Thanks for the comments. I won’t say much as I’ll be posting my next piece soon.

Vance, I wasn’t saying that you held to a Multiple-Worlds Hypothesis. I was saying that if we exclude this problematic view from consideration and just have a single shot to get things right, we would far more readily expect such a scenario given a context of theism than naturalism. As for “proof,” if you’re thinking 100% proof, no. Again, if I were a betting man, I’d go with intelligent planning over chance.

When you say that having proof for God leaves no room for faith, I think you have a view of faith that seems like a blind leap in the opposite direction. If we define faith as a kind of blind and/or arbitrary leap, then when do the book of Acts and Paul in 1 Cor. 15 set forth evidence for the resurrection–not 100% foolproof from all skepticism, but certainly a more plausible scenario than the alternatives. And if the universe is so religiously ambiguous, then how could God hold people accountable for going against something without having a clue? (Regarding the lottery, first, it’s not necessarily a guarantee that someone will win–remember my quotation from Dennett! Second, if the lottery winner was the son of the president of Lotto, we might suspect that something intentional was afoot rather than saying, “Well, SOMEONE had to win the lottery!”)

Well, those are a few questions and thoughts that you raised in my mind; so I thought I’d offer a few closing thoughts. Many thanks–and on to my next posting.

Best,

Paul

My general approach in these areas is that if we are looking for proof of God, we are looking in vain. If God was provable, we would all believe, and faith would not be necessary. What I see is that there is nothing in the nature of the universe which PRECLUDES God, therefore the door is open to belief.

“but arguing instead that the state of the universe does not necessarily *require* a creator (other than, very possibly, the origin of matter in the first place).”

Is that right?

On miracles, I have no problem whatsoever with God coming in and doing full-on miracles with absolutely no naturalistic explanation possible. Of course, every single such miracle we have heard of (including those in which I believe entirely), can not be proven to have happened, so we are a bit stymied there, and are left with probabilities, circumstantial evidence and faith. I think NT Wright has done wonders for the resurrection evidence, but it could not be conclusive for the non-believer.

On the multiple worlds, I am not positing multiple worlds in the least. I think you still misunderstand a bit where I am coming from with the probabilities of complexity. It is only when you assume life as a goal that the odds against it become outrageous. We have no evidence how likely complexity was (versus, as you say, chaos or possibly just a simplistic universe), but the conclusion that the existing complexity proves anything assumes that complexity would be rare. Let’s assume for the sake of argument that complexity would be the norm, it is what we would expect to happen in an entirely random universe. Complexity of the level of existence of life, although it need not be that. If that level of complexity was to be expected, even randomly and entirely naturalistically, then *whatever* we would have ended up with would look equally unlikely.

So, to say that we got it “right” on the one and only attempt is begging the question that there is a “right”. The entire argument is based on assumption that the level of complexity that developed this time was, indeed, against the odds. I agree entirely that any ONE of the varieties of complexity (including our own) would be dramatically against the odds (as with the lottery), but the anthropic argument ONLY works if it can be established that such levels of complexity would not be the norm. And I have seen no real evidence showing this. So, the whole lottery example really is applicable:

the odds of any one person winning the lottery could be 100 million to 1 against. The odds of SOMEONE winning the lottery are 100%. And, no matter who wins, you can look at that person and say “wow, what are the odds that this person won!”.

But I do agree that the choice to exclude the option that a creator exists is a metaphysical one. My point is simply that there is nothing about the nature of the universe (again, other than the existence of matter in the first place, possibly) that forces one metaphysical choice over another. If you choose to accept the creator option (as I do), it really would have to be based on other evidences and faith, I think, and not because the anthropic nature of this universe compels it.

I think part of the argument here is a disagreement about the lottery ’set’ we’re dealing with. If the lottery set is a variable set between 1 and 50 billion, then it is true, if the lottery system is validly random that each number is very improbable to come up, but that one will come up has a probability of 1. That seem obvious to me and I agree fully with Vance on that point.

Now, if we want o compare one outcome with any other, that ’standard’ or teleologically desired outcome has to be justified. Otherwise the comparison is arbitrary, and so the argument is circular. Again I agree with Vance.

Now I think the reason Theists find the Design Inference compelling (to use Dembski’s phrase) is for a non-arbitrary reason of likeness division. Say we divide the lottery number outcomes into two categories: Those that support life (where the Goldilocks concept obtains) and those that do not. Now this is in one sense relative, in that universes with life are better because they are better for US. However in another sense it is objective, in that it isolates two groups that are radically differentiated in probability. By categorizing the 50 billion possible outcomes this way, instead of having 50 billion possibilities with equal outcome potential, you have only two possible outcomes with vastly differing outcome potentials. The life-fostering outcome being in the low priority range.

Now if one possibility has a 49,999,999,900/50 billion of occurring and the other has a 100/50 billion probability of obtaining (and my understanding is this is generous to the non-life possibility), then if the 100/50B obtains, that is a very improbably occurrence. And I think theists will argue, like me, that this is improbable enough that I am inclined to look for another explanation than that we happened to get the most wildly improbably outcome we might have expected.

Now you may not agree with all the details here, but my point is that if you subcategorize the possible outcomes, then the response ‘well we had to get somethign, and everything had an equally likely chance of happening.’, though it is philosophically valid in one sense, doesn’t take into account all the theist is getting at.

Thanks for your comments–thoughtful and well-articulated!

As for the deism issue, I think that even if we have a front-loaded universe from God, the opposite need not to be seen as “micro-managing” at all. Rather, it’s God’s displaying his revelatory, loving (and judging) acts to humans—not God’s tinkering with the details. I do think that given the nature of certain biblical miracles, a step-by-step unfolding (as Polkinghorne suggests for Jesus’ resurrection) seems a strained explanation.

Regarding the cosmic lottery, there is, as you know, the problem in Multiple-Worlds scenarios of having no empirical evidence in support of them (that is, we have a bloated ontology, multiplying worlds unnecessarily). Furthermore, we have the problem of a universe generator—a mechanism that would actually produce such worlds. Also, we’re left with the problem of how finite matter got here in the first place. Now, one may metaphysically help himself to the universe’s emergence from nothing (which is a borrowing from and a pointing toward, theism), and then he may further take a view that there is only possible shot—and only one—to “get it right” all the way down the line (rather than resorting to multiple worlds options). In doing so, one is taking quite a metaphysical gamble that this process was produced naturalistically; a leading alternative is a Creator—the One who actually brought the universe into being—as the One responsible for this fine-tuning to produce any kind of life offers a ready context.

When you say that if we could start another universe from scratch (which, again, begs for some Originator), it’s misleading to say that “those differences would be equally fine-tuned to those new circumstances, and viewed independently would seem equally improbable.” If these circumstances produced chaos and no life at all, I would say that this is the more likely scenario—even if the equally-probable details differ as to what is involved in the chaos. Fine-tuning for life is far more precise than this and hardly predictable given naturalism.

Additionally, you mention “absent the teleological goal”; that’s part of the point: this seems to arbitrarily exclude God from consideration. I would like to know why one does so. If one says that it’s possible to explain the origin and fine-tuning of the universe without appealing to God/design, I would say, “Well, the universe’s origin is a big problem; it points to God. Furthermore, it’s a metaphysical choice that’s being made to exclude God and telic explanations when it’s precisely such a scenario that is far simpler and offers a decent context for such a phenomenon. To leave God out isn’t scientific; it’s metaphysical. Indeed, because we something outside the universe brought the universe about, we may be on to something regarding its design/fine-tuning.”

Well, there are my thoughts. I am grateful for your gracious, engaging discussion!

First, on the deism/miracles issue. The fact that God could create in a way that He need not tinker and fine-tune does not in any way preclude purposeful decisions to intervene in miraculous ways when He sees fit. And, it is SUPERnatural and miraculous precisely because it overrides the existing, entirely natural processes God has created. If we accept that there is any process that God has set to run without direct micromanagement (like biological processes of birth, photosynthesis, the weather, etc), then I see no reason why this could not apply to every other process as well.

On the lottery issue, even if it as billion tickets (representing a billion factors), the analogy still works because the degree of improbability does not matter. You said

“Third, just because other gradualistic scenarios are *logically* possible, this is much different from their being plausible or even remotely likely to come off. Daniel Dennett considers the staggering contingencies and acknowledges that “we almost didn’t make it!” In other words, there’s no way life could emerge with all of these contingencies if, on a second go-round, it was left up to natural processes alone.”

But this begs the question that we *needed* to make it, that life, and human life in particular, is a teleological goal. Again, the logical response is that if we didn’t make it, if something else happened, then something else would be here. Take every single one of those “dials” and let them randomly adjust to something else and, very true, WE would not be here. But something else WOULD be here. And, if you followed any given path of billions of random options for billions of years, you could stop at any point and calculate enormous odds against THAT particular, exact state of affairs happening.

You point to life-producing universe scenarios. My point is that we have no evidence regarding what other types of equally complex universes could have resulted, and the probability that they would have resulted. All we can do is sit in our one universe and point out how finely tuned everything is to keep things the way everything is. Yes, the odds of THIS exact universe, with its existing balance, are phenomenal. But, that does not establish (as the ID proponents would have to do) that such a complex universe is prohibitively rare, only that our exact flavor is rare.

What I am saying is that, absent a teleological goal, “if it ain’t one thing, its another”. And we have no idea what would have happened if all those dials were randomly turned or if everything had happened differently. We have no idea if an equally complex and amazing state of affairs would have existed. We just know that OUR state of affairs would not have existed. But, for the non-believer, there is no reason to figure that what we DID end up with was somehow a goal.

Imagine that we could watch the whole universe develop again. And just nudge something so that it happened differently, then sure, it would very possibly result in dramatic differences. But then those differences would be equally fine-tuned to those new circumstances, and viewed independently would seem equally improbable.

Now, I think what you say along the way is what I was getting at right up front. For those of us with theological reasons for knowing that humans WERE an end goal, a planned results, then yes, of course, the numbers are very convincing. In fact, they are even more amazing and powerful when you consider its development over billions of years than an instant creation, but that is another discussion.

Vance makes the good point of science not being an enterprise that seeks ultimate answers, and that’s correct. Science is limited and only offers a partial glimpse into the big metaphysical picture. Just before this, a rainbow was mentioned as a “supernatural” explanation (as opposed to refracted light). It was a sign, but that doesn’t mean that there hadn’t been rainbows in existence before. It was just a naturally-occurring phenomenon that was given a new significance in light of what had just happened. Consider the stones that the Israelites would assemble as a sign of what God had done. Or, circumcision was also a sign (to Abraham/Israel), but this didn’t mean it was necessarily (divinely) unique to God’s people.
The comment was made: “[The fine-tuning argument] seems to be saying that what we have now is uniquely and amazingly well-suited to fit, well, the way things are now. ‘If X was even very slightly different, we would not be able to live on this planet”, etc, etc. This makes a very large logical fallacy, it would seem to me: that this end product was a necessity.’” No, not necessity, I would reply, but rather design. The difference is enormous. God didn’t have to create at all, let alone create a universe with life in it. But the kind of bio-friendly balanced arrangement we see in the universe is perfectly understandable and to some degree predictable if God exists, but not so if he doesn’t. Remember that Antony Flew changed his mind about God’s existence precisely because of the design implicit in the bio-friendliness of the universe.

In response to the comment, “I also have to recognize that God very well may have created the world to work exactly as it would work without his Divine involvement. He created it so perfectly that He needs no ‘fine tuning.’” First, this doesn’t strike me as too much different than Deism. Also, it seems to rule out miracles of the Red Sea-parting and resurrection-of-Jesus type.

What about the question that our science could overturn our claims to God’s involvement in/design of the universe. This strikes me as a double-standard in this way: Why is it that when science seems to support theology, then we’re warned against not holding on to scientific discoveries too strongly since they could be overturned? But then the secular scientist, whose only game in town is gradualistic undirected evolution, confidently champions science as certain and fixed. In response, the Christian should say that the Christian faith is SUPPORTED by current scientific study, NOT that it is BASED UPON this. I think that we Christians can appropriate science to point people to God’s existence and involvement in the universe, but also that we remember that science should not be elevated to some pedestal of secular omniscience. Keep in mind that there was a time when many assumed the world never had a beginning, but the Christian assumed it did for theological reasons. Science came to the support of this assumption. Science didn’t determine this for the Christian, but helped reinforce it.

Vance, you say, “I don’t think there can ever be any negative evidence for God in any degree of knowledge we arrive at.” Don’t you think there could be negating evidence? If, say, the universe were eternal, that would be problematic for at least the Jewish-Christian doctrine of creation out of nothing, which the Scriptures affirm. Also, why wouldn’t we think we could expect to see positive evidence of God in these processes (Psalm 19:1)? Keep in mind that, as Robert Jastrow wrote, the discovery of the Big Bang surprised everyone except the theologians, who had been affirming that God created it all from nothing. If the heavens are declaring the glory and wisdom of God, shouldn’t there be some positive evidence to scope out?

Regarding the claim that we would have complexity no matter what, this isn’t the way the evidence points (again, see Dennett’s earlier quotation). As physicist Paul Davies acknowledged in *The Mind of God* (p. 16), “Through my scientific work I have come to believe more and more strongly that the physical universe is put together with an ingenuity so astonishing that I cannot accept it merely as a brute fact.” Shock and surprise *are* appropriate when we see the remarkably delicate balance in the universe. Clearblue’s use of John Leslie’s firing squad example is indeed apt. Furthermore, Vance’s use of the “lottery” incorrectly suggests that the universe’s arrangement is a one-shot deal. As Clearblue suggests, the more appropriate analogy is winning the lottery over and over and over again. The delicate balance is an ongoing requirement for the conditions of life, and even if we have a life-*permitting* universe, that’s no guarantee that it’s going to be life-*producing*. If God exists, however, this is the kind of phenomenon we can reasonable *expect*; we wouldn’t rightfully expect this given unguided naturalism—and this strikes me as an important argument favoring design. This is important: Given the backdrop of naturalism, we wouldn’t expect such a universe; given God’s existence, however, we are much better positioned to expect such fine-tuning.

Also, science in the past couple of centuries has come to rule out final (teleological) causation in favor of efficient (productive) causality alone. However, this is a philosophical move, not a scientific one. In our everyday lives we are familiar with both mind-directed (final/teleological) causes and efficient causes. In one case, personal agents are involved; in the other, non-conscious processes are involved.

Well, that’s about all I have time for right now. Thanks again for your terrific interaction. I’ll try to interact with any follow-up comments. I’ll be posting soon on a different topic—on taking Calvinism too far, indeed to heterodox conclusions.