point I was trying to make.
As far as Dunn not being on the Arminian side, I never said this. In fact, I would say the majority of NT exegetes whom I mentioned were not Calvinists are not on the Arminian side, they are really on neither side. I was just making the point that there are a good number of evangelical NT exegetes that don’t take Romans 9 the way Calvinists do. There are a number of NT exegetes that could not only not sign on to all 5 point, but could hardly sign on to one or 2.
I believe Olson says this because most of the outspoken evangelicals are Calvinists. Because of the harsh rhetoric and controversy other reformed evangelicals have stirred up in regards to open theism, and since open theism is one step further than Arminianism, then that is a reason why it is taboo. I know very few evangelicals who would verbally affirm Arminianism, but I know many who would deny Calvinism…not just the term, but the beliefs as well. It all comes back to labels and semantics if you ask me. Just because hardly any NT exegetes verbally defend Arminianism does not mean that there aren’t who are more Arminian in their theology. For an evangelical NT exegete to come out and claim he’s Arminian or open theist is almost suicide for his/her career because of how harsh and vindictive many Calvinists are towards the labels.
Like I said, Calvinism may have been the predominate view for much of the time of evangelical NT scholarship, but I view things as changing a great deal with missional, canonical, and narrative theology on the rise. Not only are we seeing more and more NT scholars lose the Calvinist label, but we are seeing more and more deny Calvinistic teachings (Grant Osbourne, an excellent NT exegete, is another one I believe I forgot about). This is why I think the argument ad populum can no longer be said with any certainty. Calvinists in NT scholarship are much more outspoken about their system, and I think that’s the reason many think that most of NT scholarship is Calvinistic in regards to Romans 9 and other passages. Like I said, they are difficult passages to handle (for both sides, mind you), but especially with narrative criticism and missional theology, many are just seeing that it doesn’t fit into the “story” nor “mission” of God, and we must rethink our narrow exegesis and see things in light of the story. Personally, I think Christopher J.H. Wright’s view on election (as well as Frank Spina, Scot McKnight, and Joel Kaminsky’s) is the complete opposite of what Calvinists say, and this is because they read election as part of the grand meta-narrative of scripture as opposed to sticking to Paul’s letter and not looking at the bigger story. This especially play in to Romans 9 with the inclusion/exclusion of Gentiles/Jews. I think Doug Moo even understands this (though he does not subscribe) in his theological survey of Romans book. With a narrow and individualistic exegesis, then you may be right, but reading it as apart of the meta-narrative with a canonical exegesis/theology is the complete opposite. The great advances in hermeneutics in the last 20 or 30 years have helped us see this, it’s just that many evangelical seminaries are afraid to incorporate new things and methods into their curriculum. For instance, DTS for the most part is still stuck with a strict historical/grammatical approach, only concentrating still on form/source/redaction criticism from the mid 1900s (for most profs, not all by any means), as opposed to learning the social sciences, literary/narrative criticism, speech-act theory, cultural analysis, intertextuality, backgrounds, and theological hermeneutics. Reason being is because conservatives like to keep things the way they have always been and are skeptical of new things (which is a shame, in my mind). The other things are what the “liberals” do, so we shouldn’t do them. But since these criticisms have now been around for a while, they are beginning to make inroads to conservative scholarship and many are beginning to rethink some of these things (it will still just take a while to incorporate them in the curriculum at schools). With a strict historical-grammatical approach, Calvinism may seem easy to defend and read into passages such as Romans 9, but with a more holistic approach of all of these criticisms, then just about the opposite emerges. That’s why I say it can no longer be said to be the “mass majority” but only the “mass majority” at more reformed institutions. The sheer amount of names that I gave who are NT exegetes should be enough proof for that. There are some big-time NT scholars that just don’t go that route anymore, not only b/c they don’t like labels, but because they just think it’s wrong. Do you not see this?
C Michael Patton on 22 Nov 2008 at 3:02 pm #
Luke, we will just have to leave it at that, letting my previous comments stand. This does not need to turn on such a dime. My original post did not focus on the current state of scholarship, but the accusations that Arminians often make that Calvinists are attempting to be rationalists in their systems.
Not sure if you are able, but you should join ETS. It will help to give you a better understanding of the Evangelical ethos concerning this subject.
Luke on 22 Nov 2008 at 4:14 pm #
Sounds good CMP, sorry to get off topic.
Regarding ETS, I will join probably next year or something. I’ll probably be required to for my academic internship anyways. However, I certainly wouldn’t base my opinion of Calvinism/Arminianism and where evangelicals stand on the two in regards to my experience at ETS. The hard-nose Calvinists (Piper, Grudem, etc) have basically scared off the majority of the Arminians with their vicious rhetoric and hateful papers, so most of them just go to SBL now and gave up on ETS. They’re still evangelical, they’re just tired of everything I suppose. In fact, whether you like or hate open theism, the way many ETS members treated the open theists was just down right embarrassing, and personally that alone makes me want to stay away (even though I’m not an open theist). I mean, I think we both agree that open theists are Christ-loving people who are not “beyond the bounds,” they just may be a little off. To suggest that there is no way they can believe in inerrancy is akin to me (a non-Calvinist) saying there’s no way a Calvinist can believe in inerrancy. I personally don’t know if any of the excellent scholars I mentioned above are members of ETS anymore. It seems to have turned into the “RETS” (Reformed Evangelical Theological Society) instead of the ETS (in regards to NT scholarship, at least), though I am aware of a few non-Calvinists who still participate (certainly not NT scholars though). NT scholars who are Calvinists are the socially accepted norm at ETS, IMO. You’re asking for nothing but controversy and vitriol if you present a NT studies paper that suggests otherwise.
If I go next year, lets go out to eat together and I’ll buy you a beer. You down with that? If I don’t go next year then it will definitely be the year after that (if not both).
C Michael Patton on 22 Nov 2008 at 5:03 pm #
Sounds good brother.
I agree with you about ETS and Open Theists…hey they even let Preterists set up a booth there each year!
Anyway, I seriously doubt that Grudem and Piper are scaring people away. I don’t get that sense. However, that might be a good topic, but if Geisler got scared away (relatively speaking) I don’t think there is anyone there capible of producing enough scare factor on anyone!
I am biased, however, concerning scholarship that does not engage in such a forum. As Moreland has said before, it is a place to present your views and get critiqued. If you can’t take the critique then your position should not be responsibily put forward.
Wallace, for example, took both Borland (ETS Secretary) and Gorden Fee to task for their biased exegesis and text criticism. I doubt that either of them will retire from the society. If they did, rather than engage the criticism, I would say that they don’t get its purpose.
Nick on 23 Nov 2008 at 9:47 am #
My red flags go up when I hear that we believe things that don’t make sense. We believe things that we cannot fully comprehend, but I would not dare go to an Arian I’m trying to convert and when asked about the Trinity say “Well, it doesn’t make any sense, but you should believe it.”
IMHO saying a view is the least rational is a good reason to NOT believe that view.
Wm Tanksley on 23 Nov 2008 at 4:28 pm #
Busy thread! I’m sorry I got in so late.
Then you reject Augustine? And almost all of the other great doctors of the Church? It sounds like the only teaching you’d accept comes directly from the lips of the mystics.
If you accept any of the non-mystical teachers, you’re accepting the arguments they presented in favor of their ideas. Even if you accept the great doctors on the ground that they were approved by the Church, you still have to face that they were approved by means of logical examination of their arguments.
So no, rejecting “private judgment” (whatever that means) doesn’t immunize oneself from rationalism.
-Wm
Wm Tanksley on 23 Nov 2008 at 5:20 pm #
That’s why Calvinist teachers don’t say that (well, I dunno that someone might say that in order to get attention!). They say that God is sovereign over salvation, and man is held responsible to accept or reject Christ. These DO cause a reasonable tension in the listener; but tension is only a contradiction if there’s no possible way to resolve it.
In this case, there are a number of ways to resolve it.
Yes, those are two possible ways of resolving the tension. (I’m assuming that the second thing you’re describing is also known as “compatibilism”; I’ve never heard the words you’re using for that idea.) The existence of either one proves beyond a doubt that Calvinism does not require a contradiction on this point.
The tension remains, because the Bible doesn’t tell us how to resolve it; I personally find compatibilism most persuasive. Middle Knowledge seems to me to fall a little short — it’s useful only if you assume that God cannot control the desires of the souls He creates, but instead can only pick from a limited palette of souls.
Er… You’re confusing Arminians with Open Theists, I think. Most Arminians believe that God doesn’t change His plans; open theism is a much more recent innovation.
“… You thought that I was one just like yourself. But now I rebuke you…” (Ps. 50:21)
Are you claiming that this makes it EASY? There are tons of possible meanings. The hard thing is choosing any single one of them. The biggest help we have is that some of the apparent possibilities are simple contradictions of other Biblical texts or doctrines.
Two points.
First, our choices are real choices. We really DO accept or reject Christ, and we really WANT to do that, and we will truly be held responsible for that. This is perhaps MORE important with a compatibilist understanding of freedom, since we believe that our choices proceed directly from our core being rather than being something that could be different anytime they were retried.
Second, the testimony that God changes His mind is sparse, and all makes perfect sense as an anthropomorphism, the same sort of things as “…and God withheld His hand.” It also is very dependent on interpretation; many of the words involved have changed subtleties over the years, so that “it repented the LORD that He made man” doesn’t mean that He changed His mind or was caught by surprise; but that He was grieved.
I’ve really tried to understand WLC’s presentation of time, but failed. His work seems to me to be simply false, and the refutations I’ve seen make immensely more sense.
However, I don’t see how this matters; I know of a few prominent Calvinists who agree with his assessment of time.
And it’s interesting that you’d correctly point out that an Arminian uses middle knowledge after (above) claiming that Calvinists “end up” using it. I think middle knowledge is simply a slippery slope to Calvinism; if you accept that God knows all logical possibilities via middle knowledge, AND you accept that God can actually create any of those, you’re a Calvinist whether you accept it or not.
-Wm
C Michael Patton on 24 Nov 2008 at 4:12 am #
Nick, no one is saying that irrationalism is the pinnacle of spirituality. I believe that one should exhaust all possibilities to explain something while remaining faithful to the text. But when the explanations do not produce a rational conclusion, this does not mean they are necessarily irrational, but beyond our ability to understand.
This is the case with the Trinity. Do you think that modalism or Trinitarianism is more understandable? I would assume modalism since it tries to make rational sense out of the Biblical text, but, in the end, perverts its teachings to do so. Therefore, we hold to a less rational doctrine, but this does not make it irrational. It just means that it is beyond our rational to understand. Trinitarianism cannot solve the mystery, but leaves it in tact. I believe it is the same with the Calvinistic understanding of human responsibility and unconditional election.
kangaroodort on 24 Nov 2008 at 10:53 am #
Mr. Patton,
I don’t know if you responded to my post. One response looks like you may have had my post in mind but maybe not. I just want to make a few quick points and then I will leave it alone.
I don’t see any correlation between the supposed tensions in Calvinistic thought and the tensions in doctrines like the Trinity. The Trinity is beyond our ability to fully grasp but it is not irrational. It is logical to say that a being can exist in three persons (without understanding how that can be). But if we say that a person can also be three persons (one God and three Gods), well then we have problems.
Again, for me you need to presuppose unconditional election to make your point stand. Arminians do not reject unconditional election because of tension. They reject it because the they see the Bible teaching conditional election. Calvinists who see unconditional election in Scripture will usually not accept a universal atonement. And why not? Because there is no evidence for it in Scripture? Hardly. They reject it because it does not comport with their view of election (i.e. unconditional election). So they cannot live with the tension of unlimited atonement and unconditional election and proceed to try to explain away passages that seem to plainly teach unlimited atonement. The same could be said about warning and apostasy passages. So I just think your premise is entirely reversible and therefore invalid.
Now as far as mysteries and contradictions I think Calvinism is wrought with (real) contradictions. One example is determinism and choice. Calvinists say that God pre-determines everything (I know that some say He only pre-determines things that pertain to salvation, but that is a minority position). Now what I see as a contradiction is the notion of a pre-determined choice. If it is pre-determined then it is not really a choice. To choose we need viable options to choose from but if the only action truly available is the pre-determined one, then that is simply not choice. We can’t make “choices” in a deterministic worldview. We can only do things (things that we must do, things that were pre-determined for us to do).
So the Calvinist ends up either affirming choice and not choice (contradiction) or he redefines key words and empties them of normal meaning. For example, many Calvinists (compatibilists) re-define free will as doing what you want or desire (rather than making real choices as explained above). But if everything is pre-determined, then this includes our wants and desires (Calvinists often quote the proverb concerning God controlling the heart of the king). So free will quickly reduces to the “freedom” to do what God has pre-determined you must do; or the “freedom” to do that which you cannot possibly avoid. So freedom is redefined in such a way that it is no longer freedom. Therefore, free will really is just “determined” will and is no different than determinism. So all the Calvinist has proved is that determinism is compatible with determinism. The only alternative is to understand free will in a libertarian sense (the sense that most of the planet understands it to mean), but then we are affirming contradictions (not tensions) again.
This is just one example of many that could be cited. I personally just can’t buy the argument that Calvinists only affirm “apparent” contradictions. It seems to me that Calvinists just call these real contradictions “apparent” contradictions for the sake of side-stepping the obvious fact that their system would be in error if these contradictions were indeed real. But whether or not they can explain how these contradictions are only apparent, rather than real, remains to be seen. I, for one, have never seen this done, only asserted. And as I mentioned, appeals to mystery and comparisons to the Trinity just don’t cut it in my opinion.
Just some thoughts from the Arminian perspective. Take em’ or leave em’ and either way my prayer is that God will bless you as you continue to seek Him and His truth.
Ben
J's comment on 25 Nov 2008 at 10:09 am #
Wm Tanksley, you wrote that you can’t see how a view of time matters. However, other writers on this thread do, as do various evangelical theologians who have written on this topic. It matters because it helps us to understand, analyse and discuss how God knows the future after he creates the universe and creates time. It is no shame to admit that one does not yet understand the very complicated discussion of time, but that does not mean that the concept or discussion is inherently not undderstandable or irrelevant. Others do understand it and its importance.
One thing to bear in mind is that Calvinists and Armininians (to use shorthand) define several concepts differently, including “free will”. By the Arminians definition of “free will” the Cavilinsits do engage in the use of an actual contradiction, not merely a tension. In addition, Arminians define “free will” diferentlyu because they see the Bible as providing evidence for their definition of free will, and not providingiing evidence for the Calvinists definition.
Arminians see the many stories of choice as being real reports of what actually transpired and not merely some metaphorical symbol of something else. So for instance, in 1 Samuel 13:13–14 Samuel tells Saul that because of his rebellious (i.e., not following God) actions, “The Lord would have established your kingdom over Israel forever but now your kingdom will not continue.” That (the “would”) only makes sense if we accept as true the story told by the inspired writer of Samuel, that is, that God intended to establish Saul’s descendants as the permanent heir to the throne of Israel. But in the Calvinist view, God could not have really have planned on permanently establishing Saul’s throne, for he would have eternally foreknown that this wouldn’t happen. Thus a Calvinist would have to interpret the literal language in some sort of metaphorical or symbolic manner.
The prophet continues to make similar statements throughout 1 Samuel 15. In 1 Samuel 15:10 he reports that God said, “I regret that I made Saul king, for he has turned back from following me.” Earlier, in Genesis, we have Abraham and God discussion the saving of the City if differing numbers of upright men can be found.
More significant are passages like Exodus 32:33 where Moses writes that God said that he will blot out of His book all those who persist in rebellion against him. Why write them in there in the first place if God knows that they will rebel? Calvinists have to spiritualize the text and not take the versers literally (i.e., that there really is such a book and that God really did have to amend it). Or they say that the book is some other book and not a book of those whom God saves.
The Arminian takes these reports more literally than the Calvinist, and thus, I would argue, in a manner mrore faithful to the actual Biblical text.
Wm Tanksley on 25 Nov 2008 at 3:45 pm #
kangaroodort, I really like your nick.
I like this; you’re exactly on point and clearly stated. What you don’t do is interact with Calvinist’s explanations of their own positions, and if you’re going to claim a total contradiction, that’s an essential. Our arguments have exactly the same form as your non-contradiction defence of the Trinity!
See my post above for a brief look at some of the arguments. I won’t spend any more time on this here, because you make many other good points below.
I just don’t see how that’s true. The Bible is clear that there is a condition to salvation, but it never states that there’s a condition to election. You have to read that into the text. I understand that you reject unconditional election, and there are reasons for you to do so, but that rejection is based on the assumption that the conditions that apply to salvation also apply to election.
The problem with this assumption is that the Bible teaches that God saves us for His own good pleasure and based on his own eternal plan, not by works of righteousness that we have done; although our choice is crucial to salvation there’s also an aspect in which our choice has nothing to do with whether we will be saved.
I think this is an excellent rebuttal to his point. If he’d spent more time arguing from the Scriptures he could perhaps dodge this, but he didn’t.
Good argument.
One minor point before I address your detailed argument: the position that God only completely predetermines SOME things is not really a minority position; it’s not only common, it’s also supported by other positions, such as the agnostic position (we don’t know what He’s determined). Few Calvinists would say that God determines only salvational issues (arguably all of the prophecies are examples of His determination, and not all of them hinge on salvation), but the Bible leaves open the question of exactly what else is determined, mentioning only that God pays attention to tiny details, such as the number of hairs on your head or the fall of a sparrow. Taking note doesn’t mean He ordained those tiny issues from before the foundation of the world, but it does leave open the possibility.
I would find it perfectly reasonable to suppose that God ordained His regenerative power for each of His elect, and ordained His common grace to all the universe to bring about the existance of each of His elect, and no more than that. Some would take it farther, that God ordained every vibration of every molecule; but of course the Bible cannot tell us whether that’s true or even relevant.
There are two weaknesses in your argument. The first is that the argument is brittle because it claims a total contradiction, and thus can be rebutted simply by showing that there is a way to think about it without causing a contradiction. The second is more significant, since it actually addresses the content of your argument rather than the form.
The question you raise has to be settled by asking whether choices can be determined at all. It seems, by your argument, that free choices are absolutely never determined; in practice, this would imply that all free choices are entirely random. Thus, if I have a preexisting desire for Christ, and I choose Him, that is not a free choice, since it was at least partially determined by my preexisting desire.
But this leads to immediate absurdity. Surely I can freely choose something I desire; my desire makes the choice MORE mine, not less so. Therefore, we conclude that a free choice cannot usefully be defined by total nondeterminism. Free choices are at minimum determined by the subject’s desires.
But this is, of course, not enough to show that God can determine free choices. We have to go one short step further, and that is to show that God can determine the desires of a free person. And this is clearly the case; Gal 5:17 and 1Cor 2:17 make it clear that the desires “of the Spirit” are not available to the flesh, and that the “natural man” cannot even understand, much less desire, the things of the Spirit.
Once we see that there is a condition of man that is unregenerate, and that this condition does not include the desire for God or the things of God, then we see that it is sensible to speak of God being able to determine man’s free choices; since the natural (unregenerate) man freely follows his desires to reject God, and the Spiritual (regenerate) man freely follows his desires to accept God.
Here you do a quick survey of my points, but you completely fail to address them. Yes, free will can be determined; but since it cannot be otherwise, how is that a weakness? Doesn’t it make sense to you that a free man is free BECAUSE he is able to choose what he desires? The way the ‘libertarian’ definition works, it appears that a man would only be free if he could also choose what he does NOT desire. And that’s simply absurd. It would seem that choosing contrary to your own desire would imply a lack of freedom.
You also make the claim that most of the planet understands free will in your specific sense. I would certainly argue with that — most people don’t need to consider such abstract philosophy. In practical experience, most people are concerned with whether they can choose what they desire; they aren’t concerned with whether, all things being equal, they could choose something other than what they actually chose. Here’s what Wikipedia says about libertarian free will:
Now, are you sure you want to claim that most people worry about rewinding time? It would seem that the compatibilist definition of free will is not only sufficient for understanding free will (which it is), but the libertarian defintion actually goes too far by requiring a state of affairs which is impossible (rewinding time).
Can you distinguish “libertarian free will” from “compatibilist free will” without invoking an impossible state of affairs?
Praise God for our brotherhood in Christ, and thank you for teaching me.
-Wm
Wm Tanksley on 25 Nov 2008 at 5:53 pm #
Boy, was that puzzling… I had to read all my replies before I figured out what you were talking about. I never said that, and I recommend that you read more closely before lecturing. Suffice it to say that one’s view of the nature of time “matters”. What I was saying was that whether you accept or reject WLC’s view of time will not force you to accept or reject Calvinism.
Whether my logic has an actual contradiction doesn’t depend on your definitions. Actual contradictions require that no possible definitions allow the contradiction to be removed. If tensions became actual contradictions whenever the other side made a definition, the Trinity would be long since abandoned.
But let’s look at your evidences; this may be useful.
But first and most importantly, this isn’t what the text says. The text gives a simple counterfactual, something that we use in language all the time. At no point do most people assume that the conditional MUST be possible! Consider this: “If triangles had exactly five sides, then the sum of the angles of a triangle would equal 540 degrees.”
Second, this is beside the point. I’m not arguing that God must meticulously arrange every single event and detail in the world. I think a case can be made for that, but I’m not making it. Thus, even if God truly WAS caught by surprise by Saul’s failure, this wouldn’t affect our argument, because we’re discussing the Calvinistic doctrines of Grace, not the doctrine of sovereignty.
The question of whether God is caught by surprise or disappointed is a very important one, but we needn’t cover it here. Suffice it to say that Isa 46:9-10 is as true as all the stories you cite — except that Isa 46:9-10 is actually and directly making a statement of fact about God’s plans, while the stories are merely counterfactuals.
You’re not suggesting that God didn’t know how many righteous people were in Sodom, are you? I don’t see how else you could bring this up in this context. But that’s just plain silly; of course God knew how many righteous people there were.
What do you mean by this?
Yes, I’d read this “book” as being figurative; it appears that Moses meant it so, and there are no other Biblical references to it. Its meaning is sufficiently clear from Moses’ words; he’s either asking God to end his part in the story (to kill him), or to end his part with the people of God (to remove him from the tribe). He’s not asking God to take away his eternal salvation — nor would he, since he never refers to anything in that manner. If Moses were being literal, then perhaps there is an actual book that God “had written”, but if so, the verb tense would suggest that the book was already written before the events happened… an odd thing for an Arminian to claim.
It seems to me that you merely eisegete, or read more into these stories. The actual words the stories use don’t require the philosophical tenets you hold; they certainly accomodate them, but don’t require them. Meanwhile, explicit doctine teaches that God’s plans stand, and man’s heart is directed wherever God wills.
-Wm
John C. (formerly J's comment) on 27 Nov 2008 at 12:09 pm #
A counterfactual assumes the truth of its premise, a definition easily supported by an text on langauage or philosophy (as a quick check, one can go to the Stanford site and even Wikipedia is correct on this matter). Thus the reason that my citation oo the Saul and Samuel story is that God’s statement only makes sense if one assumes that the conditional premise is true in relation to the following proposition.
It is not necessary, in relation to the arguments I make, to infer or assume that God is the least beit surprised; and I do not so assume.
The difference between calvinists and arminians, which you make clear, is that they define free will differently. Arminians argue for a certain view of freewill as being correct. If that understanding of free will is correct, then the Calvinist position on free will is contradictory. That is, if there is a correct understanding of free will, and that correct understanding is the arminian one, and the Calvinists uses the correct (arminian) definition of free will, then the Calvinist will have to admit that she holds to a contradiction.
The calvinist only escapes the contradiction by using a different definition of free will. On that different definition she does not hold a contradiction. Perhaps I did not express it clearly enough, but those were my points on that topic.
Thus, given the importance of finding the correct definition of “free will” (is it the calviist or arminian definition), one then looks to the biblical text. And arminians claim that the text leads one to the arminiaan definition.
There is no indication in the text that either Moses or God are referring to a the book as a mere figure of speech. Rather, the narrative assumes the reality of such a book and the real possibility of being blotted out from it. God indicates to Moses that he will not blot out Moses’ name, but will, in fact, blot out others. God’s book is most likely the same book referred to in Revelation.
Wm Tanksley on 28 Nov 2008 at 5:33 pm #
Could you provide either link? My search of Wikipedia turns up this article, which says absolutely nothing about being required to assume the truth of the conditional.
The purpose of Samuel’s statement to Saul is completely obvious — he’s telling Saul that a specific great privilege is taken away, and why it was taken away. There’s nothing in the passage about God’s sovereign plan and man’s freedom; it gives us at most a hint that must be harmonized with texts that DO talk about God’s plan or man’s freedom and responsibility.
No, if the Arminian position on free will is correct, the Calvinist position is incorrect; not contradictory, but incorrect. A contradiction can only arise between two elements in the same logical system. But this is all circling the question, the REAL question: which view best fits the experiential and Biblical evidence, the Calvinist view or the Arminian view?
Well said. And Calvinists claim the same. The Calvinists bring forth verses that talk about God’s plan and power; Arminians bring forward verses that contain counterfactuals. Both positions can be defended, but I’m sticking with the direct doctrinal teaching rather than the inference from the wording in stories.
Yes. By not holding a contradiction at all, Calvinists narrowly evade holding a contradiction. Exactly. (That’s sarcasm.) Seriously, “not holding a contradiction” is a good thing. You don’t need to chide me about it, or accuse me of playing logical tricks by not holding to contradictory views.
Not true. Moses wasn’t asking God to literally blot him from a literal book. He was asking for something else, of which the blotting from a book was a symbol. Now, there may actually BE a book; but the book is secondary to what Moses was asking for.
I see why you’d think that; but I don’t think there’s any need to assume that, and there’s no ground for the assumption. The ONLY thing Moses and God make clear about God’s book is that God already wrote it, and that people can be wiped from it because of their sins. In Revelations we see multiple books (“and the books were opened, and another book was opened, which is the Book of Life”), and no mention is made of wiping anyone.
Am I missing something?
And how do you address the passages I brought forth? You’re very willing to discuss your stories, but what about my doctrinal verses? Don’t you think a verse talking directly about the plans of God is more useful to establish truth about the plans of God than a story about the historical actions of God?
-Wm
kangaroodort on 03 Dec 2008 at 9:56 am #
Wm,
I just noticed your comments above. It seems at one point that you think I am addressing something you wrote but my comments were directed to Mr. Patton and the OP. Anyway, I will address your comments. I really don’t have much time and you seem like a person who could really go on and on (and I tend to be the same sort of person) so I am not sure I will be responding further.
My computer is on the fritz and I just noticed that my copy and paste funtion isn’t working so my responses will be rather general.
First, I think I did demontstrate contradiction with the idea of predetermined choice. If a choice is predetermined then it is not a choice because there is nothing to choose from. One can only “act” in the predetermined way. The only way to avoid this is to empty “choice” of its normal meaning (which seems to be rather typical practice among determinists).
You mention desires predetermining our actions but that begs the question of determinism. I reject the idea that our desires have inherent weight and essentially cause us to make certain choices. Rather, we give weight to our desires and choose accordingly. That is what LFW essentially means. The agent is in control of his falculties given certain options (but if an option is not available then we do not in that case have the freedom to choose it, e.g. the depraved sinner cannot choose Christ without the Spirit intervening). His desires do not irresitibly control him. Rather, he controls his desires (i.e. decides which ones he will yield to or resist). This is biblically essential IMO when we consider basic biblical concepts like self-denial and self-sacrifice (really if God predetermines our desires and choices then sacrifice also quickly loses meaning IMO).
So I think the contradiction stands as real. Either the Calvinist ceases to use the language of choice (which contradicts Scripture as Scripture clearly speaks of choices) or adheres to real contradiction in positing predetermined choices. A predetermined choice (in the sense of God predetermining our every action from eternity) is as non-sensical as a square circle.
And I think you are in the minority in limiting God’s predetermining to only certain areas. I think most Calvinists would see this as a direct attack on God’s sovereignty since that is exactly how Calvinists typically define divine sovereignty (sovereignty=exhaustive determinism). It also conflicts with the typical (traditional) Calvinist view of foreknowledge which says that God can only foreknow what He decrees and will infallibly make happen. If you reject these features of Calvinism then I commend you, but you are certainly in the minority IMO.
You made a comment about people worrying about rewinding time. No, I don’t think that people worry about rewinding time since they realize that is impossible. But people do have regrets (even hard core determinists have them) which betrays an innate conviction that we truly could have made better choices than we actually did. If all of our actions are predetermined and in accord with God’s eternal decree then we should never have regrets. Why should I regret doing something God decreed for me to do and I had no power to do other than what I actually did?
So I do believe that based on the common experiences of regrets, deliberation, the use of persuasive language, and many others, most of the planet naturally concludes that we do have free will in the libertarian sense. And this comports perfectly with the Biblical data as well so there just is no reason to embrace determinism unless some theological system we are firmly commited to demands it. That’s how I see it, take it or leave it.
You also mentioned the possibility of salvation being conditional and not election. That seems rather strange to me as election is part of salvation. If salvation is conditonal then election is conditional. If election is unconditional then so is salvation. And just to clarify my position, I see election being primarily conditioned on being in Christ (i.e. being in union with Christ). The condition for being in Christ, however, is faith. Christ is the elect One and we share in His election and all the spiritual blessings that are found in Him through faith union with Him (Eph. 1:3, 4, 13).
And on a final note I just want to reinforce the point that Arminians do not believe we can choose against our greatest desire if greatest desire essentially equals the choice we make (which is tautological, don’t you think?). But we do sometimes choose against certain desires that we deem less important, and it is the God given ability to decide which desires are more important and to act accordingly which essentially defines LFW. Hope that at least helps to clarify things from the Arminian perspective.
God Bless,
Ben
Wm Tanksley on 04 Dec 2008 at 7:24 pm #
You’re smuggling in a definition of “choice”; one that you refer to as “its normal meaning”. But this reference begs the question of what the correct definition of the word “choice” is. No dictionary will help us here, of course, since the issue is hotly debated; and appeals to popular agreement won’t help because it’s a very deep philosophical issue. I propose that the proper thing to do is to keep an open mind and admit that both definitions are possibly valid, and then consider the big picture as it’s presented in Scripture.
No, Scripture won’t resolve the issue of what “choice” means, but it does address the questions of whether God is sovereign (He is, even over the small stuff and the choices of evil men) and whether man is responsible for all of his actions (he is, even for “every idle word”). We can argue about how to define words, but we can’t play balancing games: the two spheres of authority cover the exact same actions, so that for example both God and Saul are responsible in some meaning for the death of Saul.
Thus, any Biblically correct view must be — in some sense of the word — “compatibilist”. That’s not intended to say that the view historically known as “compatibilism” is correct, but the motivation behind it is.
I do claim that our desires determine our choices. If you disagree (and you do), I ask you to provide to me some explanation for “choice” that models your disagreement. I find it hard to reconcile with experience and Scripture to claim that our choices are entirely undetermined (i.e. random), and given that they seem determined, the most important determiner (on a moral level) would seem to be our desires.
This shouldn’t be confused with fatalistic or physicalistic determinism, where impersonal or external forces have exclusive control over a person’s actions. In Biblical compatibilism, it’s necessary to accept that a person’s actions stem from that person’s own desires (as James says), not any property of someone or something else.
But you do go into a bit more detail. Let’s look at that.
I do understand that, but it seems viciously circular. If our choices are determined entirely by our choice of which desire to favor, what determines our choices of what desires to favor? We are not eternal or necessary beings, so the regress cannot go on infinitely. In short, someone or something other than ourselves planted the desires we were born with and/or the desires thrust on us by our environment (we don’t need to argue nature versus nurture, since both are outside of “self”; I’m sure my current desires are a combination of both).
And yes, I can introspectively choose to act in order to cultivate new desires — but I do not GET the new desires simply because I want them, but rather because I choose to perform the actions that will build those desires in me instead of other actions which will accomplish something else. The time and effort I spend to develop those desires is time and effort I cannot spend on anything else.
Wait, are you admitting that the depraved sinner cannot choose Christ? It seems like you’re doing so, yet this is the entire core of the disagreement. Why do you say that the option of choosing Christ is not available to the depraved sinner? I agree with you, but I find it interesting that you would admit it. Do you also agree that the depraved sinner is failing morally when he does not choose Christ? If so, is it not true that God forced the depraved sinner to fail and not be saved, by your logic?
With that said: on what basis does a man control his desires? I agree that it’s possible to develop or suppress desires, but it seems that the actions required to carry out that development or suppressions would themselves be the result of choices earlier in time, which are also dictated by the desires at the time. It seems that if a man does not desire God, he would at least POSSIBLY not desire to develop the desires that would lead him to God; while if a man does desire God, even not knowing who He is, that man would desire to develop the desires that lead to God.
Sacrifice never loses meaning — it simply proves that you desire one thing more than another, even though that other thing is still worthy and good. “He is no fool who gives up what he cannot keep to gain what he cannot lose.” God doesn’t ask for sacrifice because He’s a killjoy; He asks for it in order to give us that which will give us the most delight, Himself.
And we will find, I believe, that in most of our sacrifices we’ll find that not only did we gain something better than what we lost, we actually don’t lose that which we thought we sacrificed: “whoever shall lose his life for My sake shall find it.”
I’ve seen a lot on both sides, and a lot who don’t take sides. Clearly the Bible says that God concerns Himself with the little things, but the Bible doesn’t say whether He decreed all of them from before the foundations of the Earth — only our salvation is declared to be decreed in Scripture.
I’m not sure whether you’re concerned with God’s decree (which is documented in Scripture to concern the salvation of man), or with God’s providential sovereignty (which is documented to be meticulous, down to the hairs on our head and the fall of a sparrow). I’m talking about his decree, and I don’t know how meticulous it it; I’d be surprised to find that God decreed man’s salvation without also meticulously decreeing the means to that salvation, but since the Bible doesn’t say anything about a meticulous decree, we can’t declare anything specific.
My point was that “most people”, contrary to your claim, don’t use your definition of “free will”. They don’t do that because it’s impractical and specifically requires rewinding time.
And regret doesn’t tell us that we could have done better; it only tells us that we should have done better. It’s not infallible either way, of course. Christians have always insisted that “can” does not imply “should”. It’s time to point out that “should” does not obviously imply “can”.
You’ve only talked about regrets, which doesn’t prove anything at all, as I showed. I’d like to hear more about deliberation and the use of persuasive language from your perspective — I know what I think about them, but I’d like to hear how you think they bolster your case.
But that’s the problem — it doesn’t attempt to comport with the Bible. The Bible urges us to choose, but it also tells us that we can’t choose without the Spirit of God.
I apologize for my unclarity; that was entirely my fault. By “salvation” I meant the future aspect — perhaps I should have said something like “resurrection”. Biblically, the resurrection is conditional on being in Christ. Being in Christ is conditional on coming to Him. Coming to Him is conditional on being drawn to Him by the Father.
In an ultimate sense, yes. But in a logical (and temporal) sequence, and for all practical purposes, no. The resurrection is temporally dependent on calling on Christ, which is dependent on believing in Him, which is dependent on hearing about Him. A person who’s never heard of Christ may be reasonably doubted to be saved (although we cannot know that God may intend that person to be saved tomorrow). A person who disbelieves in Christ may also be doubted to be saved (although God may have saved that person thanks to his past belief and be bringing him back). The logic doesn’t save; Christ does. But He saves by means of the things He has created; amongst them the belief of the sinner in the spoken Gospel.
But Romans 9:11 (for example) seems to simply rule that interpretation out — there God’s choice of Jacob over Esau in the womb is used to explain that God’s purpose is what drives election, not our deeds; and 9:16 even adds our desires to the list of things that God does not consider when graciously granting mercy. Ruling that interpretation of election out seems to be the primary purpose for which those sentences were placed into the argument!
I’m not sure that it clarifies anything for me; it sounds like you’re simply shifting the locus of freedom into ‘deciding’ rather than ‘choosing’. I’m not sure if you want to declare that there’s a difference between the two.
And yes, how we decide what our greatest desire is certainly is an important topic, perhaps even central, and it’s a shame that we haven’t discussed it. You’re right that by that phrasing it’s a waste of time. A more clear phrasing requires careful definitions… This will take a while.
At any given moment, we have to choose what action we will take from the actions that are immediately possible to us, and by acting on that choice, one excludes for the moment all other possible actions. For example, right now I can press down on a key on the keyboard, or I can extend my arm. I obviously chose to press down on a key (as part of typing this), and I chose not to extend my arm. Why did I make that choice? Because I desired to finish the word I was typing more than I desired a nice, relaxing stretch. Why? Because I desire maintaining my train of thought more than I value a little immediate comfort.
Furthermore, if one keeps asking “why” for each of one’s desires, there’s an ultimate personal purpose to all choices, a thing they all point towards. I might be typing this reply because I desire to rebel against God, or I might be typing it because I desire God above all else. This desire is at the core of my being, and there is nothing deeper. Why is there nothing deeper? Because there is nothing greater to desire or to reject than God, and we all know about Him thanks to His general revelation.
Here’s the difference between Calvinist compatibilism and Arminian libertarian free will: compatibilism says that our core desire, the desire to seek or reject God, is totally depraved by the fall, and that we cannot desire to change it because it IS the core desire, animating all others but not animated by any of them. Libertarian free will says that this desire, like all desires, can be changed by a simple action of the human will at any time, without necessary reference to any other desire, reason, or cause.
Do you think that’s an unfair portrayal of either viewpoint? I’m not intending to be unfair; I’m trying to be strictly accurate and precise.
(Both Calvinism and Arminianism agree that we can legitimately talk about “my” desire; fatalism denies that my desires or actions influence outcomes, and materialism/physicalism denies that desires even exist, since only matter/physics exists.)
I hope you have the time and interest to reply; I’m enjoying this discussion. I do agree that I tend to ramble on, so if you freely choose not to reply I won’t assume it’s because you’re totally depraved
.
-Wm
kangaroodort on 05 Dec 2008 at 1:38 pm #
Wm,
Just noticed your response. I do intend to respond but I am not sure I will be able to get to it today. If not, then I will respond on Monday. Have a good weekend and God Bless,
Ben
Doug Klein on 07 Dec 2008 at 8:20 pm #
The Arminian system rejects the truth of unconditional election etc. simply because they do not have ears to hear.
They interpret “God is love” to mean God has no hatred toward mankind. The Cavinist system alone sets forth the truth of irresistable election of those loved of the Lord, as well as the eternal damnation of those hated by the thrice holy God. What it boils down to is this, God does not love the non-elect. He will torture them for all eternity in His wrath and holy hatred toward them. The squeemish Arminian can not bear these facts, nor can any who are infected with the idea that God loves everybody.
jc.freak.arminian on 07 Dec 2008 at 8:45 pm #
“The Arminian system rejects the truth of unconditional election etc. simply because they do not have ears to hear. They interpret “God is love” to mean God has no hatred toward mankind. ”
That’s not really true. The primary Arminian doctrine is Atonement for All, because SCripture explicitly states that Christ died for the whole world. Do we understand “God is love” to mean God loves the whole world? No. We understand Scripture saying that God loved the world to mean that God loved the whole world.
But just because God possesses love for all, it doesn’t mean He bears no hatred. We always hate most that which we love because of our attachment. But God’s hatred is conditional on their rejection of Him.
Jason C on 07 Dec 2008 at 10:42 pm #
Will God torture, or is Hell a place of anguish and wailing, where those who rejected Christ’s salvation get to live out their eternity without Him, conscious ever of the great goodness that they chose to live without.
God’s hatred of sin, which is very real, and His hatred of sinners, which is also very real, is tempered by His great kindness which pours out rain on just and unjust alike.
Scripture does tell us that it is a terrible thing to fall into the hands of the Living God.
I’m glad I have no horse in this race.
Scripture Zealot on 07 Dec 2008 at 11:12 pm #
Doug you are referring to hyper-calvinism or something which isn’t to be confused with Calvinism. What is “irresistable election?”
Jeff, a Calvinist
kangaroodort on 08 Dec 2008 at 10:18 am #
Wm,
I am tempted to respond to every one of your points but that would make for a very long response and with further responses from you it would quickly lead to this discussion becoming unmanageable. So I will just try to focus on a few issues.
First, I am a little troubled that you found it strange that I hold to total depravity and the need for divine enablement for us to believe. That is the classical Arminian position and the position that Arminius himself strongly defended. It makes me wonder how much you really know of Arminianism and how much you have interacted with actual Arminians (many claim to be Arminians who are just non-Calvinists and really have no clue what Arminianism entails).
So let me just affirm that I do hold to total depravity and the necessity of God’s grace with regards to the ability of any sinner to exercise saving faith in Christ. More on that later.
You’re smuggling in a definition of “choice”; one that you refer to as “its normal meaning”. But this reference begs the question of what the correct definition of the word “choice” is. No dictionary will help us here, of course, since the issue is hotly debated; and appeals to popular agreement won’t help because it’s a very deep philosophical issue. I propose that the proper thing to do is to keep an open mind and admit that both definitions are possibly valid, and then consider the big picture as it’s presented in Scripture.
How about we just work with the definition you provided later on in your response:
At any given moment, we have to choose what action we will take from the actions that are immediately possible to us, and by acting on that choice, one excludes for the moment all other possible actions.
So it seems that you see choice as acting on a certain course of action among various other possible courses of action. I agree, and that is exactly why predetermined choice is a contradiction in terms. If our actions are all predetermined by God then there is really only one possible course of action available to us- the one that God predetermined for us from eternity. So in the absence of legitimate options choice loses all meaning as you in fact seem to plainly recognize. So I think you have demonstrated the reality of the contradiction rather well. Thanks for making that so easy for me.
I do claim that our desires determine our choices. If you disagree (and you do), I ask you to provide to me some explanation for “choice” that models your disagreement.
See above.
I find it hard to reconcile with experience and Scripture to claim that our choices are entirely undetermined (i.e. random), and given that they seem determined, the most important determiner (on a moral level) would seem to be our desires.
I never claimed that our choices are undetermined or random. They are determined by the free agent who exercises his God given capacity/ability to choose among various possible options.
This shouldn’t be confused with fatalistic or physicalistic determinism, where impersonal or external forces have exclusive control over a person’s actions.
Well, since God determines our every thought and desire and God is external to us then I am not sure how your view differs significantly from what you describe here.
In Biblical compatibilism, it’s necessary to accept that a person’s actions stem from that person’s own desires (as James says), not any property of someone or something else.
They can certainly be said to stem from our desires when we willingly yield to those desires, but your view has those desires and thoughts originating with God which, God forbid, means that every sinful thought and desire originates from Him as well. This conflicts with what James says concerning God not tempting us. In fact, if exhaustive determinism is correct (which you seem to at least cautiously embrace) then God does worse than tempt us since temptation can at least be resisted (1 Cor. 10:13), while God’s control of our thoughts and desires (including prevailing desires) cannot be resisted. That would seem to dramatically weaken the obvious outrage James seems to think one should have at the thought of God tempting us to sin.
I do understand that, but it seems viciously circular. If our choices are determined entirely by our choice of which desire to favor, what determines our choices of what desires to favor?
Do you not see how you are again begging the question of determinism here? You are essentially saying, if nothing determines our desires then what determines our desires (which assumes what is yet to be proved, that our desires are determined)?
Desires and influences arise from many different places and some of those desires arise without us having any control over them. Yet, there is no reason to believe that those desires and influences hold irresistible sway over us once they present themselves. That is the point of contention. So again, the free agent, made in the image of God, with the God given capacity to make choices, is the one who determines which desires he will yield to and what desires he will resist. That is as far as it goes. There is no “well what determines…”, that is clearly begging the question.
And if you feel that these desires themselves have the power to irresistibly influence us where do you suppose they get that power? What basis do you have for assigning such power to desires that you deny to the person. If desires can determine things then why can’t we?
We are not eternal or necessary beings, so the regress cannot go on infinitely. In short, someone or something other than ourselves planted the desires we were born with and/or the desires thrust on us by our environment (we don’t need to argue nature versus nurture, since both are outside of “self”; I’m sure my current desires are a combination of both).
And this line of reasoning lays the blame for all sin and evil right at the foot of God Himself. And there is no infinite regress. It stops with the person. The person determines his/her choices because God created the person with that power/ability.
And yes, I can introspectively choose to act in order to cultivate new desires — but I do not GET the new desires simply because I want them, but rather because I choose to perform the actions that will build those desires in me instead of other actions which will accomplish something else. The time and effort I spend to develop those desires is time and effort I cannot spend on anything else.
And here you use the language of LFW to argue for determinism (notice you basically concede that we can direct and control our desires, my point exactly). Interesting. This just underscores how difficult it is to define and communicate compatibilistic determinism with normal language. One must really re-write the dictionary to get any traction.
Wait, are you admitting that the depraved sinner cannot choose Christ? It seems like you’re doing so, yet this is the entire core of the disagreement. Why do you say that the option of choosing Christ is not available to the depraved sinner? I agree with you, but I find it interesting that you would admit it. Do you also agree that the depraved sinner is failing morally when he does not choose Christ? If so, is it not true that God forced the depraved sinner to fail and not be saved, by your logic?
Remember when I said that choice has reference to available options? You seemed to agree as well. So quite simply, faith in Christ is not an available option for the sinner until the influence and empowering of the Spirit is brought to bear on him. Once his depravity is overcome by the Spirit of God then he is enabled to make a real choice, to yield to God in faith or resist Him in unbelief. None of this conflicts with anything I have said.
With that said: on what basis does a man control his desires?
On the basis of the God given ability to do so. Simple.
I agree that it’s possible to develop or suppress desires, but it seems that the actions required to carry out that development or suppressions would themselves be the result of choices earlier in time, which are also dictated by the desires at the time. It seems that if a man does not desire God, he would at least POSSIBLY not desire to develop the desires that would lead him to God; while if a man does desire God, even not knowing who He is, that man would desire to develop the desires that lead to God.
Which is exactly why we need God’s enabling power in order to even begin to desire a relationship with Him.
Sacrifice never loses meaning — it simply proves that you desire one thing more than another, even though that other thing is still worthy and good. “He is no fool who gives up what he cannot keep to gain what he cannot lose.” God doesn’t ask for sacrifice because He’s a killjoy; He asks for it in order to give us that which will give us the most delight, Himself.
But this is a very man centered view of sacrifice. There is the perspective of God to consider. Why would God find pleasure in “sacrifice” if He controls our every thought and desire. It is in the submitting of our will to the will of God that sacrifice, self-denial, self-control, etc. have any meaning. If we do not control our wills then we cannot surrender them to the Lord which is the essence of sacrifice. And if we cannot control our desires then how can we control our “selfs”?
And we will find, I believe, that in most of our sacrifices we’ll find that not only did we gain something better than what we lost, we actually don’t lose that which we thought we sacrificed: “whoever shall lose his life for My sake shall find it.”
And it is because we have some control over the course of our lives that we are able to surrender ourselves to God. We cannot surrender that which we have no control over and I can’t imagine why God would find pleasure in “sacrifices” that He irresistibly causes His creatures to make.
I’ve seen a lot on both sides, and a lot who don’t take sides. Clearly the Bible says that God concerns Himself with the little things, but the Bible doesn’t say whether He decreed all of them from before the foundations of the Earth — only our salvation is declared to be decreed in Scripture.
I’m not sure whether you’re concerned with God’s decree (which is documented in Scripture to concern the salvation of man), or with God’s providential sovereignty (which is documented to be meticulous, down to the hairs on our head and the fall of a sparrow). I’m talking about his decree, and I don’t know how meticulous it it; I’d be surprised to find that God decreed man’s salvation without also meticulously decreeing the means to that salvation, but since the Bible doesn’t say anything about a meticulous decree, we can’t declare anything specific.
Actually, I can’t find where the Bible says anything about God’s “decrees” at all.
My point was that “most people”, contrary to your claim, don’t use your definition of “free will”. They don’t do that because it’s impractical and specifically requires rewinding time.
Well, I think you are quite obviously wrong about that but that is something that is very hard to “prove” from either side so I won’t dwell on it. But I will mention that you even conceded that choice involves available options (i.e. real possibilities) which I think further proves my point since most people understand choice that way which completely undermines exhaustive determinism as I explained above.
And regret doesn’t tell us that we could have done better; it only tells us that we should have done better. It’s not infallible either way, of course. Christians have always insisted that “can” does not imply “should”.
That is simply false. Calvinists/determinists might have always argued that way but the early Christians (before Augustine and most after) all argued that “should” implies “can” (Augustine also argued that way until his later years when he began to fall back upon his previous commitment to Gnostic determinism in debating the Pelagians). And appealing to our inability to fulfill the law is really invalid, but I won’t go there unless you do.
You’ve only talked about regrets, which doesn’t prove anything at all, as I showed. I’d like to hear more about deliberation and the use of persuasive language from your perspective — I know what I think about them, but I’d like to hear how you think they bolster your case.
I already explained it. If my every decision was predetermined by God according to His infallible decree then I should never regret anything I have done. Why on earth would I regret doing those things that God predetermined for me to do? I would like to hear your answer to that question.
But that’s the problem — it doesn’t attempt to comport with the Bible. The Bible urges us to choose, but it also tells us that we can’t choose without the Spirit of God.
Well, with regards to salvation this is the case but those who hear the gospel (what the Bible “urges” us to accept) are empowered by the Spirit and then they have a real choice to make among two available options- faith or unbelief. With regards to everyday choices that do not concern our faith response to God, we certainly have the power to make legitimate choices. BTW, are you suggesting that at least believers have LFW?
I apologize for my unclarity; that was entirely my fault. By “salvation” I meant the future aspect — perhaps I should have said something like “resurrection”. Biblically, the resurrection is conditional on being in Christ. Being in Christ is conditional on coming to Him. Coming to Him is conditional on being drawn to Him by the Father.
All spiritual blessings are conditioned on being in Christ (Eph. 1:3).
I wrote:
“If election is unconditional then so is salvation.”
You answered:
In an ultimate sense, yes. But in a logical (and temporal) sequence, and for all practical purposes, no. The resurrection is temporally dependent on calling on Christ, which is dependent on believing in Him, which is dependent on hearing about Him. A person who’s never heard of Christ may be reasonably doubted to be saved (although we cannot know that God may intend that person to be saved tomorrow). A person who disbelieves in Christ may also be doubted to be saved (although God may have saved that person thanks to his past belief and be bringing him back). The logic doesn’t save; Christ does. But He saves by means of the things He has created; amongst them the belief of the sinner in the spoken Gospel.
I agree with some of this but not all. It seems a little convoluted. I am trying to focus on the reality of the situation and not on how things may just seem from our temporal perspective. If you agree that the election we are discussing is an election to salvation then I don’t see how you can possibly escape the conclusion that if election is unconditional, so is salvation. I guess I see like it like this:
1) Election is unto salvation (i.e. chosen for salvation)
2) This election is unconditional and irrevocable
3) Therefore, salvation is unconditional
But Romans 9:11 (for example) seems to simply rule that interpretation out — there God’s choice of Jacob over Esau in the womb is used to explain that God’s purpose is what drives election, not our deeds; and 9:16 even adds our desires to the list of things that God does not consider when graciously granting mercy. Ruling that interpretation of election out seems to be the primary purpose for which those sentences were placed into the argument!
I hesitate to even get into this as I think it will take us in too many other directions. It does seem that there is a subtle concession concerning my understanding of Eph. 1:4 in your response since you immediately run to Rom. 9:11 rather than focusing on the context of Eph. 1:4.
The “good” or “bad” in the context of Romans 9-11 has reference to the works of the law and not to faith or unbelief. And the objection being addressed with regards to our desires/will has nothing to do with Arminianism vs. Calvinism. It has reference to the Jews’ belief that God had to save them according to their terms (i.e. unconditionally, based on the covenant promises made to the patriarchs). God is saying that He determines the condition for salvation and if He determines that the condition for salvation is faith in Christ (for both Jew and Gentile) then they have no right to object. Much more could be said on that but this post is already way too long.
Here’s the difference between Calvinist compatibilism and Arminian libertarian free will: compatibilism says that our core desire, the desire to seek or reject God, is totally depraved by the fall, and that we cannot desire to change it because it IS the core desire, animating all others but not animated by any of them. Libertarian free will says that this desire, like all desires, can be changed by a simple action of the human will at any time, without necessary reference to any other desire, reason, or cause.
Well, this is a total mischaracterization of LFW from the Arminian perspective. Arminians believe that no one can choose God prior to God’s intervention. God must graciously enable the depraved sinner to respond to the gospel. The real point of controversy resides in what happens after we are enabled to believe. The Arminian believes we are free to surrender to the truth of the gospel at that point and also free to resist it. The Calvinist believes that God overcomes depravity through irresistible regeneration and that this regeneration inevitably results in faith. So it really boils down to whether or not God’s grace is resistible or not. Arminians say yes and Calvinists say no.
Do you think that’s an unfair portrayal of either viewpoint? I’m not intending to be unfair; I’m trying to be strictly accurate and precise.
Yes, some of it is unfair as explained above.
God Bless,
Ben
John C. (formerly J's comment) on 08 Dec 2008 at 12:51 pm #
” What it boils down to is this, God does not love the non-elect. He will torture them for all eternity in His wrath and holy hatred toward them. The squeemish Arminian can not bear these facts, nor can any who are infected with the idea that God loves everybody.”
How is it squeemish to be morally, emotionally and intellectually appalled at that line of thinking? How is it great or good on the part of Calvinists to be proud of such a portrayal of God that they wear it like some badge of honour? Yes, the heroic and stoic Calvinist says, “yeah, only mature christians can accept that God will torture people in hell for ever and ever even though they were born in sin and so naturally rejected God and he decided not to rescue them.”
That “squeemishness” is something that most people feel when confronting that version of the doctrine because it is a reflection of the moral sense of God, the image of God, that still residiens in all humans. Yes, all are depraved, and depraved in every facet of their being, but not completelyand toatally depraved to the exclusion of any goodness at all. Even classic five-point Calvinists don’t believe in the complete depravitiy of human kind to the exclusion of any remainder at all of God’s original good creation. It is that residual–and proper–moral sense that must be (wrongly) overcome. We should be appalled; that’s how we were created, to recognize appalling immorality. Arminians are right to be squeenish; Calvinists are wrong not to be (I recognize that not all Calvinists take as extreme a position. However, I’m appaled by even some of their less rigourous and extreme formulations).
John C.
John C. (formerly J's comment) on 08 Dec 2008 at 1:33 pm #
On counterfactuals. As indicated below, a counterfactual makes no sense unless one can ascribe truth value to the antecedent part of the conditional (the “if” clause). Of course, in a historical sense it cannot be true since it did not come to pass, but there would not be any point in talking about the counterfactual unless it could have been true.
From the wikipedia article on “counterfactual conditional”: A counterfactual conditional, subjunctive conditional, or remote conditional, is a conditional (or “if-then”) statement indicating what would be the case if its antecedent were true. ” The following is given as an example: “The counterfactual conditional is the basis of experimental methods for establishing causality in medicine, natural and social sciences, e.g., whether taking antibiotics helps cure bacterial infection. For every individual, u, there is a function that specifies the state of u’s infection under two hypothetical conditions: had u taken antibiotic and had u not taken antibiotic. Only one of these states can be observed, since the other one is literally “counter factual.” The overall effect of antibiotic on infection is defined as the difference between these two states, averaged over the entire population. If the treatment and control groups are selected at random, the effect of antibiotic can be estimated by comparing the rates of recovery in the two groups.” That is, hwere a jdrug is found to be effective, then one could say about the person who did not take it, “he would have gotten better more quickly if he had taken the drug”.
In logic, of course, it is possible to construct conditionals that have no truth value, but that is not the sort of statement that I was pointing to in the Biblical text.
The SIL website defines a counterfactual conditional as: “A counterfactual conditional relation is a conditional relation in which the form of expression of the antecedent and consequent marks them as imagined, nonfactual states or events.”
What I meant by truth value is that in the type of text we encounter in the biblical story, the truth of the consequent can only make sense if it is possible for the antecedent to be true.
What counterfactuals engage, in their ordinary use in language, is a shared sest of facts or assumptions between the speaker and hearer regarding the two haves of the conditional. That is, there are things outside of the conditional statement itself that must be regarded. The formal reasoning grup at Stanford University site notes, “The truth of a counterfactual does not just depend on the state of the world the way a direct observation does. There is always a theory–in the above example, an implicit theory of driving shared by the passenger and the driver. The theory is based on their experience and what they have learned and been taught about driving. [referring to an example of a counterfactual used in the description of a car going over a hill]”
My point being that it renders the Biblical text nonsensical and irrelevant to say that God a(and we) regard the antecedent condition as impossible, and that the entire counterfactual is devoid of any truth. And, hence, if we are to give it any meaning at all, it must include the meaning that the choice was real and not merely apparent.
John C. (formerly J's comment) on 08 Dec 2008 at 1:43 pm #
In the interest of useful use of language: Since some of what is discussed in teh above responses involves the use of logic, it would be preferable if some care were taken with the use of expressions used by logicians. So, I quote from a web site to spare the trouble of much typing, “”Begging the question” is a form of logical fallacy in which a statement or claim is assumed to be true without evidence other than the statement or claim itself. When one begs the question, the initial assumption of a statement is treated as already proven without any logic to show why the statement is true in the first place.
A simple example would be “I think he is unattractive because he is ugly.” The adjective “ugly” does not explain why the subject is “unattractive” — they virtually amount to the same subjective meaning, and the proof is merely a restatement of the premise. The sentence has begged the question.
What is it Not?
To beg the question does not mean “to raise the question.” (e.g. “It begs the question, why is he so dumb?”) This is a common error of usage made by those who mistake the word “question” in the phrase to refer to a literal question. Sadly, the error has grown more and more common with time, such that even journalists, advertisers, and major mass media entities have fallen prey to “BTQ Abuse.”"
John C. on 08 Dec 2008 at 2:45 pm #
Kangaroodoort picked up an important point, that Arminians don’t believe that a freely exercised chouice must be random if it is not determined. To argue thusly is, in fact, to repeat a criticism of David Hume. According to David Hume, if a choice is not determined then it is simply a random event; nothing else is logically possible. Therefore, our experience of our own free will could be an illusion. However, libertarians could point out that people can’t experience things that are logically impossible. For example, people can’t imagine a perfect circle that’s also a perfect square. Therefore, if we experience our own free will, then it must be logically possible.
Compatiblists, such as Wm. T. above, respond to Arminian challenges by coming up with a determinism-friendly re-definition of “free choice” — typically, a choice that is not made under duress. and this is what I was responding to.
To use the easily available Wikipedia (which, though often biased and incorrect, is also often correct) rather than books, Arminians are metaphysical libertarians. That is, they subscribe to the position of incompatibilism which states that an action cannot be both free and physically predetermined in the commonly understood sense. Free actions for the libertarian are ones which could have been different. Traditionally, this has meant that there is no causal chain that necessitated the action prior to the agent freely choosing it; the agent is an originator of causal chains. Libertarianism is contrasted with determinism, which holds that all human actions are predetermined, and compatibilism, which argues determinism is compatible with free will.
In rejecting compatibilism, libertarians have developed alternative positions on the relationship between free will and determinism. One perspective is that humans have a special exemption from the determinism that applies to everything else—for example a soul or dualistically-conceived mind. This position is referred to as supernatural libertarianism. Alternatively, the libertarian may claim that the world in general is not strictly deterministic, and humans (and perhaps other entities) are able to exploit the resulting “elbow room” to make free decisions. This is naturalistic libertarianism.
Arminians start with an immediate advantage over Calvinists, in that it is the expereience of humans across cultures and throughout written literature and oral traditin, that a person “cold have done otherswise” ibn a specific situation. It is indeed quite abnormal for a person to think along compatibilist lines–unless one is a western philosopher (including Calvinism) or a materialist. The Arminian position is the intuitive one.
But of course, that does not settle the matter. One must look at how God revealos himslef and reveals facts about how we are and how the world is. The Biblical text naturally reads in an Arminian fashion, and one must bring into the text a compatiblist framework to reinterpret what otherwise asppears to be happening in the Biblical stories as related by God through his prophets.
This last point is what critics of Calvinism are referring to when they say that Calvinism lacks integrity in addressing the Biblical text and in forcing the texts to abide by a system (that starts with a “compatibilist” philosphical system based on an incorrect interpretation of a few verses). That is why Arminians say that they face the tension and that Calvinists dismiss the tension by using a system that has an answer for the tension, the answer being “compatibilism”. Compatiblism does not maintain or live with the tension; it res resolves the tension. It is “tidy”, and wraps up the loose ends.
Arminians, on the other hand, maintain several tensions. One being that they disagree that the understanding of the exercise of free will is limited to either randomness or determination. They don’t pretend to explain how it is that we can exercise our will freely without being memrely random. That is still a mystery (though neurology and quantum physics are starting to assist in understanding this). Scripture portrays free creatures as the final explanations of their own behavior, and thus as morally responsible for their own behavior. With a few exceptions that are limited to God’s direct interevention, Scripture’s final explanation for human behavior is to be found in the self-determining center of the human self.
How is it that we (from an Arminian perspective) can self-determine, have the origin of our decision lie within us–and potentially different each time the “film” of history were rerun–without that decision being random? That is indeed a real mystery.
Mitch on 08 Dec 2008 at 8:08 pm #
If I may be so bold to ask a question of John C. or any other Arminian that is still reading the comments, John C. wrote
How is it … the origin of our decision lie within us- and potentially different each time…
If you are correct and we can make choices different each time then how does God know what you will choose? If you are the self-determining agent then there is nothing to know UNTIL you instantiate a choice. That is why I see that Arminianism naturally leads to Open Theism if taken to its logical conclusion. Since you are the self-determining agent and the origin of the decision cannot be known until it is actualized, because it can be different until it is made according to LFW, what generally happens is you make God dependent on man. God waits to see what choice you will actualize and then I assume plan accordingly.
The way I see it- God determines all things and man still freely chooses what he wants is the best thing we can say given the biblical record. The only way it would be a contradiction is if God and man are the same, surely you are not implying that? We must remember that when we say that God determines all and man still freely chooses that that is not an apple to an apple comparison.
Grace & Peace
jc.freak.arminian on 09 Dec 2008 at 3:39 am #
If you are correct and we can make choices different each time then how does God know what you will choose? If you are the self-determining agent then there is nothing to know UNTIL you instantiate a choice. That is why I see that Arminianism naturally leads to Open Theism if taken to its logical conclusion. Since you are the self-determining agent and the origin of the decision cannot be known until it is actualized, because it can be different until it is made according to LFW, what generally happens is you make God dependent on man. God waits to see what choice you will actualize and then I assume plan accordingly.
The problem with this assessment though is that it is in direct contradiction to the traditional view of God in Christianity. Traditionally, Christians have stated that God exists outside of time and space. Indeed, recently Science has backed up this Christian claim by demonstrating that time is ans aspect of space.
We don’t believe God needs to wait for anything thing because He sees teh beginning and the end simulataneously. God doesn’t look into the future to see what we will do because for God the future is now. There is no difference to Him between the future and the present.
The way I see it- God determines all things and man still freely chooses what he wants is the best thing we can say given the biblical record. The only way it would be a contradiction is if God and man are the same, surely you are not implying that? We must remember that when we say that God determines all and man still freely chooses that that is not an apple to an apple comparison.
What you say here doesn’t really work. You are saying that an event can be determined by both God and man simultaneously. How is that not a contradiction?
Mitch on 09 Dec 2008 at 7:07 am #
I see that you appeal to the Boethian method to answer; I will leave it to the reader to investigate on their own if this answers the question.
The problem of course is that there is nothing to know until a choice has been actualized. Since with LFW man has the power of contrary choice and seeing as he is the self-determining agent there is nothing to know until he actualizes a choice, so the claim that God then becomes dependent on man is still there. Furthermore, you ascribe to man the power of contrary choice and ability to contradict his nature while limiting God. So you not only make God dependent on you, but you also give yourself a power and ability that God does not have available to Himself.
As for the second part, the contradiction would be there if God and man were equal. Since God and man are not the same/equal then because God, our creator, can do something that man, His creation, cannot is not a contradiction. Just because we cannot wrap our little minds around the “how” does not make it a contradiction.
Grace & Peace
John C. on 09 Dec 2008 at 11:15 am #
There is more than one way to understand God’s relation to time. Currently, most philosphers discuss God as being outside of time (hence seeing the beginning and end at the same time and all the time), and God as being within time once he creates it.
There are several ways of holding to incompatibilist free will. Some Arminians accept simple foreknowledge, in which God simply knows the future, and our future actions, because he is God and there is no further detailed explanation of how he can do so. Some Arminians (and even Calvinists) hold that because God is outside of time, he can see our future choices in time even as he interacts with us in the present. Still others use the concept of “middle knowledge”. In each of these explanations, God’s independence from man is preserved while also still preserving incompatibilist free will (incompatibilist becasuse it is free will that is incompatible with determinism). Under these explanations there is someting to know before a person actualizes their choice in present time.
It is also important to note that Calvinists and Armininians define the term free will differently. Arminians define it in such a way that it is incompatible with determinism. Calvinists either accept determinism or, more typically, define free will in such a way that it is compatible with determinism. The point that I have made in some of my above comments, is that a Calvnist cannot work with or accept the Armininian’s definition of free will because that (the Armininian definition) is logically incompatible with the remainder of the Calvinist system. The Arminian also argues that the only type of free will depicted in the Bible, and the only type that is worth having, and the only type that actual permits moral responsibility, is the free will according to the Arminian definition. That is, free will that is not compatible with determinism.
Hence our Arminian complaint that the traditional Calvinist definition of free will is nonsensical and useless, and that the Calvinist is locked into a logical contradiction or incompatibility if she uses the only definition of free will that makes moral sense (the Arminian definition).
Rather than arguing solely in the abstract, let me again return to the Bible with yet another story. In Galations chapter 2 Paul writes that he “withstood him [Peter] face to face because he was to be BLAMED”. Paul notes that Peter ate with the Gentiles until representatives from James arrived, after which he withdrew from eating with Gentiles. Paul writes that Peter is morally blameworthy because he could have and should have continued to eat with the Gentiles, that is, he could have but did not. This is one of the crucial points of the Arminian view, that there are real alternatives, any of whichcould be chosen by a person, and that the reality of these choices is what makes someone morally
responsible. A foreordained choice is not a morally responsible choice because the alternaitves are not real; they never could have been chosen.
A Calvinist would say that Peter is morally blameworthy because he origin of the chosie lies within Peter; it is his choice; it is his response to or outworking of his dominant desires–desires that belong to him alone.,
What the Armininian is pointing out, however, is that the Biblical text does not assign blame and moral responsibility simply because the choice is sourced within Peter or is a result of following his desires (Peter did what he most desired, and nothing stopped him from acting on those desires). No, what Paul says is that Peter is blameworthy because he chose one path (separation) instead of the other (continuing to meet with Gentiles). Peter is blameworthy because he really could have chosen to meet with Gentiles, but instead chose to separate from them.
kangaroodort on 09 Dec 2008 at 2:34 pm #
Mitch,
you wrote:
Furthermore, you ascribe to man the power of contrary choice and ability to contradict his nature while limiting God. So you not only make God dependent on you, but you also give yourself a power and ability that God does not have available to Himself.
No one said anything about contradicting one’s nature. In fact, the power of contrary choice is inherent in our nature though it has been ruined, with regards to responding to God, in the fall. If you deny that man was created with the power of self-determinism then you have big trouble in explaining why Adam sinned in the garden despite that fact that his nature was declared by God to be “good”.
And I really hope you are not denying God the power of contrary choice. While God cannot contradict His moral nature (e.g. He cannot lie), God still has the power of contrary choice in many circumstances. God did not have to create the universe. God did not have to give us five fingers on each hand. God did not have to elect you to salvation (assuming the Calvinist account of unconditional election) and pass over your neighbor, for example. So God has real freedom and is not bound by necessity. He is truly free to do many things while He is not free to be anything other than God. I am not free to flap my arms and fly since that is impossible given my design. But I am free to make real decisions on a good many things. And when God’s grace intervenes I am free to receive Him or reject Him.
God Bless,
Ben
kangaroodort on 09 Dec 2008 at 2:37 pm #
John C,
You wrote:
A foreordained choice is not a morally responsible choice because the alternaitves are not real; they never could have been chosen.
A foreordained choice is not a choice at all. It is a contradiction in terms. Don’t concede the language of choice to the Calvinist. It is completely non-sensical given their determinism.
God Bless,
Ben
Mitch on 09 Dec 2008 at 2:52 pm #
Dear Ben,
The contradicting one’s nature is usually in the definition of LFW. If all you mean to say is that LFW gives one options to pick from and that one picks the one that is in accord with their nature then we can agree. I fail to see how having sinful choices to pick from is any better than compatibilism, but to each his own.
The way it usually is defended, LFW, it’s the ability to choose between good and evil. Yet it seems that you agree that an unregenerate man only has evil options to choose from until and unless the grace of God and the Spirit empower him to see the truth. We can surely agree on this, what happens after is where we would travel different paths.
I’m only inferring from what you wrote and previous interaction with you that you would agree that the unregenerate not under this enabling grace only have sinful options available. This again puzzles me about using LFW as a defense, usually people who use LFW action theory posit that man can choose between good and evil and that is the only way that God can be just. Yet you seem to agree that this is not the case at all and that unless man is under this enabling grace that the only options available for him to actualize are evil. Interesting!
Grace & Peace
kangaroodort on 09 Dec 2008 at 3:48 pm #
Mitch,
As I have mentioned before there is much more to the debate than the ability to choose between good and evil. It really gets to the heart of the proper definition of sovereignty as well. If sovereignty=exhaustive determinism (as most Calvinists assert) and our every action is predetermined as a result, then there can be no LFW in any circumstance (even choosing between evil options). This extends to the discussion of foreknowledge as well since Calvinists generally insist that God can only foreknow what He decrees to happen (predetermines and infallibly brings to pass). This would include our every thought and action which again leaves no room for LFW in any situation at all (before or after conversion).
If you want to focus only on the ability to believe or reject the gospel LFW is still important as the enabled sinner then has a real choice and will be held accountable for the choice he/she makes once enabled to make that choice. But if there is no LFW present in the one who rejects the gospel then God judges the unbeliever for rejecting something that was never an option for him, which is absurd. And when we add to that the doctrine of limited atonement, the sinner is also judged for rejecting an atonement (since we are justified by faith in His blood, Rom. 3:25) that was never intended for him nor provided for him, which is even more absurd.
So the discussion reaches into several areas and has significant ramifications regardless of the need for divne enablement for putting faith in Christ. And the fact remains that a predetermined choice is a contradiction in terms and as non-sensical as a square circle. So Calvinism is littered with absurdities due to its commitment to determinism.
God Bless,
Ben
Mitch on 09 Dec 2008 at 4:24 pm #
Dear Ben,
Besides railing against all things TULIP, I take it that you agree with me. That the unregenerate sinner that is not under enabling grace only has sinful choices that he can actualize, kind of takes the air out of LFW.
I have yet to see how God knows BEFORE we instantiate a choice if LFW is true. Again, there is absolutely nothing to know unless/until the agent actualizes the choice. Appealing to the Boethian solution brings its own problems and still does not resolve the question of how God knows before the choice is actualized. While an appeal to God being outside of time answers the HOW it does not answer the BEFORE since the self-determining agent is temporal. That is why God would become dependent on man.
I doubt we will end centuries of debate, but I thank you for the interaction. While we will agree to disagree again I wish you a Merry Christmas.
Grace & Peace
John C. on 09 Dec 2008 at 4:57 pm #
Yes, kangaroodort, you are correct; I should have put “foreordained choice” in quotes to indicated is a term with a special meaning for Calvinists, and no meaning at all for Arminians.
John C. on 09 Dec 2008 at 5:29 pm #
It does not take the air out of incompatibilism to concede (which I do not) that a sinnner can only make sinful choices. From an Arminian perspective, free will is not merely negative, that is, an absence of restraint or obstacles. For an Arminian free will is the ability to one of several courses of action in the future. This holds even if all the choices are sinful. So, let us take Bundy the serial killer for an example. He was free to choose to kill one of a large number of people. Of all those possibilities, he only chose a few. Had he chosen to kill even one diferent person, then history of our world would have been different than it in fact did turn out. An Arminian believes that Bundy really could have chosen different people than those he did. In the “garden of forking paths”, Bundy could have gone, had the ability to go, down a different path. A Calvinist would say that he did not have that ability, because a Calvinist is a determinist–though a determinist that insists that we still have a free will and that we are morally responsible.
However, I would also make the obvious observation that nonChristians do not only choose to do evil and to sin. The recent terrorist events in Mumbai include several examples of love and heroism and self sacrifice–all things that are not sins. However, those good and moral choices are not sufficient to save onesself eternally, nor do they count for anything in Christs present and future kingdom unless they are done in the love of Christ (being only tinkling cymbals and sounding brass).
Neither Wm. T. nor Mitch address what both Kangaroodort and I have raised: how can one be morally blameworthy if one does not have the ability to act / do differently at a certain point in history. That is, if a person could only act in one way based upon the laws of nature and history up to the point of her choice, then how can she be morally responsible for the consequences of her choice? She cannot. To reply taht she could have chosen differently if the history of the world to that point had been different (for examplle, she had different desires) does not avoid the adverse result of no moral responsibility. To argue that she is morally responsible is to argue that she is responsible for something that she does not have any control over (the pre-existing laws of nature and all the events prior to her present choice).
Furthermore, the Bible’s presentation of moral responsibility is that one is morally responsible for having done what one was able not to do, or for not doing what one was able to do. One of amy examples of this is the story of Peter in Galations. Paul finds him blameworthy for disassociating from the gentiles when he had the ability to continue to associate with them. The kind of free will that God possesses, and the kind of free will that He has given us, is not compatible with determinism. It is a will that is not determined by the laws of nature (i.e., the physical regularities that we observe). It is a will that is not determined by the history of the world (including of course ourselves) prior to our choice. It is a will that is not determined by our most dominant or strongest desire.
God’s knowledge of our choices is a separate, though related, issue. There are a number of proposed solutions that would work even if one asserts the validity of incompatibilism (i.e., the positino that free will is incompatible with determinism).
John C. on 09 Dec 2008 at 5:38 pm #
It does not follow that to say that we can choose contrary to our natures gives us a power that God does not have, a power that God should have if he is God (i.e., an ultimate perfect being that possesses everything necessary to be God).
We sin, we make sinful choices, we are sinners–none of which can be ascribed to God. God’s inability to choose to sin does not make us greater than God; it makes us lesser.
God’s nature is what defines good and evil. God’s nature is such that he does not sin, is unable to sin.
God therefore is never in a situation where he would want to choose contrary to his nature.
We, on the other hand, often are. It is in our nature to lie, and we are tempted to lie, but we can choose to act contrary to that nature and tell the truth. Even unregenerate sinners can do that. It is why we hold sinners to be morally responsible. Or even take a non-sin issue. I have a desitre to eat the candy, in fact it is my favourite candy and I am very hungry and don’t expect to get any food for several more hours–however I can choose to act contrary to that desire and not eat the candy.
God also makes choices that are contrary to his desires. He desires that all should be saved, but he does not make choices that result in all being saved. He chooses not to irresistably save everyoine.
Mitch on 09 Dec 2008 at 5:51 pm #
Dear John C.,
It seems to me that you and Ben are not in full agreement and I would say that you are further away from “Classical Arminianism”, but that is neither here nor there. You say I have not answered you and I say you have not answered me, what to do???
Not having interacted with you before it seems to me that you are advocating for a more randomness in choices. I think you would say that if all things were exactly the same and nothing changed that you somehow would make a different choice. Please correct me if I am wrong, if that is what you believe then we will never see eye to eye. Not only does that not make any “real world sense”, but it is also un-biblical.
I will assume that you believe we are saved by grace alone through faith alone and count you as a dear brother in Christ. I wish you and your family, assuming you have one, a very Merry Christmas.
Grace & Peace
John C. on 09 Dec 2008 at 5:55 pm #
I contend that the following statement does contain a contradiction: “The way I see it- God determines all things and man still freely chooses what he wants is the best thing we can say given the biblical record. The only way it would be a contradiction is if God and man are the same, surely you are not implying that? We must remember that when we say that God determines all and man still freely chooses that that is not an apple to an apple comparison.”
The issue, with respect to the contradiction, is not the nature of God and the nature of humans. It is, rather, the definition of the terms “determine” and “freely choose”.
To freely chose means, in the sense that most people use it and certainly in the sense that I use it, that we are sometimes in the following position with respect to a contemplated future act: we have the ability to do that act AND we also at the same time have the ability not to do that act. So, when faced with a piece of candy on a plate, I have the ability to pick it up and eat it, and also the ability to refrain from picking it up and eating it. The future is not unique and contains both possibilities.
Determinism is the position that the past and the laws of nature and God determine at every moment a unique future. That is, the future holds only my “choice” to pick up and eat the candy.
Those two definitions are contradictory, and I am using the terms with those definitions.
John C.T. (formerly John C.) on 10 Dec 2008 at 4:50 am #
Being able to choose differently under exactly the same historical circumstances does not entail randomness, though that is a complaint often thrown against those who believe in incompatibilism and indeterminism. Incompatiblism (free will is incompatible with determinism) is the natural intuition of people, which is why philosophers (who subscribe to determism) have to argue that this intuition is wrong. However, the fact that the intuition does exist, and the fact that some people do believe in incompatibilism and indeterminacy and construct competent arguments for it, means that that position cannot be dismissed as lacking real world sense.
The ability to choose either of two courses of action, and thus to be morally blameworthy for making the wrong choice, is in fact Biblical, as my example of Peter in Galatians illustrates. Those who argue for determinism must explain why the Biblical text does not mean what at face value it says. That is, they must explain why Peter’s choice was in fact determined when the Bible prima facie tells the story as if his choice were not determined.
Other than using some modern terminology, nothing I’ve written puts me outside traditional Arminian writings. Of course, it doesn’t exclude more modern variants either (such as open theism, which seems to be largely a theory of the nature of knowledge).
Jason C on 10 Dec 2008 at 5:09 am #
There are passages in scripture such as God’s “now I know” statement to Abraham that suggest there is such a thing as God’s knowledge being dependent on our choices.
However He also knows the choice from outside time so He does indeed know it in advance of us.
If I pick up a history book I know what each person chose to do in that book. They had free will, but I know the outcome. If I traveled back in time with the book I could watch those events unfold, I would see every action played out, every man free to choose, but the knowledge of the outcome would be in my hands.
My knowledge does not determine their actions, their actions determine my knowledge.
jc.freak.arminian on 10 Dec 2008 at 9:33 am #
I see that you appeal to the Boethian method to answer; I will leave it to the reader to investigate on their own if this answers the question.
The problem of course is that there is nothing to know until a choice has been actualized. Since with LFW man has the power of contrary choice and seeing as he is the self-determining agent there is nothing to know until he actualizes a choice, so the claim that God then becomes dependent on man is still there. Furthermore, you ascribe to man the power of contrary choice and ability to contradict his nature while limiting God. So you not only make God dependent on you, but you also give yourself a power and ability that God does not have available to Himself.
There is a lot that you are assuming here that doesn’t follow. First of all, you say “Furthermore, you ascribe to man the power of contrary choice and ability to contradict his nature while limiting God.” This isn’t true. God has a free will and has granted man a free will. Both have the power of contrary choice, so I do not see how this is empowering man while limiting God. Second, man does not have the ability to contradict his own nature, and I do not even see where you believe that I am implying that.
Also, the idea that God is dependant on the human is also false because it is assuming the Calvinist presupposition that the way in which God saves is the way in which God must save. God’s method of saving is the way God choose to do it, and He could have done it another way. God is not dependant on man since God did not have to make salvation conditioned on faith, but choose to Himself.
Furthermore, it is not as if God is inactive until a person comes to saving faith. All Arminianism is consistant in saying that God is ever active in prevenient grace enabling a person to come to saving faith. God not only knows who will be saved, and when, but is there enabling the person from the moment they are born. Salvation is God from beginning to end, and in no way is He dependant on man, but man is completely and utterly dependant on Him. You’re argument is akin to saying that the potter is dependant on the clay because he won’t put it into the kiln until it is the right shape.
As for the second part, the contradiction would be there if God and man were equal. Since God and man are not the same/equal then because God, our creator, can do something that man, His creation, cannot is not a contradiction. Just because we cannot wrap our little minds around the “how” does not make it a contradiction.
Actually, I think I misread you the first time. I retract my statements here.
John C. on 10 Dec 2008 at 10:44 am #
This thread is quite interesting, and all the more so because the discussion has been peaceable and without rancor.
Before picking up on some recent comments, I’d like to return to CMP’s comment that started it all.
There are several things in his original post to which I disagree.
Indeed, I find a substantial one in the second paragraph, wherein he states that “Both Calvinists and Arminians believe in predestination. In other words, whether or not God predestines people is not the issue. All Bible believing Christians believe this doctrine. The issue has to do with the basis of this predestining.” That is only partly true, however, because although all Christians believe in predestination they disagree not only with respect to the basis but also with respect to its nature, content and scope. Arminians can put forward a valid and persuasive case that predestination as used in the New Testament refers to the predestination of groups and nations, and not to individuals.
The observation regarding the so-called “tension” (so-called because I don’t believe that it is so) must make sense only from a particular Calvinist view point. The Arminian certainly retains “tension” because it is difficult to explain how God can see the future content of someone’s free choice. The Arminian also retains a “tension” because it is difficult to explain how a decision can be indeterminate and also non-random.
The Calvinist, from my perspective, resolves and eliminates the tension by analysing predestination in an individual sense and by accepting the determinism of individual choices. The Calvinist defines free will in a manner that makes it compatible with determinism. There is no “tension” left.
It is not clear from the comment what CMP means by the word “tension”, how that term relates to “rational”, and whether he has put forward a valid criterion for truth. Initially, it seems that by “tension” he means “consistency” (see his 5th paragraph). He also seems to mean “pulling in two directions” when he discusses human freedom and God’s choice (he implies that they pull in opposite, or at least different, directions). He also seems to mean “lack of knowledge” and “make sense”. His concept of “tension” is too elastic to be useful for constructing a path to truth. Ultimately, however, he discards this concept; he doesn’t reject Arminianism because it lacks “tension” but because it favours human reasoning—the “rational”—over revelation when there is a real conflict between the two.
More problematic, however, is his equivocation in his use of “rational”. The catchiness of his title only works because typically a reader would believe that something that is more “rational” is truer, but CMP has written his title so that something that is irrational or non-rational is truer than the rational. Normally rational means based on sound logic and accurate observation and true propositions. However, it becomes clear that CMP is jamming another meaning into his use of that word: “rationalistic” or “rationalism”, by which I mean an illegitimate use of one’s “ration”, a continuance of belief in a system of thought or propositions even in the face of contrary evidence, or a system of thought that ignores or discounts the revelation of God.
The contrary evidence is, as CMP argues, the revelation of God. So what CMP really means is that Calvinism is less dependent on a system of thought that ignores the revelation of God when it is contrary to some propositions or beliefs that are part of that system of thought. And he views Arminianism as holding to beliefs or propositions that ignore the revelation of God.
But that is hardly a criterion at all because Arminianism is just as insistent that she accounts for the full revelation of God and that it is Calvinism that ignores or misconstrues important aspects of God’s revelation in the Bible. CMP’s entire paragraph only works because he equivocates in his use of “rational”. However, a belief is rational (in the proper, restricted sense of the term) only if it takes into account all available facts / evidence, or at least accounts for the available facts. If one believes that God’s revelation in the Bible is true (as do Arminians) then it would be irrational to ignore what God says.
Rationality is an appropriate criterion for truth when it is defined to include both formal logic (which deals with provable facts) and “uncertain but sensible” arguments based on probability, expectation, personal experience and the like. When used with that definition (which is the usual definition of the term), then the most rational analysis and explanation of human’s freedom and God’s choice is the truer one because the most rational analysis will include and account for the totality of God’s revelation.
The Arminian will argue that the Arminian position is more rational, and thus truer, than the Calvinist position because it (the Arminian position) accounts better for the provable facts and for God’s revelation and for other, less certain, things. The Arminian would disagree that her position is “more rational” in CMP’s second sense of holding to a human system of thought that ignores God’s revelation. Indeed, she would counter that the Calvinist position is the “more rational” system (using this second meaning for rational).
CMP’s “tension” and “less rational” method for determining or describing truth is muddled and unhelpful, for which system has more “tension” and is “less rational” depends on which side of the fence one is standing.
If one is going to have to have any sort of engagement with the “other side”, one has to do what the 130+ posts above are doing: using God’s gift of mind and rationality to evaluate all the facts before us, both those of the natural world and those given to us through His revelation in the Bible. Furthermore, the revelation, the facts, in the Bible are given to us by means of human language. Disagreements about the proper understanding of the language used can only be handled by humans through their use of language. We don’t have Vulcan mind melds, we can’t interact directly from mind to mind.
Thus CMP’s comment is not helpful except in so far as it took a stick and stirred the pot or whacked the hornet’s nest to generate discussion (by use of a catchy title and the invitiation to “fire away”).
Mitch on 10 Dec 2008 at 10:46 am #
Dear JC.Freak,
Forgive my lack of clarity and thank you for the thoughtful interaction. When you wrote-
Second, man does not have the ability to contradict his own nature…
I heartily say amen with you.
I will try now to clarify my thought on how LFW makes God dependent on man. I had in my mind the view that Jason C. wrote about in the comment above, let me excerpt the relevant part.
If I pick up a history book I know what each person chose to do in that book. They had free will, but I know the outcome. If I traveled back in time with the book I could watch those events unfold, I would see every action played out, every man free to choose, but the knowledge of the outcome would be in my hands.
My knowledge does not determine their actions, their actions determine my knowledge.
It is my belief that this view as stated by Jason C. makes God dependent on man. The reason God knows the future is because he has the “history book”. So with that knowledge God then can plan how best to implement his overall plan. I will try to rephrase my last sentence; God’s knowledge of future is dependent on man.
This view of course seems deterministic as well and runs counter some definitions of LFW that have the power of contrary choice.
More could be said, but I will leave it alone. Thank you again for the interaction and Merry Christmas!
Grace & Peace
John C.T. (formerly John C. and not the other John C) on 10 Dec 2008 at 12:11 pm #
The obvious question is, what is unBiblical about God saving those
who freely choose him in faith? (where “freely” means they had the ability to either place their faith in God, or not place their faith in Him, and are not prevented from choosing one of those two options by the laws of nature, the history of the world to that point (including their own personal history) or God).
And what kind of dependency are you objecting to? If God’s grace is irresistable, then he can save whomever he wants to, merely by exercising his irresistable grace, apart from some free choice. That is, even an Arminian grants that God could (has the power or ability) to exercise his grace irresistably. However, the Arminian argues that God refrains from doing so. Hence the “dependence” (if that is what it is) does not relate to any lack in God’s power. That is, God is not “dependent” on a
human’s choice in the sense that the human choice is a necessary precondition for the exercise of God’s power, that God cannot exercise His power unless the person makes the choice.
Thus the relationship described in post 134 as “dependent” is not one in which the “dependency” necessarily prevents God from exercising his power. The control is all on God’s side: he has the poer to save via irrisistable grace but He chooses not to and His choice not to do so
is not dependent on anything in the human, but only dependent on His own nature and will.
A necessary dependency would be a limit on the omnipotence of God, but a voluntary dependency would not.
Susan on 10 Dec 2008 at 1:53 pm #
Hey Mitch! Is it you?…. Larramore?
I see that you’ve been spreading holiday cheer
Merry Christmas to YOU!
Wm Tanksley on 10 Dec 2008 at 8:11 pm #
I completely understand. I hope I can be as restrained.
What I’m shocked about is that you appear to claim that the following points are true:
+ LFW is the only just way people can be held responsible for choices.
+ God is just.
+ God holds all people responsible for choosing Christ.
+ Some people lack LFW to choose Christ.
How can these propositions possibly be consistent? By your rules, God would only be just in judging people who have had their total depravity lifted, and yet rejected God anyhow. But the Bible condemns people who reject God when all they’ve heard is the testimony of nature; so clearly, God actually holds all people accountable, not just some non-depraved subset of people.
It seems to me that the only escape from the contradiction here is to claim that God grants his grace to everyone, thus removing any element of total depravity from human nature, making the term “total depravity” merely academic (some would call this “semi-Pelagian”). But this isn’t what you do; you affirm that total depravity applies to some people. Your version seems to contain an internal contradiction that the typical Arminian position lacks.
I hold those propositions to be true, except for the first one: LFW is not required for justice. All that’s required is that the allegedly guilty act be committed by the suspect, and be in accordance with the suspect’s desires. It doesn’t matter whether the suspect’s desires are a result of something else beyond the suspect; the buck stops at the desires of the person committing the sin.
Example of guilt: if someone forces me at gunpoint to rob a store, I have evidence of coercion and a defense in the eyes of the law. But if someone presents evidence that I’d planned to rob that store on that night and wanted to do it, and that I’d actually kept and used some or all of the proceeds of the robbery — then it’s clear that regardless of coercion, the robbery was my own desire (and intent), and I am guilty. The fact that I was threatened only adds guilt to the threatener, it doesn’t serve to remove it from me.
Now, God doesn’t threaten or force; He creates creatures who act entirely according to their own desires. He does so according to His own desires.
I think you’re basically right that my use of “immediately possible” is incorrect. I should have said “immediately obvious” instead; my error causes ambiguity, since you interpret it as “morally possible” when I meant it as “physically possible”. There are other problems with my wording — for example, an action may not be physically possible but may APPEAR to be physically possible, and thus be chosen.
So I must alter my definition. While I’m doing that I will also add a bit of text to refine it:
At any given moment, one has to choose what action one will take from the actions that are immediately obvious as means to accomplish some desire, and by acting on that choice, one excludes for the moment all other actions.
I also added some text to define our choices in terms of our desires.
If choices are not deterministic, they are not determined. This is very basic — there’s no room to make a finely nuanced definition; those words are inseparably linked. If they aren’t determined, then they aren’t determined by anyone, including a free agent.
You CAN say that the actions are “LFW-chosen” by a free agent (and that this is not the same as determining them), since that is different from saying that it’s “determined” by anyone. But something that’s not determined, i.e. undetermined, is by definition random.
Here we see at last a true contradiction: you claim that free choices cannot be determined, and that people determine their own free choices. This contradiction is absolute and intrinsic to the nature of your words. The only choices are to either admit that choices are determined, or to claim that the act of choosing does not require determination. The latter choice is popular, but has never been explained.
That’s a great question. In short, I’m claiming that God determines and plans at least some of our desires; but our desires are still truly ours; in fact, my desires are as much ME as my spirit and body are (and note that God also designed and maintains those as well!). Thus, when I desire evil or fail to desire good, that is a depravity in me, regardless of WHY my desires fail to measure up. When I fall short of the glory of God because I desired to do so, I am directly at fault, and no pointing at external sources can possibly excuse me.
A fatalistic view, in contrast, holds that God predetermines everything to the exclusion of our desires — we may WANT to love God or trust Christ, but He won’t allow us to, so we go to hell. That’s the error of fatalism, and that’s the reason you feel Calvinism is so unfair — because you know fatalism is unfair.
God’s creation cannot be resisted either. Is that unjust? The jar can’t resist the potter’s forming. Is that unjust, or unlike God?
James isn’t expressing outrage; he’s explaining who and what is to blame for temptation. My temptation is caused by my own desires. It’s part of me, part of my very existence; God thrust them on me in the same way He thrust existence itself on me, and it makes sense to rail against God for my innate desires as much as it makes sense to rail against Him for my existence — that is, it makes no sense at all.
By the way, 1 Cor. doesn’t say that temptation can be resisted; it says that it can be escaped. This is not God’s permission to “endure” the temptation while sitting right in its path; it’s a mandate to look for a way out of the temptation.
Prior to that, you conceded that choices are determined by desires; I’m merely pointing out a problem with your consequent logic when you attempt to claim that the desires can be chosen. I’m not begging the question; I’m pointing out the cycle in your reasoning. The desires that “cause” a given choice cannot themselves be the effect of the same choice!
If (as you conceded) each choice is determined at the moment of the choice by desires, then how can you go on to assume that the desires can be set by choice at the same time? Wouldn’t this require an infinite regress of choices? But in reality there is only one choice — the choice of what action to take — and there is one cause of the choice: the desires of the one making the choice.
How does the free agent make those choices between desires? Surely the way one chooses between desires is the same way one chooses between any other two things, correct? If not, don’t you have reason to suspect that your definition of “choose” is inadequate, since it doesn’t work for choosing desires?
Compatibilism proposes that when it’s possible to choose which desire to prefer above another desire, one chooses in accordance with one’s existing desires. The “mechanism” is exactly the same as it is for any other choice.
But that last sentence assumes a separation between myself and my desires. If my desires cannot determine things, then I can’t determine things. If my desires can determine things, they do so by means of my choices leading to actions.
My desires are the core of my being. God created me and them together. It’s not unjust to me to give me the just consequences of my desires, even when those desires were not entirely chosen by me. It is not wrong for God to create me with desires, even if the desires are not for Him. Nor is it unjust for God to change my desires so that they are for Him.
By your definitions, there is an infinite regress within the person, as they choose their desires so that they can choose their desires so that … so that they can choose their action. By my definitions it stops with the person acting in accordance with their own innate desires, no matter how those desires got there.
And if God is the one who created us, then He did indeed create us with desires.
The buck does indeed stop with God; it seems obviously reasonable for a human to cry out against God, “why have you made me thus!” It seems to have occurred to Paul in Romans 9, since he puts these words in an objector’s mouth. Unfortunately for the objector, God makes us the way He wants, and we are fit for the purpose He created us for, and when we fulfill that purpose — whether it leads to punishment or glory — we receive no injustice.
Not at all — it’s hard to discuss the concept of free will at all using ordinary language (LFW requires talk about rewinding time or trying the same thing again with all things being equal, or other such nonsense). And of course I concede that we can direct our desires; that’s been my point all along, that our direction of our desires is precisely the point at which LFW fails most painfully, because it requires that either a man’s desires do NOT affect his choices at all, OR that a man’s choices entirely determine his desires and vice versa at the same time.
A compatibilist reading makes this simple: a man can choose actions. All choices are based on the man’s desires. Some actions will result in building up desires. A man will choose those actions if that man’s current desires “want” that result.
Nobody can choose to develop a desire that they do not desire for some greater reason. If you want to develop a desire for prayer, you want it for a reason — perhaps because you love God, or perhaps because it’s a good focusing meditation to build yourself up.
It makes a mockery of the argument that God cannot hold man responsible without giving man LFW, because it has God holding unregenerate man responsible for not choosing Christ when they cannot desire Christ.
This is not a problem for compatibilism, because it claims that man should be held responsible for the actions that he performed because he desired them.
But which one gets chosen? There are a lot of desires… Which one to pick? By your axioms the answer can’t be “the God-given ability tells us which desire”, because that would give God the choice.
The answer could be “by flipping a coin”, but that seems like it’s not MY choice, but the coin’s choice.
My answer is “a man’s own desires”. Those ARE the God-given ability to choose — and they don’t come with anything mystical about them; they are exactly what they seem to be.
This again fails to ask why God would find any pleasure in sacrifice at all. You then assume that the purpose of sacrifice is submission of will — but submission of will is exactly the definition of sacrifice: it’s when I choose to give up something all my other desires want in order to gain God, Who is my greatest desire. The purpose of sacrifice isn’t the same as the means.
I really like your last sentence: “If we cannot control our desires then how can we control our selves?” I agree; our desires are a core part of ourselves. But we do not merely control them; we ARE them. We cannot choose what we do not desire, and we cannot choose to desire something that we do not desire for some greater reason.
It’s there. Try a topical concordance.
But my point isn’t too far from yours; the Bible doesn’t ever say that God elaborately planned out every detail of our lives in advance. All it says is that He set out a plan of salvation before the foundation of the world, to save specific people; and He also purposed to set aside others as vessels of wrath, both choices made before those people made any choices of their own and independently of their choices “in order that God’s purpose in election might stand”.
The Bible also does say that God exercises meticulous, sovereign providence over the tiniest details, including the fall of a sparrow and the hairs on our head; and it also promises that “to those who are called according to His purpose” all things will work together for good (“all things” includes all the tiny things). But this doesn’t require an advance planning of those details, even though it doesn’t exclude the possibility.
I find it quite plausible that God foreordained specific people to salvation, but didn’t foreordain the specific details of how they would be saved; rather, He works sovereignly to accomplish all of His purposes in that salvation (and none can thwart Him). I also find it plausible that God MIGHT have meticulously decreed all things, no matter how minute; the Bible doesn’t support or oppose that, so I can’t argue for or against it.
What do you think — do you think we “should” regret? You shouldn’t regret anything you can’t change, which is the entire contents of the past. You should consider the past to think how you were wrong and should do better, but that’s fixed on the future, not the unchangeable past.
I don’t think “regret” works very well. There’s repentance, there’s guilt, and there’s shame; but regret doesn’t seem to be useful. I wonder whether the word ‘regret’ means the same about the past as ‘worry’ does about the future — ‘worry’, as you know, is forbidden by Christ, on the grounds that we can’t change the important things about the future. If that’s true about the future, how much more about the past!
But let’s just assume you used the words “feel guilty” instead of “regret”. We both agree that feelings of guilt are real things, a product of conscience, and is very useful in discerning sin (although not infallible). What can we conclude from the presence of feelings of guilt? I don’t think that changing the past, or assuming the mutability of the past, or philosophy is appropriate; the right thing to do is to confess and repent. Repentance means turning from your old sin (and the desires that led to it) so that you will not repeat them in the future. It doesn’t mean speculating that you could have done differently!
None of this proves anything about how the past is mutable, or choices in the past might or might not have come out differently.
This still stuns me. You insist that people have LFW in everything except the most important decision. Why do you insist that LFW matters at all if it doesn’t matter in the truly important things?
With that said, because you reject LFW in the one case that it matters to Scripture (for salvation), your beliefs work perfectly with my understanding of the Scriptures — as far as I’m concerned, you’re a Scriptural compatibilist (even if you’re not a philosophical compatibilist).
I prefer a bit of philosophical consistency, but that’s merely a preference — philosophy is slippery and easy to get wrong. If you agree with the Bible, I agree with you. I do ask that you maintain the same reasonable standard by not demanding that I agree with LFW, when neither the Bible nor you requires it for all morally responsible choices.
Those things are all conditional on different things. Election is conditional on the council of God, not on our decisions or deeds; but salvation is conditional on our faith — but our faith is conditional upon God’s regenerating power, so although it’s perfectly true that salvation is directly conditional on our faith, it’s also true that it’s conditional on God’s plan (because our faith is conditional on God regenerating us so that we can have faith).
No, I’m allowed to reference the Bible too. I don’t think that counts as cowardice.
But Eph 1:3,4,13 (the reference you made) is completely compatible with a compatibilist view… I don’t see any sign of incompatibility. Yes, you’re certainly free to read the plural as meaning that only the group is predestined; but I’m also allowed to read the plural as referring to a group of individually predestined people. The passage is ambiguous due to the plurality, so the question must be resolved elsewhere.
There’s still a problem — God’s election precedes anything we do, works or even desire (don’t forget Romans 9:16, which excludes our desire from the list of things that God’s salvation depends on). Romans doesn’t say whether His election precedes our existence, but it does make the election an individual matter rather than a group issue (contra your reading of Ephesians 1).
Pardon, but that is what LFW means, so I’m not mischaracterizing LFW. I now understand that you don’t hold to LFW with respect to salvation; in your opinion we’re only free to choose Christ after God has regenerated us (to use the Calvinist term). I’m glad you see the same things in the Bible that I do, but I don’t see why you’re so insistent on LFW when you don’t believe it’s important to salvation in any way.
-Wm
jc.freak.arminian on 10 Dec 2008 at 10:33 pm #
Well, Mitch, I would say that though Jason’s description isn’t necessarily wrong, it is over simplified. I see where your thoughts are coming from, but its based more on the metaphor Jason happened to use than the actual idea.
Jason C on 10 Dec 2008 at 11:45 pm #
It is simple only because you all have made it very complicated.
What is so difficult about understanding that whilst God knows what will happen, unless bringing it about requires His direct action, His knowledge does not necessarily cause what will happen?
I think that without God’s calling no one can come to Christ, however I think that God calls everyone who hears the message of Christ (and maybe some who don’t). He calls everyone, but He also knows that some will not answer the call. I think that the first motion to answer is the point at which, if necessary, God gives the gift of faith (trust/loyalty) so that a person can respond fully.
John C.T. (formerly John C. and not the other John C) on 11 Dec 2008 at 10:32 am #
Wm. T. states: “LFW is not required for justice. All that’s required is that the allegedly guilty act be committed by the suspect, and be in accordance with the suspect’s desires. It doesn’t matter whether the suspect’s desires are a result of something else beyond the suspect; the buck stops at the desires of the person committing the sin.”
That statement is only true for those that believe in determinism and compatibilism. Arminians would not agree with that statement, nor would other incompatibilists. We would assert to the contrary that Wm. T.’s position is not sufficient to create moral responsibility and that moral responsibility requiers that free will be understood in a incompatibilist framework. Since kangaroodort and I disagree fundamentally with Wm. t. at theis fundamental level, it renders much of his argument irrelevant to us.
Wm. T. states, “It seems to me that the only escape from the contradiction here is to claim that God grants his grace to everyone, thus removing any element of total depravity from human nature, making the term “total depravity” merely academic (some would call this “semi-Pelagian”). But this isn’t what you do; you affirm that total depravity applies to some people. Your version seems to contain an internal contradiction that the typical Arminian position lacks.”
However, that is not what Arminians believe. Since the council of Doort it has been alleged (wrongly) that Arminius and Arminians were semi-Pelagion. However Arminius, Wesley and others have always agreed with “total depravity”.
The Arminian belief regarding depravity is that although humans’ nature is infected ni every respect by sin–as poison mixed with wine is found in every part of the mixture–man is not so totally depraved that there is no goodness left, no remainder of the image of God. Moreover, Arminians also believe that God has sent both common grace and prevenient grace to all humans.
In “Original Sin and Christian Philosophy”, Philosophia Christi, Series 2, 5/2 (2003): 519-41, Paul Copan writes “Theologian Harold O.J. Brown comments on the Formula of Concord, which offered
much-needed philosophical precision on sin and human nature: “The sweeping Christological implications of Flacius’ view are apparent. If man is by nature a sinner, then in the incarnation either Jesus became a sinner or did not truly assume human nature. . . . If sin belongs to the very nature of man, then Christ cannot be consubstantial with us, as the Chalcedonian Creed affirms, unless sin also belongs to his nature, which the creed denies. . . . The mistake lies in thinking that the Fall has so altered human nature that sin is now an essential component of humanity, so that no one and nothing can be human without thereby partaking in error and even in sin.” The Council of Florence (1442) rightly affirmed: “The church asserts that there is no such thing as a nature of evil, because every nature insofar as it is a nature, is good.”25 Thus I would concur with Gordon Lewis and Bruce Demarest: “The imago Dei ontologically remains undestroyed in all persons. . . . However overtly depraved, all humans in their being remain constitutionally imagebearers.””
Tom Oden in his book The Transforming Power of Grace, writes “No one remains merely in an utterly ungraced, fallen state…. The good that is found in the unregenerate fallen human will is not due to nature, as the semi-Pelagians would have it, but grace. This explains why all men are not as bad as they could be. “Grace arrested man in his fall, and placed him in a salvable state, and endowed him with the gracious ability to meet all the conditions of personal salvation. Fallen man has never been without the benefits and influences of the atonement,” wrote Tillet. The benefits of Christ’s righteousness and atoning death are coextensive with the effects of Adam’s sin (Ps. 117, 120; Rom. 5:12-21″ [pp.44, 45])..
It seems to me that Wm. T.’s assertion is without warrant, and given that neither kangaroodort nor I subscribe to that position, Wm. T’s argument is irrelevant.
kangaroodort on 11 Dec 2008 at 10:36 am #
Mitch,
You wrote:
Besides railing against all things TULIP, I take it that you agree with me. That the unregenerate sinner that is not under enabling grace only has sinful choices that he can actualize, kind of takes the air out of LFW.
This is wild. It is as if you didn’t read anything I said concerning the importance of LFW to so many facets of the theological discussion. You just ignore it and dismiss it with, “kind of takes the air out of LFW”. Such tactics make for a very frustrating discussion.
And this whole argument about God being dependent on man is equivocation. To say that God’s knowledge of our actions is dependant on our actions is not at all equal to saying God Himself is dependent on man. Let me ask you a few related questions. Do you believe that God loves you? If so, then isn’t God’s love for you dependent on you as a personal creation? Could God love you if He had never created you? Would you then say that God is dependent on you? What about knowledge? What if God had never created you? Could God know anything about you had He never created you? Could He have knowledge of your existence if, in fact, you never came to exist? Could He have knowledge of your actions if you never existed to act in any way? I should think not since that would falsify His knowledge. So it seems very reasonable to me to conclude that God’s knowledge of our actions is dependent on our actions or at least on our existence as real persons.
Would you say that God was free to either create or not create the universe? You seemed to affirm earlier that God has no power of contrary choice and I pointed out the problems that would create for your view. You ignored that portion of my post (as well as the portion dealing with Adam’s nature and choice in the garden). I would like you to declare yourself on this point as it is very important. If you deny God this power then you will have some very difficult questions to answer from your perspective regarding God’s independence (aseity) or lack thereof. Much bigger problems than the ones you perceive to be inherent in my position. If you concede that God has such power then you must prove that God cannot bestow this same power on His creatures, made in His image. I would be very interested to see you do that. I am anxious to hear how you will respond.
God Bless,
Ben
John C.T. (formerly John C. and not the other John C) on 11 Dec 2008 at 10:39 am #
Wm. T. conflates two aspects of the Arminian understanding of free will when he concludes, “Pardon, but that is what LFW means, so I’m not mischaracterizing LFW. I now understand that you don’t hold to LFW with respect to salvation; in your opinion we’re only free to choose Christ after God has regenerated us (to use the Calvinist term). I’m glad you see the same things in the Bible that I do, but I don’t see why you’re so insistent on LFW when you don’t believe it’s important to salvation in any way.”
With respect to many actions, incompatibilists such as kangaroodort and I would assert that our choices are not determined by our desires. However, the Bible is clear that apart fomr the intervention of Giod no one will ever exercise their free will to choose God. Our free will is damaged by sin, in in respct of the choice to follow God or not it is fatally damaged.
Consequently, in order to enable us to make a morally responsible / culpable choice (i.e. such a choice would require incompatibilist fee choice) for or against God he intervenes with prevenient grace.
kangaroodort on 11 Dec 2008 at 10:45 am #
Wm,
Good grief that was a long response. I understand you wanting to deal with everything I said so I can’t fault you for that. However, it might be a while before I can find the time to respond. Till then…may God bless you as you continue to seek Him and His truth.
Ben
John C.T. (formerly John C. and not the other John C) on 11 Dec 2008 at 11:22 am #
Wm. T.: “If they aren’t determined, then they aren’t determined by anyone, including a free agent.”
??!
That statement entirely misses the point of the Arminian and icompatibilist argument. We are concerned with the factors prior to the exercise of the will in making a choice. If factors, including natural law, desries and God, limit the choice to one, then the will is determined; the future is unique.
However, when the will is exercised it obviously determines (and thereby limits) the possible futures.
Arminians draw a distinction between the determination of the will by factors outsdie of the, or other than, the will on the one hand, and the exercise of the will which necessarily determines what can happen in the future. The distinction, to put it another way, is whether the will itself is determined.
Since the distinction has been accepted as valid by philosophers and theologians for hundreds of years, i don’t think it warrants further discussion in this thread. Indeed, the complaint usually made is that an indeterminate will can never be exercised because it is never determined, or that it must therefore be random and beyond the control of the person.
John C.T. (formerly John C. and not the other John C) on 11 Dec 2008 at 11:33 am #
Wm. T. quoting kangaroodort and then making his own statement: “‘Spirit is brought to bear on him. Once his depravity is overcome by the Spirit of God then he is enabled to make a real choice, to yield to God in faith or resist Him in unbelief. None of this conflicts with anything I have said.’
[Wm.T.] It makes a mockery of the argument that God cannot hold man responsible without giving man LFW, because it has God holding unregenerate man responsible for not choosing Christ when they cannot desire Christ.”
??
God holds humans responsible for rejecting him AFTER he mad it possible for them to accept him. That is in fact what kangaroodort stated. Hence, once k’s statement is correctly understood, there is no mockery.
John C.T. (formerly John C. and not the other John C) on 11 Dec 2008 at 11:36 am #
Post #142 is v. good, kangaroodort.
Mitch on 11 Dec 2008 at 11:37 am #
Dear Ben,
Please forgive me for the lack of clarity that has led to this “frustrating discussion”. I will try to be more precise.
When I say that God does not have contrary choice I am referring to good and evil only. And when I say that God is dependent on man I mean that God knows AFTER the LFW agent makes the choice. In essence it makes God learn because without the LFW agent actualizing the choice God does not know since there is nothing to know.
I am of the opinion that all God does is perfectly good and just. So if God does something it is because it is perfect. So was God free to create the universe? The answer is in the why? Why did God create the universe? I think we both know and since he did create I know that that was the perfect thing to do.
As for God loving before you were created, yes I believe that God loved before you were created.
Question for John C.T.- you wrote that God has sent two kinds of grace common and prevenient, what is the difference in common grace and prevenient grace? And is there another kind of grace when it comes to salvation?
Susan- I do not believe that I know you and apologies for any confusion, Merry Christmas to you and yours.
Grace & Peace
Wm Tanksley on 11 Dec 2008 at 3:55 pm #
That’s not an argument — all you’re doing is attempting to claim that I believe one thing and you believe another. We already knew that we disagree; the question is whether one of our positions is better supported than the other, either by philosophical consistency or by Biblical evidence. A statement such as mine is not “true for those who believe…”, it’s either _true_ or it’s _false_.
I gave a detailed example of how my statement plays out in criminal justice, in a situation which is only slightly contrived (I fabricated it, but it’s actually conceivably possible), and is intended to show that a natural sense of justice is satisfied when people are punished or rewarded simply according to their intent and desires; there’s no need to perform any deeper inspection to see whether the intent or desire was actually created ex nihilo by the person or whether it was taught to them by someone else.
I agree. I hate it when Calvinists use the term “semi-Pelagian” to refer to all Arminians. This is why I didn’t do that; I specifically identified the error that I would call semi-Pelagianism, and I pointed out that the poster doesn’t make this error; he chooses instead to grant a Calvinistic definition of Total Depravity to some people (he doesn’t identify who they are), which seems to contradict his insistance that LFW is required for justice.
“Total depravity” has never meant “there is no goodness left”. That’s a contradiction — existence is a good thing, so “no goodness” means “doesn’t exist”. Calvinists will sometimes speak of the distinction between “total depravity” (every faculty of the thing is is evil) and “utter depravity” (the thing is as evil as it could possibly be).
I’m confused. What Oden calls “semi-Pelagian” here I’d call “Pelagian”, since it would claim that every man is by nature capable of saving himself without divine help. I’d call the belief that God grants every man without exception the ability to save himself “semi-Pelagian” — with the note that it’s not a heresy, unlike full Pelagianism.
I don’t know Oden, but I suspect he’s a better scholar than I am. I wonder what I’m missing?
Calvinists such as myself would agree with most of what Oden says, since God does act graciously and mercifully toward all; but we’d part ways with the claim that grace gave all men all they needed to meet all the requirements of salvation. We agree in common grace; but we don’t think that common grace is exactly equal to saving grace, as this specifically claims.
-Wm
Wm Tanksley on 11 Dec 2008 at 4:03 pm #
I have a simple question, then. It’s not even rhetorical. If our choices are not determined by our desires, then do we find that our choices are correlated against our desires, correlated with our desires, or completely uncorrelated to our desires? How strong is the correlation?
I’m avoiding the “determined by” buzzword, of course.
My expectation would be that our choices are perfectly correlated with our desires — that we always choose the thing we desire.
(I obviously have to address Paul’s “oh wretched man that I am!” argument; I believe that the problem there is that the saved man has two natures warring within him, two sets of contrary desires, and either one coming out in action will utterly frustrate the other.)
-Wm
Wm Tanksley on 11 Dec 2008 at 8:23 pm #
I said:
John C.T. said:
You may be right — I may be assuming too much about kangaroodort’s comment: “the depraved sinner cannot choose Christ without the Spirit intervening.”
I assumed, perhaps incorrectly, that kangaroodort held the following beliefs in addition to that statement:
+ God is just.
+ One is not “in Christ” until one chooses Christ.
+ Everyone who is not “in Christ” stands condemned.
+ It is unjust to condemn someone for failing to make a choice that they can’t make because of a depraved will or other incapacity.
Am I right on all four (plus the one I quoted him on)?
It seems the only way to accept all four is to weaken one of them dramatically… Perhaps it’s just to condemn someone for a bad choice even while they are morally depraved (Calvinism), or perhaps there’s no such thing as a depraved sinner (Pelagianism), or perhaps everyone WAS depraved but becomes undepraved at some point before they die (your position?).
The latter option is, I think, your opinion; I didn’t realize that it was kangaroodort’s. I find it to be an interesting philosophy, but there are problems.
The big one to me is that it’s Biblically as much necessary to have the Gospel preached as it is to have grace administered; and we know with total certainty that God did not design the world to have the gospel preached to everyone. Therefore there are some people who cannot, no matter how powerful their LFW, accept Christ.
Molinism (middle knowledge) doesn’t seem to help this at all, because you still have people condemned to hell without any possibility of their choosing Christ.
I think the error is in assuming that moral depravity is an excuse. In more common terms, “I didn’t want to do the right thing” is not an excuse for failing to do the right thing.
Wm Tanksley on 12 Dec 2008 at 9:57 am #
…and compatibilists point out that the will is commonly said to incorporate the desires, so that having one’s choices determined by one’s desires by convention means that one’s will determines one’s choices.
But you ARE correct that the real question is whether the will is libertarian-free or not.
As I said before, if the will is libertarian-free, then one can always choose what desires one will use in an act of choice — but this leads to an infinite regress, since the choice of desires is itself a choice requiring an underlying choice of desires. There’s no logical or temporal final grounding for choice under the libertarian free will model.
John C.T. on 12 Dec 2008 at 11:08 am #
re Mitch, #148
My understanding is that common grace is what God gives to both the regenerate and the unregenerate. Among other things, it is what allows us to have functioning societies.
Prevenient grace refers to the grace that God gives when he draws people to Himself and what will result in salvation unless it is resisted.
John C.T. on 12 Dec 2008 at 11:13 am #
re Mitch #148
What is not yet clear, is why the dependency you describe is unlike any of the dependencies that kangaroodort describes. I see them as being of the same type, and therefore permissible. All of those dependencies arise as a result of God’s choice to create. God enters into those dependencies because He creates them, but those dependencies are not necessary ones that affects God’s “aseity” (the term for God’s independent, uncaused, etc. existence).
John C.T. on 12 Dec 2008 at 11:37 am #
re Wm.T. #149: “That’s not an argument.” What I meant was that your argument to which I was referring only worked once one accepted some basic Calvinist propositions or assumptions. Since I did not accept those, there was no need to respond to your argument. You are correct taht we have to look at these basic beliefs and engage our minds in philosophy and theology (though teh two, obviously overlap).
My argument was that I don’t concede that acting upon desires is sufficient to create moral responsibility, neither philosophically nor Biblically. Your example was: Example of guilt: if someone forces me at gunpoint to rob a store, I have evidence of coercion and a defense in the eyes of the law. But if someone presents evidence that I’d planned to rob that store on that night and wanted to do it, and that I’d actually kept and used some or all of the proceeds of the robbery — then it’s clear that regardless of coercion, the robbery was my own desire (and intent), and I am guilty. The fact that I was threatened only adds guilt to the threatener, it doesn’t serve to remove it from me.”
Your story depends on the implied fact that your plan to rob the store was a plan to do it solo, alone and independently. Subsequent to the creation of that plan, someone else, also with a plan to rob a store, makes you do certain illegal actions at gunpoint. After the robbery, you keep some money. In criminal law (at least in common law countries like the U.S., U.K., Australia, Canada) one must have both the mental intent for the specific action and also do the action. You had the mental intent to do a solo robbery, but not the mental intent to do a joint robbery or to do any of the actions you did when under gunpoint (if you did have the mental intent, then the other person would not have to have you at gun point). Hence, at law you would be “not guilty”. The crime of keeping proceeds of a crime is a subsequent crime for which you have both the mental intent (“mens rea” for you fans of law latin) and the physical action (“actus reus”, again for fans of law latin). Before God you would be guilty solely on the basis of your original plan, and guilty for that plan. As to whether you are guilty for doing things under fear of death, its possible to have different positions.
In any case, your desire plays no part in your guilt at law, nor in your guilt before God (except in so far as any of your desires were evil desires, in which case you’d be guilty for them alone).
There is no Biblical example that I’m aware of where God notes someone as guilty for their desires, at least not in the way you are describing things. However, there are numerous examples of God holdling people to be guilty and morally blameworthy for making an incorrect choice, such as the example I gave of Peter in Galations.
The remainder of post #149 clarifies that we are all on the same page as far as humans’ depravity goes: it affects the total being but is not utterly complete.
Wm Tanksley on 12 Dec 2008 at 12:05 pm #
Note that all Calvinists distinguish between God’s meticulous providence and God’s foreordination or decree. The former refers to God’s working in the present, and Jesus is very specific that it is meticulous down to the smallest detail. The latter refers to God’s predestined command for His entire creation, and the Bible doesn’t specify that it applies to everything.
That’s not true. There’s a logical distinction between God’s foreknowledge and God’s decree; it’s true that everything decreed is necessarily foreknown, but the converse is not necessary.
Also note that your definition of “decree” is insufficient. God’s plan and daily providence are predetermined and infallibly brought to pass; but that doesn’t make them part of God’s decree. The decree is defined as that which God commanded prior to creation, that creation MUST fulfill.
You’re right that many Calvinists believe that those things coincide; but that doesn’t mean that they’re the same thing.
Such interpretations are indeed common, and do indeed leave no room for LFW, nor mental freedom for that matter.
The crucial point of judgement, however, isn’t the choice of whether to accept or reject the gospel; it’s whether to accept or reject Christ! And that’s not a matter for LFW; it’s a matter for God’s grace, and for hearing the gospel; and we both agree that not everyone gets to hear the gospel.
So not every sinner has a “real choice” on whether to go to hell. Does this make God unjust?
The judgment is NOT for rejecting anything; the condemnation is already given for being in sin. One is never judged for “not being in Christ”. Rather, special mercy is available for those “in Christ”; everyone else “gets what they had coming”.
The people who weren’t able to choose Christ — either because they never heard of Him, or because they never received regenerating grace — still receive full justice when they are condemned, because they are not condemned for what they didn’t choose, but for the evil they performed.
-Wm
Mitch on 12 Dec 2008 at 12:06 pm #
Dear John C.T.,
Can the Father stop loving the Son?
And when you wrote this to Wm. T.-
There is no Biblical example that I’m aware of where God notes someone as guilty for their desires…
What about when our Lord said that if you look at a woman with lust after her that you are guilty of adultery? Here is a case where the desire was not even instantiated and we are told that the person is guilty of adultery.
It seems that you understand this because you wrote this to Wm. T. as well-
In any case, your desire plays no part in your guilt at law, nor in your guilt before God (except in so far as any of your desires were evil desires, in which case you’d be guilty for them alone).
Of course we are told that natural man only has evil desires so you would admit that desires alone convict all before God.
Grace & Peace
John C.T. on 12 Dec 2008 at 12:17 pm #
re Wm.T. #150
I don’t consider “determined by” to be a buzzword, but a key concept to the issue at hand.
Wm.T.: “If our choices are not determined by our desires, then do we find that our choices are correlated against our desires, correlated with our desires, or completely uncorrelated to our desires? How strong is the correlation?”
Correlation between desired future and chosen future is irrelevant. The incompatibilist belief in indeterminacy entails a lack of, or inconsistent, correlation. However, that does not mean that the choice is random, in the sense that a choice just occurs to us. Indeterminacy and randomness are not the same concept. Indeterminacy, as used in relation to free will, means that there is nothing that determines the decision prior to the exercise of the will: not natural law, not desires, not God, etc.
The compatibilist version of “free choice” is not a choice between alternatives, but only the opportunity to not have one’s desires frustrated. For example, Paul is locked in jail but has a desire to get out. As long as the door is locked, he cannot act on his desire to leave. When the door opens, he can then actualize or act on his desire to leave and thus physically leave. The opening of the door freed heim to act on his desire to leave.
The incompatibilist, would say that merely being able to act out one’s desires is not free will. Free will requries the ability to do one of two or more possible choices. The example would be Paul standing at the open door of his jail cell. In the compatibilist version his dominant desire is to leave, so he does and he can do no other thing (he can’t stay, because he has no desire to stay). However, the incompatibilist version has Paul at the gate, also with a dominant desire to leave, however, he has the power, the ability, to choose to either leave or stay. He exercises his will and stays, contrary to his dominant desire. Now, he may have reasons for staying (I want to witness to the jailer, i don’t want to leave my buddy Silas behind), but none of his reasons are deterninative of his decision.
People experience this sort of thing all the time when they resist temptation. Mary has a strong desire to steal the candy bar, but in the face of this temptation she does not take it and leaves the sotre. Upon introspection Mary cannot find any desire, or combination of desires, that was stronger than her desire to steal. To state after the fact that she must have had a stronger desire not to steal is a ratinalization without foundation or justification. It’s a “just so” story, like the ones that some economists tell about Mother Theresa (that no one, not even her, acts altruistically and that she was acting in her own self interest to work among the poor and lepers).
I reiterate my observations about the asymmetry between past and future. We don’t deliberate about the past in the same way that we deliberate about the future. While Paul might deliberate about whether a past action (staying in the jail) was really the best action that he could have done, he deliberates about the future in a different way.
Paul can question whether her past actions were in fact the best, but he cannot change his past acts.
However, Paul (or Mary, from my above examples) can both question what future acts would be best as well as which future acts he should perform. Thus, it looks like the future is open to Paul, or “up to him”, in a way that the past is not. In other words, when an agent like Paul is using his free will, what he is doing is selecting from a range of different options for the future, each of which is possible given the past and the laws of nature. In an earlier post I referred to this view of free will as the “Garden of Forking Paths Model.”
An argument known as the “consequence argument” builds upon this view of the fixed nature of the past to argue that if determinism is true, the future is not open in the way that the above reflections suggest. For if determinism is true, the future is as fixed as is the past.
Determinism is the position or thesis that the past (including our past desires and the desires that exist at the time of choice) and the laws of nature entail a unique future. No one has or ever had any choice about the past (or about God’s actions) or about the laws of nature. Therefore, no one has or ever had any choice about any physical state of the universe (which includes desires) up to the point at which she makes a choice; no choice whatsoever. It follows, therefore, that we cannot have any choice about our actions since these all follow strictly from a prior state of the universe according to the laws of nature.
John C.T. on 12 Dec 2008 at 12:29 pm #
re Wm.T. #156
The unpreached are an issue for both Calvinists and Arminians. Both have explanations. Neither the issue of the unpreached nor the explanations have any necessary bearing on the issue of free will.
One can be an Arminian or a Calvinist and also be a universalist. Or one could say that it’s tough (ARminian: don’t get preached, don’t get saved, but you’re guilty anyway for your bad choices. Calvinsist: you’re not elect, so it doesn’t matter if you got preached to or not). Or one could say that the unpreached could have been saved if they had responded to the prevenient grace given to them as they saw God’s glory in the universe which is apparent to all. Or one could throw up one’s hands and say that however God deals with them, it will be in a just, merciful, gracious and loving manner.
Free will is not about whether one hears the gospel or only sees God at work in creation, free will is about the nature of the choices that one makes.
John C.T. on 12 Dec 2008 at 12:39 pm #
re Mitch #157
The fact that some choices are not available (e.g., the Father will not and cannot stop loving the Son) does not mean that no choices are available. In respect of some things we have a free choice; in respect of others we do not.
I’m not sure that I would concede the lust, as spoken of in the Bible, is simply and only a deire. In the example you gave, one is required to look (a physical act that is a result of a choice), and lust requries that one’s mind entertain a thought, which is also a choice.
I disagree that humans, even unregenerate ones, have only evil desires. What about a mother’s love for her child? Surely that is not evil. An unregenerate mother’s love (or her expressino thereof) for her child may not be complertely pure and free from the taint of evil, but surely love itself is not an evil desire?
Love is part of the image of God, present in Adam before his fall.
John C.T. on 12 Dec 2008 at 12:44 pm #
#156, Wm.T.: “Note that all Calvinists distinguish between God’s meticulous providence and God’s foreordination or decree. The former refers to God’s working in the present, and Jesus is very specific that it is meticulous down to the smallest detail. The latter refers to God’s predestined command for His entire creation, and the Bible doesn’t specify that it applies to everything.”
I’ve never actually read that in any Calvinist works, would you supply a reference please? In addition to never having read that, it doesn’t seem logically tenable to hold to both. What parts of God’s creation would be indeterminate and not foreordained? All Calvinists that I’ve read assume or argue that everything is determined.
John C.T. on 12 Dec 2008 at 12:49 pm #
Wm.T. #152: “As I said before, if the will is libertarian-free, then one can always choose what desires one will use in an act of choice — but this leads to an infinite regress, since the choice of desires is itself a choice requiring an underlying choice of desires. There’s no logical or temporal final grounding for choice under the libertarian free will model.”
There is no infinite regress for the incompatibilist because the desires do not determine the choice. One does not have to go behind (or prior to) the desires existing at the time of choice because the desires at the time of choice do not determine the choice. The choice cannot be predicted from knowing the desires. That does not mean that desires are irrelevant, only that they are not determinative.
Hence, the allegation of infinite regress does not hold up and does not defeat the incompatibilist position.
Mitch on 12 Dec 2008 at 12:57 pm #
Dear John C.T.,
When you write that ”lust requires that one’s mind entertain a thought, which is also a choice. That is the problem, most of us have “thoughts” come to our mind without giving formal approval for them to come to our mind:)
As for the unregenerate mother’s love for her child, you answered it very nicely for me. You concede that this love is not completely pure nor is it completely free from evil. God does not play horseshoes my friend, if there is even a hint of impure motif and/or evil then it is unacceptable to God.
The whole point that Jesus was making is that it is not our realized actions that are the problem; the problem is our very nature. That is why he drives home the point by saying if their view was correct and it was only the act itself that condemned them then they should pluck out their eyes. You do realize that he was not advocating for us to do that though right?
Grace & Peace
John C.T. on 12 Dec 2008 at 1:37 pm #
re Mitch #163: It is important to distinguish, as does Wm.T. and other Calvinists adn Arminians, between humans’ total depravity (every thing we do is affected by sin) and utter depravity (we can only sin; there is nothing good in us). A mother’s love, though tainted by sin, is not in itself a sinful desire. Of course it is not enough to give her salvation, but that is a different issue. The fact that her love is not a sinful desire is enough to defeat your argument. Moreover, the issue of whether desires are sinful or not is irrelevant to the issue of free will from an incompatibilist and indeterminist position. The incompatibilist asserts that a choice can be made contrary to or different from one’s desires.
That does not mean, however, that the incompatibilist must agree that every physcial act is a result of a free will choice. Some acts can be or are determined, either by the previous state of the universe or by desires, etc. The unregenerate human can make many free will choices without God’s help (e.g., which route should I take to work today). He cannot, however, make an unhelped free will choice to follow God. H must be drawn to God by God’s prevenient grace. Under the influence of God’s drawing, however, he then has the ability to resist that drawing or not to resist it. If he resists the drawing until he dies, then he’s a goat before the throne. If he follows the drawing until he dies, then he’s a sheep.
Mitch on 12 Dec 2008 at 1:53 pm #
Dear John C.T.,
Is the mother’s love the pure love that God has for the Son? If not, then yes it is still sinful no matter how much good you think she still has left in her.
So we do not have LFW except for the most important choice of all, but we have it for all the little mundane things? Weird.
I understand that an incompatibilist asserts that he make choices completely independent of desires or contrary, but if there is no rhyme or reason for why you make a choice then you may as well just flip a coin next time.
Grace & Peace
Mitch on 12 Dec 2008 at 2:33 pm #
John C.T.,
You wrote the following-
The incompatibilist asserts that a choice can be made contrary to or different from one’s desires.
Let’s for the sake of argument agree with that and let me try to flesh this out a bit more. Say that you have a strong desire to hit your brother, for sake of argument you have a brother, but you use your nifty little LFW and make the choice not to hit your brother. I will add one more thing to this scenario; say that hitting your brother is illegal where you live. Now according to the law you would be innocent correct? After all you didn’t go through with it, but what would the verdict be in front of God’s judgment seat? Guilty! Do you see that is the whole point that Jesus was making and that’s why it is so important to be born from above. Without that all we do is sinful because it is not derived from a pure heart. Hopefully this answers your example of the mother and child again as well.
It seems that your view is in line with the ones that Jesus was addressing in Matthew, in that you put the concern with the actualized act rather than see it is your very essence/nature that is the problem.
Grace & Peace
John C.T. on 12 Dec 2008 at 3:53 pm #
re #166.
I would not be guilty for physically hitting my brother, since I did not.
“James 1:14 But each one is tempted when he is lured and enticed by his own desires. 1:15 Then when desire conceives, it gives birth to sin, and when sin is full grown, it gives birth to death. 1:16 Do not be led astray, my dear brothers and sisters.”
It appears that the Bible does not equate sin and desire. It is the giving in to our desire that produces sin; desire thus gives birth to sin.
Of course, that is apart from whether incompatibilist free will exists. It is possible to have incompatibilist free will regardless of whether the desires themselves constitute sin (whether desires count as sin that would exclude us from God’s kingdom is not an issue I’m addressing).
Note how James discusses temptation, desire and sin and death. Desire presents itself as a lure toward sin. As an attraction to us, which if we CHOOSE to follow results in sin. James does not present desrie as something that determines our choices, that irresistably controls the exercise of our will. James warns us about temptation because he expects us to choose against our desire and to choose to obey Christ in spite of (contrary to) our desires.
Again, another example of how the Bible consistently and without exception uses languageand stories and reasoning to present the position that we can, and are expected to, use our wills in a manner contrary to our desires where those desires do not line up with God’s command to love.
It is true that because the image of God in us is damaged and infected by sin that we will inevitably succmb many times in our lives to following the lure of our desires and so choose to sin.
It is also true that our only cure from this and our only hope for salvation is Christ. However, the source of the cure, and the fact that we are corrupted by sin, has no bearing on whether we have incompatibilist freedom.
Mitch on 12 Dec 2008 at 4:29 pm #
Dear John C.T.,
Good to see you use James as I feel he destroys your whole view of LFW and of course I feel he is perfectly in line with what Jesus said in Matthew about how our desire is sin and we are held accountable for them. To me your view is very robust works righteousness, if one does not act in a sinful way than God cannot hold them responsible. Yet we are told that our every thought, word and act will be judged.
I do notice that you do not even try to answer my questions; it seems that all you do is say that you are right. That being the case I will bow out of this interaction and leave you to flip the coin of your LFW, I will be content to stay with the testimony of Scripture.
Merry Christmas!
Grace & Peace
Wm Tanksley on 12 Dec 2008 at 4:36 pm #
I grant that you claim an additional requirement, than we must also have a “libertarian free choice” above and beyond “acting on our desires”.
This additional requirement is not supported by common law or the Bible. Its presence in philosophy is limited to inference, and is only available when counterfactuals are assumed to be real (although most libertarians only hold this for future counterfactuals).
I was (perhaps too vaguely) citing the available evidence, not an omniscient narrator. I didn’t imply anything about solo or duo, except that the robbery was obviously committed in duo. And anyhow, solo or duo makes no difference to the severity of the crime or punishment.
What if your intent was to be kept at gunpoint? What if you’re a two-strikes-against-you criminal, and your associate is a juvenile — you both want to rob, and think this plan will get you each the least danger of an extended sentence?
Pure speculation, of course; the law doesn’t have the true mental intent available, so it uses the evidence that it DOES have: that you clearly planned to accomplish a robbery by some unknown means, and that you then DID accomplish a robbery by some specific means; those specific means judged alone make you appear to be a victim, but when viewed with the evidence of intent, make it reasonably clear that you did intend to commit the crime.
The desire and the action is clear; the guilt is then established. Had they only proved the desire, the guilt would not be clear; had they only proved the action, only your accomplice would be proven guilty.
Nothing further is needed — the fact that you perhaps didn’t have unhindered free will during the crime because your alleged accomplice kept apparently threatening to kill you isn’t sufficient defense, even if it’s entirely possible that you DID perhaps change your mind and he didn’t let you stop.
(This isn’t a perfect analogy, I admit. Non-libertarian will isn’t the same thing as duress. I’m simply trying to use a close analogy.)
Agreed. Thanks for looking past that detail.
This is false on both counts.
First, evidence of motive is an important element in many crimes and torts (“malice” is a common term in law), and is usually decisive in jury deliberations even when it’s not part of the law itself. (Consider the classical trio of “motive, means, and opportunity.”)
Second, God judges both action and desire, both when they’re together and when they’re disjoint. (One can obviously desire evil without acting on it, but less obviously one can perform evil without desiring that specific evil — “every idle word” will be judged — although of course one must have an evil heart in order to commit evil even negligently.)
Looking on a woman is not sinful. Looking with lust in your heart is.
“Man looks on the outward appearance, but God looks on the heart.” Now, what was God looking at? He didn’t claim to be looking at the future; He was looking at David’s heart (as compared to his brothers’) as it was at that time. What did He see? The fullness of David’s heart — probably not his intellect or emotional range, but rather his desire for God.
Luke 6:45 (and several proverbs) claims that our words come from the contents of our hearts — in context, clearly from the desires; and this is not mentioned as something optional that you can overcome if your will is strong enough.
James says that temptations come when we are led astray by our own desires; Paul says that the way to deal with temptation is to look for a “way to escape”, not to attempt to be stronger than your desires or to change them.
The expression “pure in heart” is used constantly in the OT. Proverbs 20:9 seems to indicate that keeping your heart clean is a requirement for being clear of sin.
I see plenty of verses that could possibly be read either way; I see verses that have nothing to do with the subject; but I see many verses that, unless they are purely cultural language, mean that a man should be judged by his desires; and I see nothing that says otherwise, that a man should NOT be judged by his desires.
John C.T. on 12 Dec 2008 at 5:52 pm #
re #169, Wm.T.: “. . . grant that you claim an additional requirement, than we must also have a “libertarian free choice” above and beyond “acting on our desires”. This additional requirement is not supported by common law ”
??
To be guilty under the criminal law of a common law country, the prosecution (the State in republican common law countries, the Crown in parliamentary ones) must prove both the mental element–intent NOT DESIRE–and the physical acts. The point is so basic that I think it shouldn’t need further proof. any elementary text on criminal law will provide that definition and it will be impossible to find one that uses “desire” as an element of the crime.
“. . . what if it was your intent to be kept at gun point . . .” Then under criminal law the excuse that “I was held at gun point” would be found to be a mere sham and not an excuse because the “holding at gunpoint” was done willingly and did not exert any force of terror. That is, you were pretenindg to be acting in response to a threat (the gun point), but it was only a pretense because tehre was not any real threat. Again, its not like criminals haven’t tried such tricks before and been convicted anyway.
The only mental aspect that needs to be proved in a criminal trial is “intent”; “desire” is not a requisite element of a crime. It matters not under the law whether one has lots of desire or no desire, it matters only whether one intended to do the crime.
Note that there are two different crimes, the one you planned, and the one that you were allegedly forced to do under gunpoint. The planning of certain (but not all) crimes is an offence separate from the commission of a crime. You could be accused of and found guilty for the planning of the first crime, but you could not be found guilty of carrying it out. The crime actually carried out was the one carried out “under gun point”.
Furthermore, if you had truly intended to carry out your plan to rob, then the prosecutor would try to prove INTENT, not DESIRE. You would never be convicted if the only mental element present was desire.
MOTIVE is NOT an element of ANY crime. Prosecutors show motive as an indirect way of showing intent. However, what must be proved is intent, not motive. Showing motive can also be usful in creating probabilities where there is no direct physical evidence. Is it necessary for me to quote from a legal text? I’ll do so if it will put this to rest.
I assert that desire is not relevant, for the reasons given above, and that the story of the robbery isn’t analgous in any relevant fashion.
Returning to my actual Biblical examples, James writes that sin is born when one follows the lure of desire and acts on it. The desire may lure, but there is no sin until the lure is taken.
In Galations, Paul finds Peter blameworthy not because of a desire, but because of actions he took when he could have and should have exercise his will to act in a different manner.
Lastly, the content of one’s heart is the result of choices and resultant actions.
John C.T. on 12 Dec 2008 at 6:32 pm #
Motive and desire are not, I’d say, identical. However, aside from that, here is
what the Corpus Juris Secundum states: “Proof of motive is not essential to a conviction for murder where the other evidence in the case is sufficient to warrant it. Where accused’s guilt is established by proof of ALL THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS [emphasis added, note that this means that motive is not an essential element], the existence of a motive may be inferred. Failure to prove motive does not establish or raise a presumption of innocence; nor does reasonable doubt as to motive prevent a conviction of a higher degree of homocide than the second degree. Conversely, neither proof of motive alone, nor proof of motive plus opportunity or presence at the scene, can support a conviction for murder.” [from paragraph 304 “Motive” in the section “Homocide”]
“Heart” is also not identical with “desire”. From Easton’s Bible Dictionary (1897): “Heart According to the Bible, the heart is the centre not only of spiritual activity, but of all the operations of human life. “Heart” and “soul” are often used interchangeably (Deu 6:5; Deu 26:16; compare Mat 22:37; Mar 12:30, Mar 12:33), but this is not generally the case. The heart is the “home of the personal life,” and hence a man is designated, according to his heart, wise (Kg1 3:12, etc.), pure (Psa 24:4; Mat 5:8, etc.), upright and righteous (Gen 20:5, Gen 20:6; Psa 11:2; Psa 78:72), pious and good (Luk 8:15), etc. In these and such passages the word “soul” could not be substituted for “heart.” The heart is also the seat of the conscience (Rom 2:15). “
Mitch on 12 Dec 2008 at 8:47 pm #
I couldn’t resist, must be I lack this LFW that some people possess.
It has been said that the heart is the centre of all operations of human life and/or is the seat of conscience, great. So from this is where we get our desire, will, intent, make choices and all things that make us – us. The scripture tells us that this “heart” and/or”centre of all operations of human life” and/or “seat of conscience” is wicked and evil. Nothing truly good can come from it and this is right in-line with the point that our Lord and Saviour was making in Matthew. Our very core has been corrupted and all that flows from this source is corrupt. Using an example that John C.T. gave, it’s like a glass of water with a drop of the deadliest poison in it. Even if you pour it in a clean cup its still poison. This applies to any perceived good that we do, it all has the taint of poison which makes it bad.
That is why the Bible makes it clear that it is our very being that needs to be changed, we need a radical transformation. All of us were slaves to sin. Nowhere does the Bible ascribe to this LFW, in fact it makes it crystal clear that LFW is false. It seems that the LFW advocates in this combox want to believe that only their actualizing of an act renders them guilty even though the Bible states otherwise. They want to believe that this LFW does not enslave them to what their very essence is… sinful. The Bible plainly tells us that you are either a slave to sin or a slave to Christ. This idea of being an autonomous independent agent that has this mystical power of LFW does not exist.
To any and all that read this Merry Christmas and may our Lord and Saviour who set us free from sin be praised and glorified in all we do.
Grace & Peace
John C.T. on 13 Dec 2008 at 4:56 am #
Unregenerate people can love and do altruistic acts, and these things are neither evil nor corrupt. Fathers sacrifice their lives saving their children from drowning or from house invaders or from wild animals. Soldiers sacrifice their lives for their comrades. Jesus himself said that there is no greater love than sacrificing oneself for another. Atheist doctors do altruistic service through the organization “Doctors without Borders”. None of those things flow from corruption, from evil, from Satan. Those things flow from being created in the image of God and from participating in His common grace.
Consequently, it is not sufficient to speak abstractly of “corruption”. One must ground one’s use of that term in specific passages of scripture. Likewise, it is not sufficient to merely assert that the Bible is “crystal clear that LFW is false”. Without grounding that assertion in actual scripture and without providing actual reasons to support the assertion, one is merely telling a “just so” story.
I have above given the story of Peter in Galations. In that story Paul finds Peter blameworthy because he did not choose to continue eating with the Gentiles even though he could have and should have. Paul assumes that Peter could have chosen otherwise, the he had the ability to either choose to eat with them or to choose not to eat with them. No where in the story is there present the theory that Peter’s choice was determined by his dominant desire. One has to import that compatibilist theory into the story; indeed, one has to hijack the story. There is nothing in the story about Peter’s desires, or about obstacles that prevented Peter from acting on his desires.
The Bible is rife with stories like that. For another example, read Acts 27:10 – 44. In that story of Paul’s sailing to Italy and thence to Rome, Paul tells the captain not to set sail, and that part of the story only makes sense if Paul expected that the captain could choose not to sail, to choose contrary to his dominant desire to sail, to choose not to sail simply because he takes Paul’s advice rather than following his desires. Later, when the desire of the sailor’s was to leave the ship, Paul advises them to act contrary to their desire and to stay with their ship. This time, they do act contrary to their desire to flee (expressed by lowering an escape boat from the ship) and follow Paul’s advice.
None of the stories express a compatibilist theory of determined choices. The Calvinist must derive her theory of determinism and compatibilism elsewhere and then import it into the story. The Arminian sticks with the story as presented in the Bible.
The Calvinist theory of compatibilism resolves all “tension” (to use the CMP word) by strongly asserting determinism and then reworking the definition of free will so that it is compatible with determinism. The Arminian does not. Consequently the Arminian is left with the difficulty of explaining how an indeterminate free will is not simply random. However, by sticking with that difficulty the Arminian is being responsible to the Biblical texts. The Calvinist, on the other hand, eliminates that difficulty.
The difficulty is not, however, a fatality no more than is the difficulty in explaining the trinity, or how the nonmaterial spirit can cause material effects (e.g., move one’s arm), or how Christ can be both God and man, or how God’s word can cause something physical to appear, or how God can know the future free nondetermined choices of people. All of these difficulties arise from taking the texts as we find them.
John C.T. on 13 Dec 2008 at 5:05 am #
re #172, Mitch: “I couldn’t resist, must be I lack this LFW that some people possess.”
Your sense of humour is welcome and appreciated.
Wm Tanksley on 14 Dec 2008 at 1:40 pm #
A person can only be morally responsible if the action taken proves something fundamental about them. If they could have only done good, we know they’re reliably good; if they could only do evil we know they’re reliably evil. They must be morally judged accordingly, and there’s no room for a judge who refuses to judge because they could do only good (or only evil).
What can we judge about a person — a hypothetical person — who we can’t predict? This person can do either good or evil, and we just don’t know; it’s part of that person’s nature to do either. Christians can do either, and Paul explains that this is due to us having two natures warring within us; one can do only evil and one can do only good. When the old man is finally slain for good, we will become only able to do good.
Think about it — does it really make sense to you to condemn a person to eternal hell for making a choice today that they could, in principle and practice, make the other way tomorrow? Perhaps if only the person were allowed to live one more day, he might make a different choice? It makes more sense to condemn people eternally to the fate that their nature condemns them to: the innately evil to hell, and ones regenerated by the mercy of God to Heaven.
Wm Tanksley on 14 Dec 2008 at 1:47 pm #
But it does when the Arminian brings up the claim that God isn’t just if He condemns men to hell when they had no free choice. God IS just, and we know due to “the unreached” that He does condemn men to hell when they have no true chance to choose Him. We don’t have to get metaphysical, we know it with certainty.
Whatever conclusion we reach, there’s no way to avoid the fact that your argument is impossible, because our just God condemns men who have no chance to choose Him.
Wm Tanksley on 14 Dec 2008 at 1:59 pm #
Certainly all of our abilities are given by God and therefore good; but until they are informed by the love of God (which is only available from the Spirit of God!) everything we do with them is worthless and corrupt. I can cite not only 1 Cor 13, but also Isa. 56:6. This verse says not merely that all of our righteousnesses are disgusting and worthless, but that they are unclean and defiling.
As C.S. Lewis said in the Great Divorce, there’s not one passion that, untransformed, will not drag us to hell; and not one passion that, transformed, will not be glorified in Heaven. Mother love is a worse demon than lust, if only because it’s fallen from a more glorious angel.
John C.T. on 14 Dec 2008 at 2:32 pm #
#175 Wm.T.: “Think about it — does it really make sense to you to condemn a person to eternal hell for making a choice today that they could, in principle and practice, make the other way tomorrow? Perhaps if only the person were allowed to live one more day, he might make a different choice? ”
It certainly does make sense to judge each person for each of their decisions. We do it all the time when we apply criminal law. A thief gets judged on his theft, even though tomorrow he will be honest. However, your statement appears to conflating two separate issues. A person’s culpability for each individual act of theirs, which is not disputed, to a person being consigned to eternal judgment and damnation for a single act. Since we cannot earn earn our eternal salvation, it makes no difference how many good deeds we do. Since we are born damaged by sin, and all sin responsibly, it does not matter how many bad dees we do–we are being sent away as goats by God the judge unless we are saved by Christ.
So, therefore, the issue of a bad deed followed by a good deed is not reelvant at all to my position that incompatibilistic free will exists.
Post #176 is not a defeater of incompatibilist free will for the reasons given in my post #159. As I stated there, many explanations can be given by an Arminian in relation to the fate of thouse who have not been preached to since the death and resurrection of Christ.
What is more troubling, is the fate of the non-elect under Calvinism. All the non-elect are created merely to suffer in hell forever. The are created in sin, created with desires to sin, created to foulfill those sinful desires, created knowing they will never be saved (and for most Calvinists, to burn in hell without ending of time). I have read many stories of people who left Christianity, or faith in Christ because of that teaching; I have never read of anyone who left their faith because of an Armininian teaching of free will. And even if one could find someone who dropped their faith because of a teaching of free will, it would be a vanishingly small number compared to those who left Christ (or never came to faith) because otf the teaching of the damnation of the non-elect.
Wm Tanksley on 14 Dec 2008 at 2:36 pm #
Thank you — so there’s no correlation between what we desire and what we choose to do. This means that in practice, most of the time what we do actually frustrates our desires. We’re always looking back and wondering, “why did I do *that*? I didn’t even *want* to!”
Of course, that’s nonsense, and the result of a silly philosophical premise run amuck.
I understand that; this is why I used a formally defined word “correlated”. Correlation doesn’t imply causation; it simply establishes how frequently things happen to appear together historically.
And your philosophy requires that desires not appear together with actions; that we do things that frustrate us as often as we do things that we wanted to do.
This is an illustration of physical capability, of course; not of compatibilist free will.
He has desires both to leave and to stay. He weighs them based on his heart’s desires and his beliefs about what would happen as a result of each action, and he chooses the action that he thinks will be most effective to meet his “core” (heart’s) desire.
His reasons are determinative of his decision. That’s why he’s called “reasoning”.
Bah, economists don’t buy that nonsense; only Randites do. Economists admit that people desire to be altruistic often as an end in itself — sometimes more than they desire to actually help people. But Mary of course had desires to not steal! And of course she reasoned about them. She didn’t just avoid it for no reason at all — and she could TELL you about the reasons, and you would see that her desires were behind each reason.
That’s only because he knows more about one than the other. In reality, the past and future are objectively the same — God knows them in the same way.
Indeed, both the future and the past are “up to him”, and at judgment day God will hold him responsible for both what was at the time past and what was at the time future.
-Wm
John C.T. on 14 Dec 2008 at 2:38 pm #
I have provided two examples of the Bible describing the exercise of the will as being able to choose between two alternatives, which I’ve also noted is consistent with our intuitions about ourselves. That is, “free” in “free will” means having the power or ability to choose between two or more alternatives regardless of the state of one’s desires.
No one has yet provided an example of the Bible describing free will as merely being able to physically do what one desires and thus determined. That is, that “free” in “free will” means simply being able to actualize our dominant desire, rather than having that desire frustrated by circumstances or forces that are outside ourselves.
John C.T. on 14 Dec 2008 at 2:41 pm #
It also seems to me to be a significant difficulty or contradiction for a Calvinist to tell the gospel to an unsaved person. The Calvinist cannot know whether that person is elect or non-elect. If the person is non-elect, then the Calvinist is wasting his breath and, what is worse, is telling that unsaved person about a promise that is not available to him or her.
Wm Tanksley on 14 Dec 2008 at 4:22 pm #
Wikipedia, Intent: “Intent is the planning and desire to perform an act… The requirements for the proof of intent in tort law are generally simpler than criminal law. Knowledge of the repercussions of the act is often not necessary. It is sometimes only a matter of showing that there was desire to perform an act.”
Wikipedia, Intention (criminal): “A person intends a consequence when he or she foresees that it will happen if the given series of acts or omissions continue and desires it to happen.”
Law.com, intent: “mental desire and will to act in a particular way”.
Okay, I’m 3 for 3 finding “desire” to be crucial in the definition of “intent”.
I grant that “desire” and “intent” are not synonyms; but desire is the foundation of intent. You do not intend an act or consequence that you do not desire.
This is true. Motive isn’t synonymous with intent or desire, either. In fact, I’d say that desire < motive < intent; desire means only that you’d like something, while motive means you’d like something enough to act, while intent means you liked something enough to plan out the act. But the foundation is desire.
There is wrong even in lingering in desire. God provides with every temptation a way to escape, not a way to endure.
That’s not what Paul said! This is terrible eisegesis; you’re simply reading in what you want to see. Paul didn’t explicitly talk about either desires or choices; the passage simply doesn’t mention anything on point to our discussion.
Compare to the passages that do mention things we’re talking about — even James, allegedly “your” passage, makes desire the lynchpin of action, not free will. And so many other passages talk about the heart of man…
So it’s not the result of God’s creation? So God created every part of us except the core, heart, that which makes each of us uniquely “I”?
The contents of the heart are man’s desires. What comes out of the heart is all the actions and choices we make. The heart determines the actions — and this time I use the word “determines” in every sense we’ve discussed. The actions only rarely get a chance to affect the desires — and those only to provide lesser desires than the ones already present.
God promises to remove our hearts of stone and replace them with hearts of flesh. God is the one who “forms every human heart” (Ps 33:15). From these we see that God created our hearts, and maintains them — and elsewhere we see that our actions proceed from our hearts, and prove them.
-Wm
Wm Tanksley on 15 Dec 2008 at 12:58 am #
This claim makes very little sense to me. A few questions, and then I’ll answer the part of the claim that makes sense to me.
+ Who are we supposed to tell the gospel to except unsaved people? They are the ones who need it.
+ Why is telling the gospel to non-elect especially bad? They need it just as badly as the elect, and it glorifies God.
+ The promise is available to everyone. The Bible says so. The non-elect don’t want it and won’t accept it; but that doesn’t mean it’s not offered to them.
+ Finally, we can’t tell who’s elect and who isn’t, and in fact we’re commanded over and over to not try that. Even if none of my other points were true, it’s still true that God specifically told us that determining who’s truly saved (or savable) is His job.
John C.T. on 15 Dec 2008 at 7:34 am #
I’m not the first to notice the problem with telling the gospel to the non-elect, since the promis is not available to them. Preaching the gospel to them does not make the gospel available to them since it is impossible for them to resopnd unless God has previously elected them. I’m alwo awaere of the Calvinist argument that we should simply preach to the non-elect because doing so is a matter of obedience. i’m not the only one to wonder why god would want us to be obedient to something that is entirely pointless, since there is no chance the non-elect will be saved. It is illogical and irrational to say that the promise is avialable to the non-elect since there is no possibility (if Calvinism is true) that God will exercise his irresistable grace toward them. However, I do realize that this is starting to take us off the main topic.
John C.T. on 15 Dec 2008 at 8:00 am #
How is Galations not relevant? Peter was eating with the Gentiles. Then the Jewish Christians arrived. Then Peter stopped eating with Gentiles. How is it eisegesis to infer that Peter made a decision to stop eating with the Gentiles? And it certainly isn’t eisegesis to note that Paul finds Peter blameworthy for stopping his practice of eating with Gentiles. That’s why Paul confronted Peter.
Did Peter magically stop eating with Gentiles? How else can it be than Peter was faced with a choice. Once the Jews from James arrived, Peter had to choose: do I continue to eat with Gentiles or do I stop eating with them and only eat with Jews.
So we have a Biblical text that describes a situation in which an apostle was faced with a choice. and teh Bible clearly states that Peter made the wrong choice. How is there any eisegesis (reading into the text) in what I have written so far. Are you denying that Peter made a choice? Are you denying that he made the wrong choice? Are you denying that Paul found him blameworthy for choosing not to eat with Gentiles?
Paul writes in Galatians 2:14 “But when I saw that they [Peter and the others who withdrew from the Gentiles] walked not uprightly according to the truth of the gospel, I said unto Peter before them all, If thou being a jew, livest after the manner of Gentiles, and not as do the Jews, why compellest thou the Gentiles to live as do the Jews”.
You simply assert that what I wrote is not what Paul said, without stating the difference between what I said and what Paul said. Consequently, it’s impossible for me to respond without guessing at what you meant.
You also state, “There is wrong even in lingering in desire.” I would counter that to “linger” requires an act of the will. However, it would be more to the point if you could provide a Biblical text in which God says that lingering in desire is sin. Rather than writing about what you or I think “lingering” is , I would rather know what God says. James certainly seems to be saying that the initial desire is not a sin, because the sin has to be given birth after the desire has occurred. James does not write that the sin occurs at the same time as the desire occurs.
Wm Tanksley on 15 Dec 2008 at 1:41 pm #
It’s eisegesis to infer that this account has anything to do with our debate.
If LFW is correct, YES, there’s some hidden magical reason for Peter’s choice. If a compatibilist understanding is correct, there’s a concrete, preexisting reason for Peter’s shameful lapse.
Actually, the latter is what the text says — it doesn’t simply say “Peter made the wrong choice”; it says “Peter made the wrong choice because he feared those of the circumcision.”
I still don’t claim that this proves my point — but it certainly does nothing good for your point.
Agreed, but this doesn’t tell us whether he made the choice by miraculous LFW, or by plain old common-sense desires. The story could be expanded to fit either philosophical account; but since that’s not its purpose, Paul doesn’t do that. All he says is that Peter was to be blamed.
I’ll deny this, but not because it affects your premise; simply because it’s not what Paul blamed Peter for. Look at the text you quote: why compellest thou the Gentiles to live as do the Jews”. The problem wasn’t as much avoiding eating with the Gentiles; the problem was that he was putting pressure on the Gentiles to submit to the Judaizers, a problem Paul was addressing in that letter and the reason he included that anecdote.
I absolutely concede and grant that point. It doesn’t pertain to our debate, though; the question of why we would will to linger or shun the incitement of a specific desire is still open; you say we linger because of the desire but shun for no reason; and I say both lingering and shunning are the results of desires.
That would be silly. Common sense says that every desire is sin if indulged wrongly and virtue if indulged rightly. There’s a time to love, a time to kill.
The only thing about desires that the Bible hints is a direct sin is the lack of desire for God; Calvinists believe that this lack of desire is the “sin” (note the singular) that Christ promises the Holy Spirit will convict the world of, as opposed to the “sins” that He convicts believers of.
Nonetheless, no matter how good our desires can be when they are used by the Holy Spirit, they also can be evil when we are left to our own desires. Whoops, I used the word “desires”; perhaps I should have used the word “tendencies”.
When God decides to punish us by having us do evil, as with Pharaoh or in Romans 1, he doesn’t insert evil into our hearts; rather, he simply “…gave them over in the desires of their hearts to impurity;” he ceases the restraining job of the Holy spirit.
-Wm
Wm Tanksley on 15 Dec 2008 at 2:22 pm #
That makes Calvinism fit more of the Bible than Arminianism, because this is exactly the situation that Christ describes in the parables, including the that of the sower, or the wheat and the tares. “Man plants and sows, but it is God who gives the increase.”
The Bible is very clear that it is impossible for man to respond to the gospel unless God enables them; you agree with that. The only reason you bring this up as an objection is that you’ve imported an extrabiblical premise: that God must intervene to allow them to respond before they hear the Gospel, or God’s not just. The Bible just doesn’t support that argument; God makes no promise of that.
I grant that “it’s a matter of obedience” isn’t a satisfactory answer, and your explanation of why it’s bad is well-given.
But God’s command isn’t pointless, it simply appears so to you. There’s a reason why He made His Church to contain both saved and unsaved/wheat and tares, and made the world to contain both elect and non-elect. We can’t tell the difference in either case, but we both concede that the Church contains both wheat and tares, and that we are commanded not to try to separate them out for destruction; it seems a logical extension that God wouldn’t want us to try to pre-judge the elect from the non-elect, but to leave that to Him.
I don’t know for sure why He took the job for Himself and made it impossible for us to do; but surely He did, and surely we can think of plenty of possible reasons.
The promise isn’t given to the elect or the non-elect; it’s given to the entire world. “Whoever believes in Him shall not perish.” We proclaim it not to the elect or non-elect — since we can’t see those groups at all — but to the entire world. To the world, the message shows God’s love and grace; to the elect, it grants salvation; and to the non-elect, it signifies God’s wrath and judgment. In all cases, it highlights the character of God.
Wm Tanksley on 15 Dec 2008 at 3:24 pm #
Nothing that exists is purely evil. It all flows from God’s creative work. But that doesn’t make anything we do acceptable before God. God made wool, and God made human blood, and God made the menstrual cycle, and all are good; but Isaiah’s “filthy rags” consist of the three good things, and they are used to represent the untouchable uncleanness of our attempts at righteousness.
You’re completely wrong here — Paul explicitly says that Peter did this “because he feared those of the circumcision”. And Paul never says “Peter could have done this, or he could have done that, but he chose to…” It’s bad enough that the story doesn’t support your main claim; you make it worse by making claims about the story that are patently false.
No, one doesn’t. One doesn’t use this story to express ANY notions about free will, determinism, or anything else except the story itself — unless the author takes a break to explain that other thing. Doing so is hijacking the story.
Of course, there’s a direct mention of Peter’s desires. But I’m puzzled now; I see you mentioning “obstacles that prevent … acting on desires”, as though they had something to do with our discussion. What do you mean? Are you suggesting that you don’t believe in obstacles that prevent us from acting on our desires, but I do believe in them?
(I’m sincerely asking; I don’t know why you said that.)
I’m reading this, and I don’t see what you’re saying at all. Luke gives great detail, yet never bothers to presume on people’s desires; it seems that the local nautical experts said one thing, and Paul (an experienced voyager) said another; the crew in some way decided based on that contradictory advice. In this case there’s no obvious reason to favor Paul’s advice rather than the captain’s (although there’s not much reason to disregard it either, assuming that they knew he was an experienced traveler).
But there Paul explained that an angel of the LORD appeared to him! That’s a little more authority than he gave before — and don’t forget that the sailors weren’t exactly keen on any of their options, the words Luke uses indicate that they’d given up all hope of being saved. Sailing out will probably result in death; staying on the boat will probably result in death; but this stranger who correctly warned us about the voyage now tells us that we’ll survive if we stay on the boat. Okay, sounds like we stay on the boat — we can always try to cast off a bit later if he’s lying about the angel.
I’m speculating — but the point is that so are you, and at least my speculations fit with the narrative of the story. Yours fit only with your philosophy, and are completely external to the narrative. Luke wasn’t making any philosophical point there, and didn’t explain any of their actions; to make your point he would have had to explain something about a lack of desires. (The same is true in reverse, of course, if I were to claim that this story supported my claims; it doesn’t because it wasn’t intended to.)
Of course not. Stories don’t DO that. They also don’t express libertarian free will with multiple real but undetermined futures; stories have a single thread. (Well, except for some fictional stories like O’Henry’s “Roads of Destiny”…) It takes a philosophical text to do that, like Paul’s writing.
-Wm
Wm Tanksley on 15 Dec 2008 at 4:18 pm #
We’ve given a number of quotes that seem to require that the authors believe that a man’s desires (sometimes called the contents of his heart) determine his actions. We’ve given quotes that support how God controls man’s actions. We’ve given quotes that explain that God’s grace is given or withheld as He wills, not according to any merit in us.
That’s all we need to do. There is no Biblical concept of free will; there are no quotes supporting it. One concept taught is that a man acts as he desires; another is that the contents of a man’s heart guide his actions; another is that our hearts contain wickedness.
The concept of LFW is entirely incoherent with the idea of man being unable to choose Christ except by the grace of God (why, what’s hindering?). The concept that God would be unjust if He demanded belief without giving the libertarian choice is incoherent with the same thing. The claim that God would be unjust if He condemned to hell without a chance is refuted by the presence of the justly damned but unreached evildoers.
The use of the story of Pharaoh in Rom 9 is incoherent unless it’s being used to explain that God intended Pharaoh as an example of His wrath from the beginning, before Pharaoh was even offered any choice. The same for Esau — and a verse later Paul even specifies that a man’s desires don’t make God choose him for salvation.
Salvation belongs to our LORD. Not to him who runs, or him who wills, but to Him who has mercy.
-Wm
Wm Tanksley on 15 Dec 2008 at 4:36 pm #
In your account of salvation, EVERYONE who’s heard the Gospel has the opportunity to choose whether they will do one specifically good act: to “believe in” Christ. Doing that act results in salvation; not doing it leaves one in their sins, without salvation. Therefore, there’s one single good deed we must do in order to be saved.
If a person’s heart cannot stop him from accepting Christ, then what does? If nothing “determines” a person’s heart, then whatever decision he makes today could be totally different tomorrow. Yet God declares that after a man dies, he receives judgment; no second chance is offered.
This makes perfect sense, of course, if a man’s decisions are determined by something real and constant about him, as the Bible says that a man’s actions are determined by his heart. Then a man’s life can be seen not as an opportunity to waver until one happens to point towards Christ (and then be taken over by Him), but rather a chance to show what the contents one one’s heart truly is — and then perhaps to have that filthy, dead heart replaced with a live one, one that cares about God and cannot help but respond to His love that’s displayed for all the world.
Not so; all creation exists in order to glorify God. That’s a high calling, and worthy of praise and acceptance. Some of us glorify Him with our mouths; others of us sulk and let Him glorify Himself by showing forth His wrath on us.
…but this bears little resemblance to the arguments Paul makes about the offensiveness of the Gospel. I’m not saying that Calvinism is true because it’s offensive, I’m merely saying that “my gospel is less offensive” isn’t much of an argument. The question isn’t which gospel is less offensive; the question is which one is true.
-Wm
kangaroodort on 16 Dec 2008 at 1:40 pm #
Wm,
I have not had the opportunity to read all of your exchanges that followed the post I am responding to here. If you feel you have addressed something in further responses to others then I apologize in advance. I see that you have a lot of time on your hands, and I, unfortunately, do not. This is a shame since I think this discussion could be productive but I just cannot commit to it any further. I will address your concerns here in your last post to me and then I will just have to let it go.
Mostly, I am trying to clear up misunderstandings that I think you have regarding LFW and my arguments. For me, it really boils down to the reality of choices and after reading what you have wrote, I still can’t see how anyone can truly have or make “choices” in your view. I don’t see that you have explained that adequately. So for me it is simple. Choices are real and therefore we have LFW. If we do not have LFW then choices are not real. There is no such thing. Any use of “choices” by those who reject LFW is non-sensical.
I wrote,
“First, I am a little troubled that you found it strange that I hold to total depravity and the need for divine enablement for us to believe. That is the classical Arminian position and the position that Arminius himself strongly defended. It makes me wonder how much you really know of Arminianism and how much you have interacted with actual Arminians (many claim to be Arminians who are just non-Calvinists and really have no clue what Arminianism entails).”
You responded:
What I’m shocked about is that you appear to claim that the following points are true:
+ LFW is the only just way people can be held responsible for choices.
+ God is just.
+ God holds all people responsible for choosing Christ.
+ Some people lack LFW to choose Christ.
How can these propositions possibly be consistent? By your rules, God would only be just in judging people who have had their total depravity lifted, and yet rejected God anyhow. But the Bible condemns people who reject God when all they’ve heard is the testimony of nature; so clearly, God actually holds all people accountable, not just some non-depraved subset of people.
Well, you have misunderstood. What I contend is that when people reject the gospel God holds them accountable for that rejection and they are primarily condemned for rejecting the forgiveness that could have been theirs in Christ. As a result, they will also suffer the consequences of those sins which have not been forgiven due to their rejection of Christ’s blood.
As for those who never hear of Christ and perhaps never have an opportunity to reject Him, then God holds those people accountable for the revelation that they do reject (natural or otherwise). So they are condemned for rejecting the revelation of God in a lesser form (rather than the perfect revelation of Christ). In that case God’s grace would also be active in making it possible for them to seek after God based on that revelation (Acts 17:26, 27). But those who refuse whatever revelation God provides for them will be judged for that rejection (Rom. 1:20-32).
It seems to me that the only escape from the contradiction here is to claim that God grants his grace to everyone, thus removing any element of total depravity from human nature, making the term “total depravity” merely academic (some would call this “semi-Pelagian”).
I do believe that God’s grace is active in a wide variety of situations in sinful man but I do not believe that God’s grace is necessarily universal in the sense that one’s depravity can be overcome at anytime and in any circumstance. But even if I did hold to that position, your objection holds no merit. Depravity does not become “academic” simply because God overcomes it by His grace. If that were the case then depravity would be “academic” at any time it is overcome by grace, and that would include the point of irresistible regeneration in the Calvinist scheme.
If God’s grace is needed to overcome it, then it is real, even if it was overcome by God’s grace from birth. Otherwise, we could not say that God’s grace overcomes it since it would lose meaning. But since it has meaning and is real, it is proper to speak of the necessity of God’s grace regardless of when or how often that grace intervenes. And you seem to not know what semi-Pelagianism entails. Semi-Pelagianism asserts that one can take the first step towards God apart from grace and that once that first step is taken God’s grace can and must intervene. No one is claiming here that one can take any steps towards God apart from His grace so it would be helpful if you shelved any further inappropriate references to semi-Pelagianism.
But this isn’t what you do; you affirm that total depravity applies to some people. Your version seems to contain an internal contradiction that the typical Arminian position lacks.
Not at all. I affirm that total depravity applies to all people as explained above.
I hold those propositions to be true, except for the first one: LFW is not required for justice. All that’s required is that the allegedly guilty act be committed by the suspect, and be in accordance with the suspect’s desires. It doesn’t matter whether the suspect’s desires are a result of something else beyond the suspect; the buck stops at the desires of the person committing the sin.
Example of guilt: if someone forces me at gunpoint to rob a store, I have evidence of coercion and a defense in the eyes of the law. But if someone presents evidence that I’d planned to rob that store on that night and wanted to do it, and that I’d actually kept and used some or all of the proceeds of the robbery — then it’s clear that regardless of coercion, the robbery was my own desire (and intent), and I am guilty. The fact that I was threatened only adds guilt to the threatener, it doesn’t serve to remove it from me.
Now, God doesn’t threaten or force; He creates creatures who act entirely according to their own desires. He does so according to His own desires.
Look at that last statement. The problem is that they are not “our” desires if God controls and gives those desires to us so that we act on them of necessity (we have no power to resist those desires). In that case, they are really God’s desires, desires that God simply works into us and we cannot help but to act on. This would include sinful desires, would it not? He controls our thoughts, desires, and actions as a result.
And as has been noted by others, we do not hold people accountable for actions that they have no control over. If God controls our thoughts, desires, and actions, then He is the one who should be responsible for those actions. It doesn’t matter that we do them willingly since God makes us willing. We do not control our willingness, God does.
Let’s look at a different example than the one you provide above. If a man puts a date rape drug into a girl’s drink that destroys her inhibitions so that she “desires” to have sex with him and “willingly” does so, would we hold her accountable for those actions? No. But we would hold the one who put the drug in her drink responsible. To say that they were her actions and that she did them willingly does not change the fact that we would not hold her accountable since the presence of the drug brought about a change in her desire and will that she had no control over and no ability to resist. And that is the point. If God controls our thoughts, desires, and actions in an irresistible manner, then we should not be held responsible as those actions are not our own in any meaningful sense.
I wrote:
“How about we just work with the definition you provided later on in your response:
At any given moment, we have to choose what action we will take from the actions that are immediately possible to us, and by acting on that choice, one excludes for the moment all other possible actions.
So it seems that you see choice as acting on a certain course of action among various other possible courses of action. I agree, and that is exactly why predetermined choice is a contradiction in terms. If our actions are all predetermined by God then there is really only one possible course of action available to us- the one that God predetermined for us from eternity. So in the absence of legitimate options choice loses all meaning as you in fact seem to plainly recognize. So I think you have demonstrated the reality of the contradiction rather well. Thanks for making that so easy for me.”
You responded:
I think you’re basically right that my use of “immediately possible” is incorrect. I should have said “immediately obvious” instead; my error causes ambiguity, since you interpret it as “morally possible” when I meant it as “physically possible”. There are other problems with my wording — for example, an action may not be physically possible but may APPEAR to be physically possible, and thus be chosen.
Again, I am dealing with the reality of the situation. It doesn’t matter if we think we can choose or feel like we are making a choice if in fact we do not have a choice. The reality of the situation is that if all of our actions are predetermined from eternity then we never have choices; and if we never have choices then we never make choices either. When people speak of having and making choices they speak of the way things are and not of the way things only appear, etc. So the determinist must abandon the reality of choices while I suppose he could still cling to the Illusion of choice.
So I must alter my definition. While I’m doing that I will also add a bit of text to refine it:
At any given moment, one has to choose what action one will take from the actions that are immediately obvious as means to accomplish some desire, and by acting on that choice, one excludes for the moment all other actions.
This still doesn’t make sense. “Obvious” essentially becomes a clever substitute for what is not real (illusion). So if it is not real then there is no “choice”, no real alternative course of action available. So why keep playing word games? Why not just abandon the language of choice? Is it because the Bible so obviously speaks of choices?
Do you see why it seems that determinists just keep changing definitions until they fit with their determinism? The system becomes impossible to falsify because normal language is just morphed into a deterministic framework at every turn and upon every objection. Maybe that is why you stated in your previous post that we should avoid dictionary definitions (which is weird since you later appealed to Wiki in order to establish your definition of LFW). So it seems that we are not going to get anywhere here since I refuse to accept your bizarre definitions. If you want to define “choices” as choosing the only possible course of action among other impossible courses of action (which in itself sounds totally ridiculous), then I can’t continue to discuss this with you.
If choices are not deterministic, they are not determined. This is very basic — there’s no room to make a finely nuanced definition; those words are inseparably linked.
Oh, I see. I can’t make a “finely nuanced defintion” while you can turn “choice” into “choosing the only possible course of action among other impossible courses of action.” (my paraphrase of your position) How convenient. I wonder if you even realize how much you are stacking the deck here? But really, I don’t need to create some nuanced definition. I never maintained that choices are not determined. They are determined. But if they are predetermined from eternity then they are not choices since, in that case, there is no other possible course of action available to “choose from”.
If they aren’t determined, then they aren’t determined by anyone, including a free agent.
And again you seem to not understand what is being discussed. The issue is who determines actions and when. If an action is determined by a free agent who chooses among real alternatives then a choice has been made. If a person acts in accordance with an eternal and unalterable decree, rendering that course of action the only possible course of action then no “choice” has been made (at least no choice has been made by the person while a choice was made by God from eternity- assuming God has the freedom of choice).
You CAN say that the actions are “LFW-chosen” by a free agent (and that this is not the same as determining them), since that is different from saying that it’s “determined” by anyone. But something that’s not determined, i.e. undetermined, is by definition random.
Here we see at last a true contradiction: you claim that free choices cannot be determined, and that people determine their own free choices. This contradiction is absolute and intrinsic to the nature of your words.
Let’s stop right here. Look at that last statement, “This contradiction is absolute and intrinsic to the nature of your words.” Why should you be concerned with what is intrinsic to the nature of words when you so willingly empty words of intrinsic meaning for the sake of preserving your determinism (e.g. choices)?? And again, I never said that free choices cannot be determined, nor did I say they were random. Since you are not criticizing any position that I hold to, I see no reason to respond.
The only choices are to either admit that choices are determined, or to claim that the act of choosing does not require determination. The latter choice is popular, but has never been explained.
Or I can just continue to maintain that actions (whether physical or not) are determined (chosen) by the free agent, created in God’s image, with the God given ability/power to “choose” among real alternatives. And BTW, are you suggesting that I have a real choice in the above statement? Can I truly “admit” to one thing or “claim” the other? Or is that “choice” just an illusion?
You wrote:
This shouldn’t be confused with fatalistic or physicalistic determinism, where impersonal or external forces have exclusive control over a person’s actions.
I responded:
“Well, since God determines our every thought and desire and God is external to us then I am not sure how your view differs significantly from what you describe here.”
You responded:
That’s a great question. In short, I’m claiming that God determines and plans at least some of our desires; but our desires are still truly ours; in fact, my desires are as much ME as my spirit and body are (and note that God also designed and maintains those as well!).
Let’s stop right here. What if God condemned you and punished you forever for just having a body and soul? Would that be fair? Would that seem like “justice” to you?
Thus, when I desire evil or fail to desire good, that is a depravity in me, regardless of WHY my desires fail to measure up.
When I fall short of the glory of God because I desired to do so, I am directly at fault, and no pointing at external sources can possibly excuse me.
If those external sources irresistibly control your desires and actions, then yes, you should be excused according to the normal definition of justice (as explained in the example of the date rape drug). And since God is “just” He will not hold you accountable for actions that He irresistibly controls you to do. The only way your above statement can be true is if you invent a bizarre defintion of justice and accountability. Basically, you are just saying it is “just” because it must be in order to fit into your deterministic framework. This again shows how you have stacked the deck and argued in such a way that your view cannot possibly be falsified. You can just keep changing definitions as you go.
A fatalistic view, in contrast, holds that God predetermines everything to the exclusion of our desires — we may WANT to love God or trust Christ, but He won’t allow us to, so we go to hell. That’s the error of fatalism, and that’s the reason you feel Calvinism is so unfair — because you know fatalism is unfair.
Not at all. I reject Calvinism primarily because it does not comport with the Biblical data and not because I think it is unfair. But God is fair and just, and thankfully so. And since He is fair and just Calvinism is in big trouble. And it is not any less unfair for God to condemn us for actions that He controls us to do via irresistible desires that He gives us (Calvinistic determinism), than for God to condemn us according to actions that He causes us to do against our will (which you define as fatalism). So yeah, fatalism would be unfair but so is Calvinistic determinism (with regards to justice and accountability).
With regards to my comments concerning God tempting us and 1 Cor. 10:13 you wrote:
God’s creation cannot be resisted either. Is that unjust? The jar can’t resist the potter’s forming. Is that unjust, or unlike God?
No, it is not unjust if creation cannot resist being created. That is not at all relevant to the discussion. But, as I explained earlier, it would be wrong/unjust for God to condemn us just for being created when we could not help but to be created. If God created us irresistibly and then condemned us to eternal punishment for being His creation, then yeah, that would be unjust as God has defined and revealed justice.
James isn’t expressing outrage; he’s explaining who and what is to blame for temptation. My temptation is caused by my own desires. It’s part of me, part of my very existence; God thrust them on me in the same way He thrust existence itself on me, and it makes sense to rail against God for my innate desires as much as it makes sense to rail against Him for my existence — that is, it makes no sense at all.
What I think makes no sense at all is that you apparently believe God would be just in condemning His creation for just being created. That’s crazy! And that is where your determinism has led you. Would it be right or wrong for me to beat my child for having light brown hair (afterall it is her hair and she grew it)? Would it be right or wrong for me to command my child not to touch my books, then administer a drug that gives her an irresistible urge to touch my books, and then beat her for touching my books?
By the way, 1 Cor. doesn’t say that temptation can be resisted; it says that it can be escaped. This is not God’s permission to “endure” the temptation while sitting right in its path; it’s a mandate to look for a way out of the temptation.
Well, I think you’re quite wrong about that and I think 1 Cor. 10:13 argues strongly for LFW. It is more than a mandate to “look for a way out” it is the promise that a way out is provided by God so that we can “endure”, “stand up under it”, etc. But according to your determinism there is no way out for those who do not resist temptation. If they yield to it then they were predetermined to yield to it from all eternity. Therefore God was not, in fact, “faithful” to them since they were bound to fall to the temptation according to God’s unalterable eternal decree, and His promise to provide for them a way of escape was a lie. There was no possible escape. But perhaps you will argue that the inspired apostle only meant that there would be the illusion of an escape. God is faithful to provide for us the illusion of escape? How very helpful of God.
Follwing this you write a lot about desires causing choices and how you think my reasoning is circular. You evetually say,
But that last sentence assumes a separation between myself and my desires. If my desires cannot determine things, then I can’t determine things. If my desires can determine things, they do so by means of my choices leading to actions.
My desires are the core of my being. God created me and them together. It’s not unjust to me to give me the just consequences of my desires, even when those desires were not entirely chosen by me.
But it would be unjust if God judges you for desires that are simply a part of what it is to be His creation as explained above. You are simply wrong about that.
It is not wrong for God to create me with desires, even if the desires are not for Him.
No, it would not be unjust for God to create you with desires. But it would be wrong for Him to condemn and punish you for having those desires.
Nor is it unjust for God to change my desires so that they are for Him.
I never said it would be.
You wrote:
We are not eternal or necessary beings, so the regress cannot go on infinitely. In short, someone or something other than ourselves planted the desires we were born with and/or the desires thrust on us by our environment (we don’t need to argue nature versus nurture, since both are outside of “self”; I’m sure my current desires are a combination of both).
And I responded with:
“And this line of reasoning lays the blame for all sin and evil right at the foot of God Himself. And there is no infinite regress. It stops with the person. The person determines his/her choices because God created the person with that power/ability.”
You then said:
By your definitions, there is an infinite regress within the person, as they choose their desires so that they can choose their desires so that … so that they can choose their action. By my definitions it stops with the person acting in accordance with their own innate desires, no matter how those desires got there.
And if God is the one who created us, then He did indeed create us with desires.
So you affirm that God creates us with evil and sinful desires that we cannot help but to act upon and then condemns and punishes us for those desires and actions. Is that correct? And you then assert that this is perfectly just and fair because…you say so. Is that correct?
Let me try to simplify my position. We either have the power of self-action (self-determinism) or we are merely passive. If we are merely passive then we can only act as we are acted upon. If we can only act as acted upon then our actions are not really our own but belong to the one who acts on us. That person is the only true actor in the universe and that Actor would have to be God. So all of our actions and thoughts (including sinful ones) are really just expressions of God’s thoughts and desires. We are essentially the program and God is the programmer. And God, the programmer, condemns and punishes His creatures for acting in accordance with the way He programmed them. This last sentence describes your position and it is plainly absurd IMO.
So what I am saying is that God created us with the power of self-determinism and holds us accountable for the way we exercise that power. It is more than just a matter of desires and influences but a God given ability to weigh (give weight to) our options and choose a course of action among real possibilities according to what we assign the greatest value to. That is why I said that we decide what desires we will surrender to and what desires we will resist. That decision is what choice is and our actions are just the actualization of that choice. Our choices shape our character and our character shapes future choices. It is not a simple topic to discuss but there is no reason to conclude that a God with the power of self-determinism cannot bestow that power on His creatures. God is capable of creating free agents. He can certainly create us with the power to make choices that He does not cause us to make by controlling our wills. He has given us the ability to reason and choose. Do you deny that God can do this? “Come, let us reason together”, but God has given us no such power?
The buck does indeed stop with God; it seems obviously reasonable for a human to cry out against God, “why have you made me thus!” It seems to have occurred to Paul in Romans 9, since he puts these words in an objector’s mouth. Unfortunately for the objector, God makes us the way He wants, and we are fit for the purpose He created us for, and when we fulfill that purpose — whether it leads to punishment or glory — we receive no injustice.
But this badly misunderstands the objection and the context of Romans. If the buck stops with God then God is ultimately responsible, correct? The objector is a Jew and not an Arminian. The Jew already believes in unconditional election and that is exactly the problem. Paul is saying that the Jews cannot object to God for condemning them since God never promised to save them unconditionally. There condemnation is deserved since they reject God’s righteousness which comes through faith in Christ. The clay is marred in the hands of God because it refuses to be conformed to His purpose (see all of Jer. 18). And God has the sovereign right to form the clay that He intended to bless (Israel) into an object of wrath and destruction due to their disobedience and rebellion. His promises are not unconditional and therefore His promises have not failed when they are rejected due to their rejection of Christ and the Gentiles are accepted due to their faith in Christ.
Not at all — it’s hard to discuss the concept of free will at all using ordinary language (LFW requires talk about rewinding time or trying the same thing again with all things being equal, or other such nonsense).
Actually, it doesn’t require that at all. It only requires that we make choices among real options rather than among imaginary ones.
And of course I concede that we can direct our desires; that’s been my point all along, that our direction of our desires is precisely the point at which LFW fails most painfully, because it requires that either a man’s desires do NOT affect his choices at all, OR that a man’s choices entirely determine his desires and vice versa at the same time.
This is really weird. Earlier you basically said that our desires are not seperate from who we are. Here you say that we can direct our desires. How can we direct our desires if there is no distinction between our desires and who we are? (and above you said, “By my definitions it stops with the person acting in accordance with their own innate desires, no matter how those desires got there.” – which suggests that the “person” is seperate from the “innate desires” he “acts on”.)
If you are affirming the power to direct/control our desires, then you are affirming LFW. But you have thus far argued that our desires direct and control us (and even are equivalent to who/what we are). This gets to the heart of things. Either we have the power to control/direct our desires (LFW) or we do not. If we do not then our desires control and direct us and our actions. They hold irresistible sway over us. That is what you have been saying, but here again you take the opposite position. Very strange.
And I do not hold that our desires do not affect our choices at all. Of course they do. They just do not irresistibly determine our choices. Nor do I believe that our choices determine our desires (in the way you describe it above). What I believe is that our “choices” amount to what desires/influences we yield to in any given situation. We do not choose in a vacuum. We choose according to the desires/influences/ that are brought to bear on us and create options for us, but those desires and influences do not irresistibly determine our choice.
A compatibilist reading makes this simple: a man can choose actions.
Not really since his actions were predetermined from eternity. So the man doesn’t really have any “choice”. You have yet to explain how choice has any meaning in light of predeterminism.
All choices are based on the man’s desires.
I agree. But what determines the prevailing desire (the actual choice)? The God given ability to assign greater weight to one desire over another.
Some actions will result in building up desires.
I agree.
A man will choose those actions if that man’s current desires “want” that result.
And to speak of what he “wants” is just to speak of which desire he assigns the greatest weight or value to.
Nobody can choose to develop a desire that they do not desire for some greater reason. If you want to develop a desire for prayer, you want it for a reason — perhaps because you love God, or perhaps because it’s a good focusing meditation to build yourself up.
This is a little hard to follow but I think I can basically agree with it. Yes, we do things and make choices for reasons and the free agent is the one who does the reasoning and assigns value to one desire or choice over another. That is what I have been saying all along. We have the God given ability to decide which desire/motive/ will prevail in any given situation where there are available options for us to choose from. That is my position in contrast to the position which says that desires carry inherent weight all their own and irresistibly cause us to act in certain ways. Either we make the desire prevail or God does. Either we “choose” or God just “causes us to act.”
I wrote:
“Remember when I said that choice has reference to available options? You seemed to agree as well. So quite simply, faith in Christ is not an available option for the sinner until the influence and empowering of the Spirit is brought to bear on him. Once his depravity is overcome by the Spirit of God then he is enabled to make a real choice, to yield to God in faith or resist Him in unbelief. None of this conflicts with anything I have said.”
You responded:
It makes a mockery of the argument that God cannot hold man responsible without giving man LFW, because it has God holding unregenerate man responsible for not choosing Christ when they cannot desire Christ.
But when God enables us to believe He does give us a desire for Christ (He draws us to Him). However, that desire is not irresistible. That is the critical point that you continue to miss.
This is not a problem for compatibilism, because it claims that man should be held responsible for the actions that he performed because he desired them.
Which is total nonsense since God controls his desires and actions. He does them willingly only because God makes him willing.
With that said: on what basis does a man control his desires?
On the basis of the God given ability to do so. Simple.
But which one gets chosen? There are a lot of desires… Which one to pick? By your axioms the answer can’t be “the God-given ability tells us which desire”, because that would give God the choice.
Nothing tells us which desire (which begs the question again). We exercise our faculties of reason and decide which course of action to follow. We are the ones who place value and importance on one choice over/against another.
The answer could be “by flipping a coin”, but that seems like it’s not MY choice, but the coin’s choice.
Right, that is why we use our abiltiy to reason and make choices based on what we think should be the most valuable in any given situation. Some choices are rather automatic and some choices are not very important. But when we face a decision that we recognize as important we use our minds to think carefully about our choices and evetually settle on the one we determine (that is what I mean by self-determinism) is the best choice. You say it goes to our desires and the buck stops there, or we can go no further, etc. I say it goes to our ability to reason and make decisions, to value one option over another, to choose which desire we will yield to or resist. I say the buck stops there and we can go no further. But you insist that I must go further. Why must I go further while you can just say, “the buck stops here (at our desire)”, etc.? And look at this last part,
“…but that seems like it’s not MY choice, but the coin’s choice.”
Do you see that? You say it would be the coins “choice” and not ours. Yet you affirm that God controls our desires rather than the coin and yet refuse to say they are then “God’s choices” rather than ours. Why is that? What is the difference?
My answer is “a man’s own desires”. Those ARE the God-given ability to choose — and they don’t come with anything mystical about them; they are exactly what they seem to be.
But choices often represent competing desires, do they not? So why does one desire win out over the other? What determines what the prevailing desire will be? Your view seems to say that one desire just has inherently more sway than the other and essentially forces our decision (though we may not feel forced, we cannot resist that over-powering desire). I am saying that when the person makes a choice he is the one who gives weight to that desire and choice. He has the ability to resist a choice or yield to it. And my view makes sense of choice since one can truly value and yield to various alternatives. Your view makes “choice” nonsense since our every action and decision was predetermined from eternity. Therefore, we never really have a choice. Only one possibility ever presents itself. It is like saying we “vote” when there is only ever one name on the ballot (and we cannot choose to refrain from “voting” either).
Regarding sacrifice you wrote:
This again fails to ask why God would find any pleasure in sacrifice at all. You then assume that the purpose of sacrifice is submission of will — but submission of will is exactly the definition of sacrifice: it’s when I choose to give up something all my other desires want in order to gain God, Who is my greatest desire. The purpose of sacrifice isn’t the same as the means.
Exactly. The nature of sacrifice demands LFW. Unless we have the ability to make God our greatest desire, then sacrifice amounts to nothing. We don’t willingly give up anything if God controls our will irresistibly. We do not value God above all else if we have not the ability to value one thing above the other.
If God makes us value Him the most by irresistibly controlling our will, then I fail to see how God can be pleased with such an act since it is not an act of our will, but God’s will irresistibly controlling us. Determinism ruins sacrifice and love, two the the Bibles most important concepts. Again, you talk like you affirm LFW while denying it. You speak of choosing God by choosing to give up all else, but if God controls our desires and we can give no weight to our desires, then we do not choose God above all else since “all else” was not a possible “choice”. This gets us back to the main point. You keep speaking of choices but “choice” is an incoherent concept when LFW is denied.
I really like your last sentence: “If we cannot control our desires then how can we control our selves?” I agree; our desires are a core part of ourselves. But we do not merely control them; we ARE them. We cannot choose what we do not desire, and we cannot choose to desire something that we do not desire for some greater reason.
Just a moment ago you said that we can choose one desire over others (God over “all else”). How do “we” choose one desire over others when “we” are nothing more than our desires?
There is much more to respond to here but I am out of time. I contend that you have still misunderstood my point concerning regrets and have still failed to explain why we should regret anything that God predetermined for us and we had no ability to do otherwise. Regrets can serve a purpose but there purpose is not the issue. The issue is why we have them and the fact that we all have them. Only the reality of choice makes sense of regrets IMO, and “choice” has no reality when LFW is denied.
I continue to disagree over your understanding of election passages and especially Rom. 9. I am convinced that Rom. 9-11 actually argues strongly against determinism and unconditional election (and I don’t believe that any concordance will help me find “secret” decrees that the Bible nowhere describes or references), but it would take too much time and effort to present that argument now (and you also misunderstand the concept of corporate election). The main issue that I feel I must address before I sign off is this:
You wrote:
But that’s the problem — it doesn’t attempt to comport with the Bible. The Bible urges us to choose, but it also tells us that we can’t choose without the Spirit of God.
I responded:
“Well, with regards to salvation this is the case but those who hear the gospel (what the Bible “urges” us to accept) are empowered by the Spirit and then they have a real choice to make among two available options- faith or unbelief. With regards to everyday choices that do not concern our faith response to God, we certainly have the power to make legitimate choices. BTW, are you suggesting that at least believers have LFW?”
You then said,
This still stuns me. You insist that people have LFW in everything except the most important decision. Why do you insist that LFW matters at all if it doesn’t matter in the truly important things?
But you totally misunderstand my point. LFW simply means that when we are facing possible options, we can choose either option. We cannot choose what is not an option for us. That has been my main point. Prior to the working of God’s prevenient grace we cannot choose Christ. But once God’s grace intervenes we can choose. It is a real choice (hence LFW) since we can then choose to surrender to Christ or reject Him. So you are wrong to say that LFW is not present for that most important decision. It is present since God enables us to believe and make a real choice at that time. It is present whenever we have possible options to choose from. But without possible options, there is no “choice” and when you deny LFW you deny any choices at all. So you can either embrace LFW or you can deny choice. The “choice” is yours.
With that said, because you reject LFW in the one case that it matters to Scripture (for salvation), your beliefs work perfectly with my understanding of the Scriptures — as far as I’m concerned, you’re a Scriptural compatibilist (even if you’re not a philosophical compatibilist).
But you are wrong. I do not deny LFW in that one case. I fully affirm it as explained above.
I prefer a bit of philosophical consistency, but that’s merely a preference
Then why do you insist on speaking of choices that were predetermined from eternity. That is a contradiction in terms and far from being philosophically consistent.
And again you write:
Pardon, but that is what LFW means, so I’m not mischaracterizing LFW. I now understand that you don’t hold to LFW with respect to salvation; in your opinion we’re only free to choose Christ after God has regenerated us (to use the Calvinist term).
Actually, I do not believe that we can only choose when regenerated since I don’t not equate God’s prevenient enabling grace with regeneration, but that is another discussion (nor does the Bible). But since I do affirm that once God’s prevenient grace intervenes we are free to either recieve or reject Christ (a real choice) then you are simply wrong to keep saying I deny LFW at that point. I deny that we can “choose” what is not an option prior to that work of God, but that is only because I am working with the real meaning of choice. But once it becomes an option then choice becomes real and our will is free to choose (LFW).
However, if you believe that one must first be regenerated to receive Christ and you believe that regeneration makes faith (receiving Christ) inevitable, then you again deny any choice. So you cannot say that we are “free to choose Christ” after God regenerates us since you deny the possiblility of rejecting Christ. Therefore, there is no “choice” to be made. We just “do” what we must. And that again is why you need to either affirm LFW (the reality of choice) or deny “choice” altogether. When you try to affirm both you affirm contradictions. That was my initial point and I am convinced that point still stands.
I’m glad you see the same things in the Bible that I do, but I don’t see why you’re so insistent on LFW when you don’t believe it’s important to salvation in any way.
And hopefully you now realize that that is not the case.
Thanks for the discussion. I know I asked a lot of questions in this post so I assume you will respond. You will likely have the benefit of the last word and I will try to be content with that. May God bless you as you continue to seek Him and His truth.
Ben
t scott on 18 Dec 2008 at 10:39 am #
This is certainly a dividing mark.
Isn’t the truth that these times are unique? The historic churches, the emerging, ecumenical movements, our presence in communications, and parachurch endeavors seem too divided today.
So let’s get all worked up over manifesting the
unity that is the truth. I really continue to
believe it is possible, yet an extremely, extremely
difficult challenge.
John McGlone on 13 Jan 2009 at 8:38 am #
God loving Jacob and hating Esau had nothing to do with their individual salvation. It was not that Jacob was automatically saved and Esau was automatically condemned. The bible never teaches that, but many have assumed it.
Rather, the bible says that God choose Jacob to be the blood line in which the Messiah would come, who would extend salvation to all nations.
Just like Isaac was chosen of Ishmael, Jacob was chosen over Esau, because the Messiah would not come from both their descendents. One of them needed to be picked (not for salvation and the other for condemnation, but for the blood line). And God picking one over the other had nothing to do with their own personal works, but rather it was because of God’s good pleasure. Romans 9:11
God choose Israel (Jacob), in order to bless all nations:
Isa 49:6 – And he said, It is a light thing that thou shouldest be my servant to raise up the tribes of Jacob, and to restore the preserved of Israel: I will also give thee for a light to the Gentiles, that thou mayest be my salvation unto the end of the earth.
God’s plan or determination has always been to extend the offer of salvation to all nations, that anyone from any nation can willingly repent and believe and be saved:
Ge 22:18 – And in thy seed shall all the nations of the earth be blessed; because thou hast obeyed my voice.
Acts 15:17-18: That the residue of men might seek after the Lord, and all the Gentiles, upon whom my name is called, saith the Lord, who doeth all these things. Known unto God are all his works from the beginning of the world.
Romans 9, 10, and 11 should be read in context of each other, along with having the historical context in mind: the debate on whether or not the Jews alone were chosen or if God predestined to extend salvation to the gentiles. Romans 9:24
So the bible says that God has eternally decreed:
Ro 10:12 – There is no difference between the Jew and the Greek: for the same Lord over all is rich unto all that call upon him. For whosoever shall call upon the name of the Lord shall be saved. [whether Jew or Gentile]
The eternal decree of God is that anyone who willingly calls upon Him shall be saved, but His eternal decree is not specifically who will be the ones that call upon Him.
The forethought of God was to have a holy people, so God predetermined to have a holy people, but He never determined the people. The very fact that he wants a holy people excludes the possibility of zombies, robots and machines. They must be voluntarily or willingly choosing good over evil if they are to be holy.
Mystery of Christ Revealed by George E. Smock
You can read it online or print it off at:
http://www.gospeltruth.net/mystery_of_christ.htm
Wm Tanksley on 15 Jan 2009 at 1:06 pm #
Good post. I don’t know how many people are still following this thread, though. I’m only seeing it because I’m subscribed to the “Comments RSS” (see the link above).
The question when interpreting this passage, however, isn’t what you think God meant; it’s how Paul used it in this passage. And that’s a job for context.
This is a plausible explanation for Jacob and Esau, but if you accept it, it makes no sense that Paul would then go on to claim that God will have mercy on whom He has mercy. Why would choosing Jacob arbitrarily be an act of mercy to Jacob? And why would not choosing Esau be an act of condemnation? No, there’s more to this than just the choice of bloodline — there’s a condemnation that came on the “hated” one. More than that, the next example cited is Pharaoh, whom God claimed to have hardened — by God’s choice. Certainly there can be no claim that God was talking about Pharaoh’s bloodline!
Then we look at Rom 9:19, You will say to me then, “Why does he still find fault? For who has ever resisted his will?” Does that fit at all with your/Smock’s claim that we’re talking about bloodlines? Finding fault? If this were a discussion of bloodlines, finding fault would be nonsense. The possibility of resisting someone’s will would be nonsense.
You’re entirely correct here, of course. But one cannot focus on the general and ignore the particular; the arguments Paul makes in support of his premise are as important as the premise itself. Paul says that specific people are condemned by God regardless of their actions; and other people are shown mercy regardless of their actions and regardless of their desires (Rom 9:16). Yes, the purpose of this mercy is to choose God’s People (as you said), but the mercy itself is described by Paul as being a particular mercy, one that reaches out to individuals who are capable of desiring it or not desiring it, acting or not acting, resisting or not resisting.
Paul’s arguments in Romans 9 presuppose God’s selection of individuals, and His mercy to them regardless of their desire for Him. Paul’s point in Romans 9 was indeed to support his explanation of God’s salvation of both Jew and Gentile; but his arguments mean what they say, and can’t be ignored.
Brian on 09 Mar 2009 at 10:56 am #
For the longest time, the main reason I held back from delving deeply into the Theology program was the Calvinist bias of the leaders, with all due respect to C. Patton. How could they help me “rightly divide” the Word, while wildly missing the boat with TULIP.
After reading this thread, it warms my heart and encourages me to see that not all of the program participants buy into the rhetoric and have thought the issue through. I’m thankful for Luke and some of the others who are standing up for the truth of the text.
I’ll refrain from scatter-shooting the proof texts against Calvinism.
For me, after prayerful and diligent research of the relevent text, I found that Calvinism misrepresented the text, as well as the opinions of non-Calvinist. The over-the-top witch hunt on open theism by Piper and MacArthur is a prime example. I’m not a an Open Theist or definding the position, but the academic treatment of it’s proponents has been nothing short of shocking, at the least. I guess it’s just coincidence that those leading the charge are 5-pointers.
Oddly, the Calvinists favorite proof texts are found in Romans, yet Romans militates against TULIP, but provides a full understanding of Election, predestination, and Grace. Predestination and Election are to be understood in the context of Abraham believing God, and it being credited to him as righteousness, and his descendants would be known, “Elect”, by faith, because of Abraham’s faith. This was God’s plan all along (Predestination).
Admittedly, this is a simplified summary, but I dont have the time to be more than brief. I need to get some work done today.
Correctly define Depravity. Correctly define Election, Correctly define Predestination. The rest will fall into place and harmonize.
John C.T. on 01 Apr 2009 at 11:29 am #
JMc had a good post above (I cannot see the numbers to the left of post headers). WT’s response does not address the Biblical context that JMc used to show that Jacob and Esau were being used as representatives of entire nations. The use of individuals’ names for entire nations that descended from them is, I understand, a semitic literary device. Although I’m not totally up on the names for literary devices, I think that the use of a part for the whole is called “metonymy” and that a western example would be the use of “crown” to mean / stand in for the king or the king’s authority or government.
JMc’s quotations from the Bible show that the Bible itself uses this literary device, and that Paul, as a Jew well versed in Scripture, would therefore likely be using their names as stand ins for the nations that arose from them. The consequence is that there is no need to see individual election in those passages in Romans.
Furthermore, I don’t see that WT has established that “Paul’s arguments in Romans 9 presuppose God’s selection of individuals”; I don’t see such a presupposition.
John C.T. on 01 Apr 2009 at 12:45 pm #
Ignoring CMP’s equivocal use of “rational”, and using it in its normal or typical sense, I think that a strong and provocative case could be made that TULIP Calvinism is the “least rational” because it is fundamentally irrational in the same what that postmodernism is irrational, where postmodernim is understood as destructive of meaning and of the integrity of texts and as claiming an exemption for itself from its skepticism of other theories. In this vein, one would then point to Tulip Calvinism permission and encouragement to believe in things that are logically contradictory, it deals with irrationality by retreating to mystery, uses language itself in a normal fashion to instead declare that other things that are said are not what they seem to mean, devalues language by forcing meanings onto texts, and so destroys texts and meaning, etc. I am not saying this is the Tulip Calvinist approach to everything in the Bible, only that it forms a basis that is stronger than what Tulip Calvinism claims on the surface–for this is where it retreats to when its surface claim to literal interpretation and logic is challenged.
Tulip Calvinism takes texts that speak about God’s knowledge and sovereignity, and erect on those texts a structure and system of sovereignty that goes beyond and outside those texts, and then forces all other texts through the grid of that system.
Thus when a choice between alternatives is presented in the Bible, the Tulip Calvinist states that the alternative selected was determined and could not have turned out other than it did–even if the Biblical text presents the material in a libertarian fashion. Similarly, when the Bible speaks of God changing his mind or repenting, the Calvinist system forces one to state that those words don’t mean what they seem to mean, that we can’t take that language as it is being used. We must instead say that God did not change his mind. A Calvinist also holds other contradictions simultaneously: we are both free and determined (unless, of course, the Calvinist takes the escape route of defining freedom in a deterministic manner that does not mean freedom). Point this out, and a Tulip Calvinist retreats into “mystery”.
Note of course, that I’m speaking of a particular aspect of postmodernism–the destruction of meaning and texts and intelligible communication–and not all the aspects of this broad way of viewing the world. It strikes me as no accident that postmodernism originated in Europe with a very European flavour and that Europe has a much deeper and institutionally supported Calvinistic intellectual milieu.
regards,
John
Wm Tanksley on 02 Apr 2009 at 6:36 pm #
Of course I did. Read my response. I cited a number of arguments Paul was making that simply make no sense whatsoever if you assume that "Jacob" and "Esau" refer to the sons of Jacob and the Edomites. For example, I asked why not choosing Esau would be an act of condemnation.
Another argument — which I didn’t bring up — is that if Paul had been referring to nations, then he would not have talked about them being in their mother’s wombs — nations are described as being in their father’s loins.
Okay, one more: your argument instantly defeats itself by insisting that Paul is saying that God condemned all of the descendants of Esau and had mercy on all the descendants of Jacob. But this is precisely the opposite of Paul’s point: that God can save without regard for nationality.
The term "Israel" is a great example that most of us are familiar with — it’s Jacob’s gifted name, and also the name by which his descendants are called.
My fault. I should have said that Paul’s arguments lead to the conclusion of individual election. They do not presuppose it; they argue in favor of it.
[from a later post:]
By the way, I agree with you that it’s silly to present "tensions" as a strength of an argument. Tensions are weaknesses, not strengths.
Most of this post was simply begging the question. Here you at least claim to have evidence; unfortunately, when asked to present it, you can show only texts where a choice is being made, never texts that show that the person could have made it otherwise.
You didn’t try, but the strongest example of a person making a contrary choice I know of is when David was fleeing from Saul and asked God "if I were to remain in this city, would the citizens give me up to Saul?" God replied that they would, so David fled — thus apparently making an example of contrary action. But in reality, this seems to show that the people of the city were so predictable that God was able to give a single specific answer — when Saul came and if David was there, they would always give him up without ever NOT choosing to give him up. So after all this isn’t contrary choice; it’s just plain old everyday choice, the one everyone means when they use the word, the one where you choose in order to get what you desire.
Right; we have to either believe that God does or does not change His mind. This problem comes about not because of the horrid Calvinistic system, but because the Bible clearly and specifically teaches that God does not change His mind or relent, and that His purpose (at least His saving purpose) is eternal — and then the Bible also shows that God "repents" of having made man, and of other things. It’s pretty clear that unless you want to say that the Bible contains inaccurate testimony about God’s nature, one of those expressions has to be other than purely literal.
-Wm
JJ on 20 Apr 2009 at 3:41 pm #
Why I reject 5 point calvinism, as popularly understood:
1) Calvin and others significantly differed from the notion of 5 point calvinism, so the Five Points of Calvinism are a reduction of a larger system.
2) Five Points of Calvinism are applied without regard to the passage someone is studying. It is a magic catch-all that gives the preacher a wonderful way to be able to preach any scripture. (reduction to the absurd). Try to make sense of the Parable of the Sower as popularly taught by reformed folks, and you lose any real warning (because we are saved, right!?)
3) If the Five Points of Calvinism were REALLY the CRUCIALLY IMPORTANT part of Christian understanding and Truth, then Jesus was the world’s worst teacher.
SInce 5 points of calvinism can be easily taught and understood in short order, then why did Christ not teach it? If you say, “He was teaching it, but people didn’t understand it.” Then I say, why was he such a bad teacher? Men teach 5 point calvinism all the time. It is understandable, it is not hard to come to grips with. As a matter of fact, it is pretty simple theology. With Christ teaching theology at all points in the Gospels, why did the Master Teacher have such problems teaching these 5 points?
Answer: The Master Teacher did not teach it.
Rather, he continually teaches that his love and grace is MORE abundant than those who receive. He teaches whosoever wills, He teaches that God has selected, elected, He teaches that if we are not mindful and faithful, we will surely not persevere, he teaches that we are all dreadful sinners, yet that we are responsible for each choice we make.
In short, there is little in 5 point calvinism that is consistently taught by Christ, without theological gymnastics. The Master Teacher fails to be able to teach the simplest of doctrines of only 5 points.
I will give you this much: Calvinism, especially of the reformed camp has huge growth in numbers in the last 30 years. Why? Probably because it is so simple. I think of it as Gnosticism:
Young Padewan, here are 5 points that will let you interpret all of Scriptures. They are hidden truths. We will give you the true knowledge. THEN YOU TOO WILL BE AROGANTLY FILLED WITH THIS KNOWLEDGE AND CAN TEACH THE UNINFORMED. Follow carefully, as some of this is counter-intuitive:
1) Man is depraved. Yes, we know that almost everyone already says this. But we mean MORE by it. We REALLY MEAN IT! Nothing at all is good in man. He can’t even chose things that God tells us to chose. Nope. And it is God’s fault… er, His Plan. He has made us completely unable to respond to his free offers of grace. ANd rightly so, we are scum. Not made in his image at all. Total scum. And besides, if we don’t stress this first point, all the other points fall aside. So, remember, we are total pond scum, actually worse… we are DEAD (not merely lost, not merely sick), we are dead pond scum and can not decide a blessed (or unblessed) thing. Got it? Good… I mean, bad… only it is Good that God has formed this idea in you. And now you have the first part of this hidden truth.
2) …
I will hold off on the “ULIP,” unless there is a great cry that I finish. You get the idea. And since i am a Calvinist myself (though not 5 points), I don’t want to try the humor of others on this topic… we might miss the point. How could the master Teacher be so inept at teaching the simplistic truths of 5 point calvinism?!!!
Love to hear back! (and pardon the humor).
God Bless,
JJ
Wm Tanksley on 21 Apr 2009 at 10:04 am #
You’re rejecting a mere caricature. No need to elaborate further.
And yes, some preachers teach this caricature. Reject them. Don’t worry, you won’t lose your salvation for rejecting Calvinism, even if it’s true; we’re saved by God, not by meritorious beliefs. A false understanding of the Gospel will hinder your ability to share the Gospel and will hurt your assurance of salvation, but won’t make you lose what only God can give.
-Wm
JJ on 21 Apr 2009 at 10:52 am #
A caricature? William, who would you suggest to read?
This is taught by most in the 5 point camp. Who should I read. Boice? Piper? Carson?
I read an interesting book on Worship in honor of Boice edited by Ryken. Some great stuff, but many of the contributors can’t help but praise their UNDERSTANDING of Calvin … “the points of Calvinism should be taught (by the pastor) in every passage of the Scriptures.”
What is worse, this gentleman (was it Dever?), says that we should STOP sharing evangelistic messages in the church because we don’t know if God will save them or not!
Now, I don’t hope to help someone like this to understand Scriptures, but unless we don’t start taking a stand against this type of theology, then the GRACE that most Calvinists claim they believe in, will be lost.
JJ
Wm Tanksley on 21 Apr 2009 at 12:10 pm #
JJ, what do you mean by “this”? Do you mean that any of those people you mentioned teach that the warnings in the Parable of the Sower are not for “us”? I’ve listened to many preachers, and have heard the opposite.
To answer your question… Listen to the ones that teach the truth; flee from the ones that don’t. Anyone who teaches you to disobey God’s command to tell others the gospel should be fled from. Anyone who tells you that you should be casual and relaxed about God’s salvation should be fled from. Anyone who tells you that your salvation is in peril unless you do the right things should be fled from. Sounds like Dever is a scoundrel (I’ve never heard of him), since he’s teaching disobedience to Christ’s commands.
Piper certainly doesn’t teach that the Parable of the Sower is empty. Sproul doesn’t. I don’t recognise Boice, and don’t recall Carson’s teaching at the moment. It’s certainly not true that false teachings like what you’re citing are “taught by most”; they’re present, but they’re addressed properly as errors by the mainstream. They are certainly NOT definitional nor necessary conclusions.
To answer your claim: the parable of the sower is a real warning because although all of us in the Church are real covenant members by baptism and communion, not all of us are elect — “they went out from us because they were not of us,” as St.John said. The parable of the Tares and Wheat confirms this; the wheat will be saved, the tares burnt; but the burning is reserved to the Last Day, and in the meantime we have the tares. The allegory of the vine confirms this again, in that branches that were attached to the vine which is Christ are cut off and burnt; again, these are the people who fulfilled the covenant physically, but “were not of us” in that they did not have the love and grace of God.
In summary: the warnings apply to everyone who’s a member of the church in good standing, who’s meeting all the requirements, and who therefore thinks he doesn’t have to worry about being saved.
(Note that I’m simply answering your implied challenge that it’s hard to address these important warnings though the Calvinist system; I’m not attempting to defend that interpretation, and I’m certainly not arguing that this is the only reasonable interpretation.)
…and I’ll repeat another thing I said: God doesn’t save us by means of our knowledge of true doctrine or our assent to it.
-Wm
Elise from Minn on 28 Oct 2009 at 10:00 am #
This from
by J’s comment on Nov 20, 2008 at 1:26 pm
I know that was awhile ago but J did you find a church in Minneapolis area.
I go to Bethany I burnsville. Bethanytc.org check it out.
Great place